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Abstract
Dynamic malware analysis is fast gaining popularity over static analysis since it is
not easily defeated by evasion tactics such as obfuscation and polymorphism. During
dynamic analysis, it is common practice to capture the system calls that are made to
better understand the behaviour of malware. System calls are captured by hooking
certain structures in the Operating System. There are several hooking techniques that
broadly fall into two categories, those that run at user-level and those that run at kernel-
level. User-level hooks are currently more popular despite there being no evidence
that they are better suited to detecting malware. The focus in much of the literature
surrounding dynamic malware analysis is on the data analysis method over the data
capturing method. This thesis, on the other hand, seeks to ascertain if the level at
which data is captured affects the ability of a detector to identify malware. This is
important because if the data captured by the hooking method most commonly used is
sub-optimal, the machine learning classifier can only go so far. To study the effects of
collecting system calls at different privilege levels and viewpoints, data was collected
at a process-specific user-level using a virtualised sandbox environment and a system-
wide kernel-level using a custom-built kernel driver for all experiments in this thesis.
The experiments conducted in this thesis showed kernel-level data to be marginally
better for detecting malware than user-level data. Further analysis revealed that the
behaviour of malware used to differentiate it differed based on the data given to the
classifiers. When trained on user-level data, classifiers used the evasive features of
malware to differentiate it from benignware. These are the very features that malware
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uses to avoid detection. When trained on kernel-level data, the classifiers preferred to
use the general behaviour of malware to differentiate it from benignware. The implic-
ations of this were witnessed when the classifiers trained on user-level and kernel-level
data were made to classify malware that had been stripped of its evasive properties.
Classifiers trained on user-level data could not detect malware that only possessed ma-
licious attributes. While classifiers trained on kernel-level data were unable to detect
malware that did not exhibit the amount of general activity they expected in malware.
This research highlights the importance of giving careful consideration to the hook-
ing methodology employed to collect data, since it not only affects the classification
results, but a classifier’s understanding of malware.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
Over the last two decades, worldwide Internet usage has grown at a remarkable rate.
As of 2018 there were 3.8 billion users worldwide [11]. All of these users are able
to share data with one another with minimal effort. While this provides countless op-
portunities, it also can be problematic. This is because the breakdown of borders also
allows malicious software, otherwise known as ‘malware’, to spread without hindrance
between users. Understandably, this provides the potential for malware to have a con-
siderable impact in the world. In the past, the payload of malware would take the form
of a practical joke making the user very aware of its presence [61]. For example, when
a computer was infected with the Cascade virus, it would cause the characters on the
screen to drop to the bottom of the screen [2]. While this was an annoyance, it was not
explicitly harmful. Malware has evolved considerably since then. With the introduc-
tion of Internet banking and the increase in the amount of sensitive information being
stored online, malware authors have far greater incentive to steal data. To complement
that, malware stopped making its presence known to the victim and even attached it-
self to legitimate programs to trick the user into downloading it [106]. However, as
malware was getting more complex, paradoxically, it was also getting easier to create
through the introduction of toolkits capable of automatically producing malware with
just a click such as the Virus Creation Laboratory (VCL) [17] and PS-MPC [13]. To
counter the growing threat of malware, security measures such as two-factor authen-
tication became the norm. In response, malware authors varied their tactics. One of
the more successful methods by which malware authors obtain capital is through the
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use of ransomware. Ransomware is a class of malware that prevents a user from ac-
cessing a core component on their machine and demands a payment for the release
of that component [101]. The locked component in question can range from a user’s
personal files to the entire machine. Ransomware falls into two categories; Locker
and Crypto [138]. Locker ransomware simply blocks access to the installed Operating
System (OS), typically by altering the boot loader in order to force the computer to
boot into a constrained interface that only allows the user to enter a code to release
their machine (which is provided after the exchange of money in some form). Crypto
ransomware generally encrypts the files in a user’s home directory and demands a pay-
ment from the user in exchange for the decryption key. Locker ransomware typically
locks the user’s machine without actually altering any of their files, making it trivial for
a user to get access to their original files. In contrast, crypto ransomware can be chal-
lenging to recover from, particularly if a sophisticated encryption algorithm is used.
This strain of malware alone has caused financial losses in the millions [184].
Malware’s impact is not limited to financial. In 2010 the potential threat of malware
was further emphasised with the discovery of Stuxnet [85]. Unlike malware before it,
Stuxnet did not attempt to cause financial damage or steal information, it was created
to cause physical damage. Specifically, it was a piece of malware written to target and
damage industrial control systems [85]. It did not stop there as the discovery of Stuxnet
inspired a number of other malware families such as Duqu and Flame [45]. Currently
malware is growing at alarming rates, with 350,000 new samples released everyday
[31].
Malware analysts initially responded to the threat of malware by employing simple
static analysis techniques. Static analysis refers to the analysis of a sample (usually
its code) without ever actually running the sample. An example of such a technique
is doing a simple string scan to find identifying byte patterns whilst maintaining some
flexibility by allowing for a certain number of mismatches [241]. The identifying sig-
nature created from static analysis is syntactic in nature. The advantage of this is that it
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is relatively quick to scan a sample which is imperative given the speed at which new
malware is produced. The Sapphire worm, for example, was able to infect 90% of its
targets within 10 minutes [170]. However, static analysis struggled significantly with
the introduction of toolkits such as the Mutation Engine (ME) [3] that could automat-
ically obfuscate code within malware by adding junk code for example. The release
of such toolkits made obfuscation techniques much more commonplace in malware
[39]. To overcome this, techniques such as smart scanning were used where ineffect-
ive instructions (such as NOP instructions) were removed/ignored when scanning the
malware sample [241]. The biggest challenge came when malware authors started
encrypting their samples. Malware analysts relied on the malware author using a re-
cognisable encryption algorithm with an insecure key or that the decryption routine
within the sample was easily decipherable. Unless a sample is decrypted, it is difficult
for an antivirus to find identifying bytes in its code [162, 171]. A prime example was
Lexotan32 [21]. Though it has been around since 2002, only 12.6% of samples were
identified by 40 virus scanners in 2009 [151]. In addition, though static analysis has the
benefit of speed when it comes to producing signatures, it lacks robustness. The storm
worm took advantage of this. Its writer produced many short lived variants on a daily
basis [119]. Antivirus companies struggled to keep up with it as for each variant, they
needed to produce another signature [128]. Subsequently as the amount of obfuscation
being added to malware grew, it became clear to analysts that static analysis contained
limitations that could not be overcome.
Therefore, behavioural analysis was proposed as a remedy to the shortcomings of static
analysis. Behavioural or dynamic analysis involves running the binary and observing
its behaviour. Since code obfuscation does not alter the general behaviour of malware,
behavioural detection is not affected by such techniques. Further, since the behaviour
of malware is analysed, the signatures produced are much more generic (since there are
some behavioural patterns common to many malware samples) [128]. However, with
the introduction of dynamic analysis, malware started employing features to evade dy-
namic analysis as well. The main aim with these techniques was to avoid displaying the
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malicious behaviour when being analysed. This would prevent analysts from making
representative signatures of the malicious sample. An example of a method malware
could use to achieve this is by not executing for 24 hours after it has been run. This is
effective because typically dynamic analysis does not run for more than a few minutes
(given the amount of malware being produced), therefore, delaying execution prevents
an analyst from observing any malicious behaviour. Alternatively malware could at-
tempt to detect peculiarities in the environment it’s being executed in since dynamic
analysis is normally performed on a virtual or emulated machine, and if malware de-
tects artefacts indicative of a virtual environment, it can simply not run. Additionally,
malware can attempt to subvert the data collection mechanism used within dynamic
analysis to capture a sample’s behaviour. The most popular way to capture a sample’s
behaviour is by collecting the system calls made. A system call is a request made to the
OS for some functionality. This could include reading or writing to a file or displaying
something on the screen, amongst many other things. Ultimately, for a sample to do
anything significant, it needs to use system calls. Therefore if malware can prevent
having its calls monitored and logged, it can hide its behaviour from the monitoring
tool. System calls are captured using whats known as a hook. A hook modifies the
standard execution pathway by inserting an additional piece of code into the pathway
[208]. There are a number of methods by which hooks can be performed. Broadly
speaking, those methods fall into two categories, those that run in user-mode and those
that run in kernel-mode. The terms user and kernel mode are labels assigned to specific
Intel x86 privilege rings built into their microchips. Privilege rings relate to hardware
enforced access control. Traditionally, there are four privilege rings and they range
from ring 0 to ring 3 [219]. Windows only uses two of these rings, ring 0 and ring 3.
Ring 0 has the highest privileges and is referred to as kernel mode (this is the privilege
most drivers run at) by the Windows OS. Ring 3 has the least privileges and is referred
to as user mode (and is the level of privileges that most applications run at) [210]. The
focus of this research is on Windows because it is still the most targeted OS by malware
as reported in [30, 100, 239].
1.0 Introduction 5
User-mode hooks tend to only record system/API calls made by a single process since
they usually hook one process at a time, whilst kernel-mode hooks are capable of
recording calls made by all the running processes at a global, system level. This is an
important difference as malware may choose to inject its code into a legitimate process
and carry out its activities from there (where it is less likely to be blocked by the
firewall). Alternatively, malware could divide its code into a number of independent
processes as proposed by [202] so that no single process in itself is malicious, but
collectively, they succeed in achieving a malicious outcome. Therefore the choice of
hooking methodology could affect the quality of the data gained. Another difference
between kernel and user level hooks is that each one hooks into a different Application
Programming Interface (API). For example, one type of kernel level hook intercepts
calls within the SSDT whose calls are similar to those found in the native API, which
is mostly undocumented, whilst user mode hooks typically hook the Win32 API which
is documented [174]. Although methods in the Win32 API essentially call methods
in the native API, there may be some methods in the native API that are unique to
it (since it is only supposed to be used by Windows developers) [49], likewise, there
are some user level methods that do not make calls into the kernel. Therefore, it is of
paramount importance that the difference in utility between data collected at each level
is objectively studied so that analysts can make an informed choice on which type of
data collection method to use.
As is evident, if malware intends to prevent a monitoring tool from capturing it’s beha-
viour via system calls, the technique it chooses to use will differ depending on which
hooking methodology it intends to evade [220]. Consequently, if a piece of malware
is focused on avoiding a particular type of hooking methodology, it is likely that any
analysts using that methodology to monitor malware will see a very different picture to
those using another methodology. Though the data collection method may seem trivial,
the choice of method can have a significant impact on results as evasive methods are
not uncommon; in fact, one study found evasive behaviour in over 40% of the samples
they analysed [65].
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From studying the existing literature, it has been made evident that the majority of the
literature captures user level calls as shown in table 2.1 in chapter 2. This suggests that
researchers believe that user level data has more utility than kernel level data, or that
they are yet to consider there to be a significant difference between either type of data
for the purposes of detecting malware. Although there are kernel level tools available,
they are not as popular as user level tools. Thus, given the aforementioned evasion
concerns and fundamental differences in each class of hooking methodology, one of
the motivations of this thesis is to study the differences in data collection at kernel
and user level, and consider whether it effects a machine learning method’s ability to
classify the data.
As malware has undergone a number of transformations over the years, and continues
to evolve and adapt, particularly with regard to evasion techniques, it is not feasible
to expect experts to continuously update heuristics for detecting malware. Therefore,
both static and dynamic analysis have moved towards using machine learning classifi-
ers to detect malware since they can automatically update themselves when presented
with new samples. Machine learning methods are not without weaknesses though, it’s
important that their learning is monitored to ensure that the features they are using to
differentiate malicious from benign are sensible and not due to chance. This is im-
portant because if they are identifying malware using a feature not common amongst
malware but common amongst the dataset they have been trained with, they are likely
to perform poorly when placed in a real environment. For example, it is likely that
malware would exhibit many more evasive properties within a training/virtual environ-
ment than when encountered in a real environment. Therefore, it is not enough to view
a classifier’s accuracy when assessing it’s performance, it must be dissected in order to
understand its reasoning.
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1.1 Contributions
The main contribution from this thesis is the study of the differences in data collection
at kernel and user level, and its effect on a machine learning algorithm’s ability to clas-
sify the data. This motivates the hypothesis that the features of malware that are used to
differentiate it from benignware1 will differ based on the data capturing method used.
This will provide insights into the utility of the different forms of data collected from a
machine when observing potentially malicious behaviour. Furthermore, given that the
majority of malware is likely to first assess the environment it is running in before ex-
hibiting malicious behaviour, and that machine learning classifiers are typically trained
on a few minutes of activity, this research evaluates whether machine learning classifi-
ers are identifying malware through their evasive and anti-vm behaviour as opposed to
malicious behaviour. This is particularly important in the cyber-security domain where
the focus tends to be on the data analysis method over the data capturing method.
In order to test the hypothesis, a Kernel Driver was implemented that hooks the entire
SSDT with the exception of one call as its internal behaviour prevented it from being
hooked safely. A tailor-made kernel driver had to be used since many of the existing
tools that hook the SSDT only monitor calls in a specific category (such as calls relat-
ing to the file system or registry) and provide no objective justification as to why they
chose the calls they did (if they even make that information available). Therefore, the
kernel driver used in this research hooks all the calls in the SSDT to ensure that no
subtle details regarding malware behaviour are missed and in order to make an object-
ive recommendation on the most important calls to hook when detecting malware. The
kernel driver used is also unique in that it collects the SSDT data at a global system-
wide level as opposed to a local process-specific level. In doing this, this research can
answer the question of whether collecting data at a global level assists in detecting mal-
ware or whether it is simply adding noise. In order to gather user level data to compare
with the driver, Cuckoo Sandbox is used since it is the most popular malware analysis
1Benignware refers to any software that behaves as advertised without any malicious intent
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tool operating at a user level (as shown in Table 2.1 in chapter 2). The data gathered
from the driver and Cuckoo is then used to experiment with state of art machine learn-
ing techniques to better understand the implications of monitoring machine activity
from different perspectives. Alongside the general insights gained from classifying the
data, specialised feature ranking methods are employed to provide insights concerning
the behaviour of malware that is utilised by the classifiers in order to distinguish it. In
the interests of transparency and reproduce-ability, the source code of the kernel driver
has been made available at [176] and the data from the experiments available at [175].
The driver can be installed on any system running Windows XP 32-bit as this was the
platform targeted. However it can also easily be extended to run on Windows 7.
The research questions that this thesis aims to answer are the following:
RQ1 Does data collected at different privilege levels during dynamic malware analysis
affect classification results?
RQ2 Is data collected at a global level more beneficial for dynamic malware analysis
than that collected at a local level?
RQ3 How does the understanding of malware differ at a kernel and a user level?
RQ4 Does the traditional Dynamic Malware Analysis process create a bias in the data
collected and subsequently classified?
RQ5 How much malicious behaviour can a malware sample exhibit before it is detec-
ted?
RQ6 Are high-level languages such as Java suitable for emulating malware to test
system call monitoring tools?
RQ7 How can the dynamic malware analysis process be amended to prevent uninten-
ded security flaws from emerging?
In answering these questions, the following contributions are made:
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C1 This thesis contributes an extensive survey and review of dynamic malware ana-
lysis tools used or proposed in the literature. Such a survey (despite its import-
ance) has never been conducted before, particularly in such depth. This survey
provides information such as the progress made with regards to each hooking
methodology, the most popular hooking methodology, and the most popular tool
for dynamic analysis.
C2 This thesis contains the first objective comparison on the effectiveness of kernel-
and user-level calls for the purposes of detecting malware.
C3 This research assesses the usefulness of collecting data for malware detection at
a global system-wide level as opposed to a local individual process level, giving
novel insights into data science methods used within malware analysis.
C4 This research assesses the benefits, or otherwise of combining kernel and user
level data for the purposes of detecting malware.
C5 This research studies and identifies the features contributing to the detection of
malware at kernel and user level and the number of features necessary to get sim-
ilar classification results, providing valuable knowledge on the forms of system
behaviour that are indicative of malicious activity.
C6 This research assesses whether popular classifiers can generalise to detect ransom-
ware that does not contain the most distinguishing features that were found in
chapter 3.
C7 This research assesses whether kernel-level or user-level data is better at gener-
alising towards malware that does not contain the distinguishing features found
in chapter 3.
C8 This research determines the sensitivity of classifiers trained in the traditional
dynamic malware analysis process to changes in system calls made.
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C9 This research contributes a driver that hooks all but one call in the SSDT and
gathers calls at a global level.
C10 The findings from this research are generalised to inform the general dynamic
malware analysis process.
1.2 Thesis Structure
The outline for the remainder of this thesis is as follows:
Chapter 2 — Background: This section contains the motivation for the remainder of
the thesis. It provides a description of static and dynamic analysis; the motivation for
moving towards dynamic analysis over static analysis; a summary of the data collection
methods within dynamic analysis; the favoured methodology and a summary of the
progress made for each methodology; and a summary of the place of machine learning
in the dynamic analysis process, the most common algorithms employed, and their
limitations. The contribution found in this chapter is C1.
Chapter 3 — Comparison of User-level and kernel-level data for dynamic mal-
ware analysis: This chapter compares the utility of user level and kernel level data for
detecting malware in the traditional dynamic malware analysis process. In addition,
the features contributing most towards the results are analysed to determine how the
classifiers are making their predictions. This chapter contributes C2, C3, C4, C5 and
C9.
Chapter 4 — Assessing the effectiveness of classifiers to detect non-evasive mal-
ware: Building on the previous chapter, this chapter assesses the robustness of clas-
sifiers that are created using the traditional dynamic malware analysis process. To
assist with this, a Java based program called Amsel is used to emulate malware lacking
evasive properties. This chapter contributes C6 and C7.
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Chapter 5 — Testing the robustness of emulated ransomware results: Inspired
by the results of the previous chapter, this chapter assess the correctness of emulated
malware that is written in high-level languages such as Java. In addition, this chapter
determines how sensitive classifiers trained on system calls are to small changes in
system calls. This chapter contributes C8.
Chapter 6 — Discussion: This chapter generalises the lessons learned from chapter 3,
chapter 4 and chapter 5 to provide recommendations regarding how dynamic malware
analysis should be carried out going forward. This chapter also discusses the limita-
tions with this work and the next steps. The contribution in this chapter is C10.
Chapter 7 — Conclusion: This chapter summarises the research conducted in this
thesis.
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Chapter 2
Background
This chapter introduces the field of malware analysis and describes the state of the art
tools in the field. Importantly, this chapter contains our first contribution:
C1 This thesis contributes an extensive survey and review of dynamic malware ana-
lysis tools used or proposed in the literature. Such a survey (despite its import-
ance) has never been conducted before, particularly in such depth. This survey
provides information such as the progress made with regards to each hooking
methodology, the most popular hooking methodology, and the most popular tool
for dynamic analysis.
2.1 The Problem of Malware
Malware, short for Malicious Software, is the all-encompassing term for unwanted
software such as Viruses, Worms, and Trojans. The problem of malware is significant;
AVTEST register 350,000 new malware samples every day and recorded a total of
885.24 million malware samples in 2018 [31]. The prime target for malware in 2018
was the Windows OS, with 64% of the samples targeting it [30]. Therefore the focus
of this research is on defending Windows against malware. The volume of malware
produced for this OS alone is far too much for a human analyst to analyse manually.
This also creates an incredible challenge for antivirus companies since their solutions
are only as secure as their databases are up-to-date [148]. Therefore, there is a need for
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solutions capable of automatically analysing and classifying unseen malware samples
without being overly reliant on signature databases or heuristics.
Malware can be analysed in one of two ways; statically and dynamically. The main
difference between the two methods is that static analysis involves studying a binary
without executing it. Whereas dynamic analysis consists of executing the binary and
analysing its behaviour while it is running [227].
2.2 Static Analysis
Static code analysis involves studying the suspicious file and looking for patterns in its
structure that might be indicative of malicious behaviour without ever actually running
the file. In most cases, the file being studied during static analysis is the compiled file,
since malware authors seldom share the source code of the binary [80, 266]. There-
fore, the typical features that are extracted during static analysis include system calls,
strings, header information, opcodes and byte n-grams [266]. System calls are calls
made to the OS when a binary requires it to perform some operation for it such as
opening and writing to a file. Strings refers to all the strings extracted from a sample
by interpreting every byte of the binary as a string. While this can produce a lot of
noise, it can also reveal a lot about a file such as the function names used by the mal-
ware author, names of directories and even IP addresses. Header information refers
to the structural information of the sample-specific to its file-type. Opcodes (short for
Operation Codes) refers to the assembly instructions within the sample. Similarly, byte
n-grams are sequences of n bytes extracted from the binary and used as features. The
most popular tool used to extract this information is IDA Pro [116].
The main benefit of performing static analysis is efficiency. Since feature extraction
only consists of going through the code of the binary, analysis is rapid. This is ideal
for real-world scenarios where security solutions need to operate in real-time. It is
for this reason that static analysis is frequently used in Antivirus solutions [148]. An-
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other benefit of static analysis is that the analyst can observe the entirety of the sample,
whereas, with dynamic analysis, the portion of the sample analysed is the portion dis-
played for the duration of the execution [266]. The final main benefit provided by static
analysis is safety. The chances of cross-contamination occurring during static analysis
are extremely slim since the binary file does not need to be run to be analysed.
However, static analysis has been losing popularity due to its inability to deal with
obfuscated and polymorphic malware [171, 162]. Polymorphic malware is malware
that encrypts itself and changes the key it uses to encrypt itself every time it propag-
ates. Some of the polymorphic malware samples even alter the decryption routine
used on each propagation [20]. Obfuscation refers to strategies used by malware au-
thors to make their code seem more benign. Obfuscation techniques include code
integration, code transposition, dead code insertion, instruction substitution, register
reassignment, and subroutine reordering [269]. Broadly speaking, these techniques
alter the code (source or compiled) so that the malware sample’s signature changes
significantly while ensuring that the malware sample behaves in the same way. The
main challenge with statically analysing obfuscated or polymorphic malware is that
unless the obfuscation technique or encryption algorithm can be detected and reversed,
the information extracted from the binary file is likely to be heavily skewed [162]. The
problem is further compounded by the fact that it is relatively easy for malware authors
to add polymorphism and obfuscation to their samples due to the prevalence of tools
available to automate the task [266]. One study found that 92% of malware samples
contained obfuscation of some sort [53].
The problems with static analysis have been studied in great depth in the literature.
[171] showed that commercial antivirus solutions were unable to deal with malware
with very simple obfuscation applied to it. To remedy this [72] proposed semantics-
aware static analysis. Semantics aware analysis defines a blueprint for general beha-
viours (such as a decryption loop) that can be compared to specific instructions within
a binary to check for a match. This has the benefit of not being reliant on specific re-
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gisters or instructions since it is looking for behaviours rather than exact code matches.
This makes it resilient to obfuscation techniques such as register reassignment (where
the registers used in malware are changed to evade detectors). However, [171] showed
that even semantic aware static analysis could be evaded by adding complex obfusca-
tions to important constants so that their values could only be determined at run-time.
Recently, [75] compared the performance of static, dynamic, and hybrid (combination
of static and dynamic data) techniques of gathering data when classifying malware,
and found that a fully dynamic approach produced the best classification results. As
a result, research (including this thesis) is now focused on dynamic analysis due to its
potential. While there is still some research in semantic-aware static analysis, given
that semantic-aware static analysis attempts to recognise the behaviour of malware, it
is undoubtedly more reliable to simply observe the behaviour of malware as dynamic
analysis does.
2.3 Dynamic Analysis
Dynamic behavioural analysis involves running the binary in a controlled environment,
such as on an emulator, or Virtual Machine (VM), and searching for patterns of OS calls
or general system behaviours that are indicative of malicious behaviour. Behavioural
analysis has gained popularity over static analysis since it runs malware in its preferred
environment making it harder to evade detection completely. Dynamic analysis can be
deployed as part of an anti-malware solution much like static analysis. However, it can
also be used to complement traditional analysis techniques when those techniques are
unable to confidently classify a sample.
Due to the fact that dynamic analysis involves running malware samples, there is a
risk of cross-contamination. To mitigate that risk, samples tend to be run within an
isolated/semi-isolated environment, where it is easy to revert the system back to a
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clean state when necessary. This can be achieved using virtualisation or emulation.
Virtualisation allows a user to run multiple machines, referred to as ‘Virtual Machines’
on the same hardware [36]. A Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM) or Hypervisor is re-
sponsible for sharing resources between each of the VMs. The key with virtualisation
is that instructions are run on the hardware itself [149]. Whereas with emulation, the
hardware or OS is implemented in software [149]. Each method has its advantages and
disadvantages. Virtualisation provides the benefit of good performance since instruc-
tions are run on the actual hardware [149]. Emulation, on the other hand, allows an
analyst to gather detailed information regarding the execution of a sample since it is
implemented in software.
Finally, in order to conduct behavioural analysis, data relating to the sample’s beha-
viour must be extracted and logged during or after its execution. The type of data that
can be useful to gather includes CPU load, memory usage, disk accesses, and system
calls. The most popular mechanism in the literature for understanding malware’s beha-
viour during execution is through capturing the calls made to the OS, i.e. system calls
[203]. In broad terms, to capture system calls, a tool must create a hook into the OS or
monitored process. A hook modifies the standard execution pathway by inserting an
additional piece of code into the pathway [208]. This is done to interrupt the normal
flow of execution that occurs when a process makes a system call in order to document
the event. There are several methods to intercept system calls in Windows and these
fall into two general categories: those that run in user mode and those that run in kernel
mode [208].
The terms ‘user’ and ‘kernel’ mode are labels assigned to specific Intel x86 privilege
rings built into their microchips. Privilege rings relate to hardware enforced access
control. There are four privilege rings and they range from ring 0 to ring 3 [219].
Windows only uses two of those rings, ring 0 and ring 3. Ring 0 has the highest
privileges and is referred to as kernel mode (this is the privilege most drivers run at) by
the Windows OS. Ring 3 has the least privileges and is referred to as user mode (and
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is the privilege level that most applications run at) [210]. The main purpose of this
stringently enforced access control is to protect user applications from modifying parts
of memory belonging to the Operating System and causing a complete system crash.
However, this also means that anything running in kernel mode has complete access to
system memory and therefore must be designed with the utmost care [210].
Though system calls can be invoked at user-mode, their functionality is implemented
in kernel-mode. An example of the normal pathway for a system call in Windows is
shown in figure 2.1. From user mode, a process may call createFileA, createFileW,
NtCreateFile, or ZwCreateFile, however, ultimately, they all lead to the NtCreateFile
method in the SSDT. In order to provide the requested functionality, the processor
must move from Ring 3 (user level) to Ring 0 (kernel level). It does this by issuing the
sysenter instruction. Although createFileA has been shown to call NtCreateFile/Zw-
CreateFile in figure 2.1, strictly speaking, it calls createFileW. However, as they are
provided by the same library, they are shown at the same level. Figure 2.1 also shows
that, in the case of createFile, to get the same information in user-mode as kernel-mode,
more methods need to be hooked.
createFileA
User Mode
createFileW
NtCreateFile/ZwCreateFile NtCreateFile
Kernel Mode
sysenter
Figure 2.1: System call visualisation
Within user-mode and kernel-mode there are a number of methods by which system
calls can be intercepted. This is shown in figure 2.2.
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Figure 2.2: Methodologies by which system calls can be intercepted
There are a plethora of tools used to perform dynamic analysis. All the tools used
in the literature are shown in table 2.1. Therefore table 2.1 excludes any novel tools
that have not yet been used/tested by other papers. Table 2.1 contains six columns;
“Name” which is the name of the tool, “Description” which describes the hooking
methodology used by the tool, “Kernel Hook” which is marked if the tool employs a
hook at kernel level, “User Hook” which is marked if the tool employs a hook at user
level, “Functions Hooked” which mentions the categories of functions hooked, and
“Used By” which lists the papers that used that tool. For each tool mentioned in Table
2.1, if the tool was available online, it was tested in order to understand how it was
intercepting API-calls. Where the tool was not available, documentation was used to
determine the type of hook being used. To limit the length of the table, Table 2.1 only
contains tools that had been used at least once in the literature (i.e., at least one entry
in their “Used By” column).
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Table 2.1 shows that the majority of the tools used in the literature hook at the user-
level. The most popular tool of all is Cuckoo Sandbox [111] which employs an inline
hook to intercept API-calls. The most popular tool for monitoring at a kernel level
is Sysinternal’s Process Monitor [209]. However, two of the most well-known tools
for monitoring at a kernel level, TTAnalyze and CWSandbox, are now commercial
products called LastLine and ThreatAnalyzer [178]. In the following sections, we
describe each hooking methodology in more detail.
2.3.1 IAT Hook
An IAT hook modifies a particular structure in a Portable Executable (PE) file. The PE
file format refers to the structure of executable files, Dynamic Link Libraries (DLLs),
and similar files in Windows [195]. IAT hooks exploit a feature of the PE file format,
the imports that are listed in a PE file after compilation. Typically the IAT contains
a list of the external DLLs and functions that a program requires from the OS. When
the PE file is loaded into memory, each function listed in the IAT is mapped to an
address in memory. An IAT hook modifies the address in memory so that the import
points to an alternative piece of code rather than the required function [154, 49, 71].
Usually, after the alternative piece of code has done what it needs (such as log the call),
it calls the real import on behalf of the original code. Detecting the presence of an IAT
hook is quite trivial as one only needs to check that the addresses in the IAT actually
point to the correct module [118]. In addition, if malware wants to hide the names
of the functions it is using, it can simply import the LoadLibrary and GetProcAddress
functions supplied by Kernel32.dll to import DLLs and load the required functions on
demand. Due to its limitations, IAT hooks are not often used in the literature. One well
known tool employing an IAT hook is MicS [127], an automated malware analysis
system. In addition, an IAT hook is also used by STraceNT, a tool built to mimic the
functionality provided by the Unix tool ‘strace’.
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2.3.2 Inline Hook
An inline hook modifies the target function’s code within memory by adding a jump to
another piece of code belonging to an analysis engine for example. Once the analysis
engine has finished doing what it needs to (such as logging the call), it jumps back to
the original code in a process known as trampolining [124, 118]. When performing
this hook, the analysis engine must be careful not to overwrite important functionality
in the target function. The easiest way to avoid this is by overwriting the preamble
of a function as generally the first five bytes of a function in Windows is always the
same. The reason for this is that it allows the OS to be hot patched. Hot patching refers
to when fixes are made to a module within memory meaning that a system restart is
not required to enact the change [118]. Inline hooks suffer similar weaknesses to IAT
hooks in that they can be detected quite easily by scanning the code of the system
functions in memory and checking if they match the code on disk. However, inline
hooks are the most popular hooking methodology employed in the literature and are
used by the most popular tools, Cuckoo Sandbox [111] and CWSandbox [259]. Its
uptake was helped by the fact that Microsoft published the library they used to perform
inline hooking (in the context of hot-patching) known as Detours [124].
2.3.3 MSR Hook
An MSR hook essentially hooks the sysenter instruction. More specifically, it involves
changing the value of a processor-specific register referred to as the SYSENTER_EIP_MSR
register. This register normally holds the address of the next instruction to execute
when sysenter is called (which is called every time a system call is made). Therefore
if this value is altered, the next time the sysenter instruction is called, the new value in
the register will be the next instruction that is executed (which in this case can point
to the analysis engine). Since an MSR hook modifies a processor specific register, de-
velopers need to ensure that they modify the registers on each processor (since most
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systems nowadays contain multiple processors) [210]. There are few examples of an
MSR hook being used as a standalone method in the literature. Usually, it is employed
in the context of VMI solutions.
VMI solutions refer to those in which the malware analysis engine resides at the same
level as the Hypervisor or VMM. They tend to use Breakpoints or Page Faults to per-
form MSR hooks [99]. Breakpoints are placed in ‘interesting’ locations and whenever
one is reached, the VMM and thereby malware analysis engine are notified.
Since VMI solutions operate at the same level as the Hypervisor, this can provide be-
nefits such as the ability to monitor a VM without having a large presence on the VM
(and thereby making it harder for malware to detect the presence of the analysis en-
gine). The difficulty with monitoring at this level is that a “semantic gap” must be
bridged in some way. The semantic gap refers to the fact that when monitoring at
the VMM layer, much of the data available is very low level (such as register values).
This data is not at a level of granularity that is easy to interpret. Therefore, in order
to bridge that, solutions use a number of techniques to convert these values to more
abstract values. For example, as mentioned previously, VMI solutions use a variation
of the MSR hook whereby instead of placing the address of the analysis solution into
the SYSENTER_EIP_MSR register, an invalid value is placed into that register. As a
result, every time a system call is made and sysenter is called, a page fault will occur.
This will in turn lead to the VMEXIT instruction being called which will pass con-
trol to the VMI tool (since it operates at the same level as the hypervisor). The VMI
tool must then examine the value of the EAX register in order to find out the system
call made. Since monitoring system calls in this manner can have a significant impact
on performance, VMI tools usually limit their monitoring to a particular process. To
achieve this, the tool must monitor for any changes in the CR3 register. The CR3 re-
gister contains the base address of the page directory of the currently running process,
therefore, if the page directory address of the process of interest is known, then system
calls can be filtered to only those emanating from the process of interest.
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Unlike the previous two hooking methods, the VMI solutions in the literature are quite
varied in how they monitor malware and how they attempt to address some of the is-
sues inherent to VMI. The most well known VMI tool is TTAnalyze [38]. TTAnalyze
executes malware in an emulated environment (QEMU [43]) as opposed to a virtual
one. [38] argue that an emulated environment is harder for malware to detect since a
real system can be mimicked perfectly. However, this comes at the expense of per-
formance, as samples are executed significantly slower. Another well known tool in
this domain is Panorama [268]. Panorama is built on top of TEMU [235] (the dynamic
analysis component of BitBlaze [235] that can perform whole-system instruction-level
monitoring), and performs fine-grained taint analysis. Taint analysis refers to the act
of monitoring any data touched by the executable being analysed. The name stems
from the fact that data touched by the executable is subsequently considered ‘tainted’.
[235]’s contribution lies in the fine-grained taint tracking it performs, even recording
keystrokes among many other things. Ether [78] is also a popular tool employing VMI
that differs by exploiting Intel VT [250] which enables in-built processor support for
virtualisation and provides a significant performance boost when running a VM. Ether
is also particularly focused on not being detectable by malware and, as such, has very
little presence on the guest machine. Osiris [60] is similar to Ether, however, it man-
ages to perform an even more complete analysis by also monitoring any processes the
original process injects its code into. [155] propose DRAKVUF which focuses more on
reducing the presence of an analysis engine from the guest machine as normally there
is some code present on the guest to run the process being monitored or help the VMI
solution with the analysis. However, DRAKVUF employs a novel method to execute
malware using process injection and therefore doesn’t require any additional software
to be present on the guest. In addition, it monitors calls at both user and kernel level.
[188] take a different approach to VMI by using invalid opcode exceptions instead of
breakpoints to intercept system calls. Invalid opcode exceptions are raised if system
calls are disabled and a system call is then called. This, they argue, performs better. In
addition, their monitoring solution is not paired with a hypervisor but exploits a vul-
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nerability ([211]) to virtualise a live system, forgoing the need for a reboot to install
the monitoring solution.
While it’s clear that significant progress has been made with VMM solutions, there is
still a delay overhead incurred from the mechanism (breakpoints/page faults) that is
typically used to monitor API-calls. Ether, a well-known tool in this genre, was shown
to have approximately a 3000 times slowdown [264]. This, among other things, makes
it easier for malware to detect the presence of a monitoring tool by simply timing
how long it takes to execute an instruction. Furthermore, while some solutions have
managed to remove much of the presence of the analysis component from the machine
being monitored, this has the unfortunate effect of making it even more challenging to
bridge the semantic gap.
2.3.4 DBI
Instrumentation refers to the insertion of additional code into a binary or system for the
purpose of monitoring behaviour. Dynamic instrumentation implies that this occurs at
runtime [230]. Dynamic Binary Instrumentation is usually implemented using a JIT
compiler. In DBI, code is executed in basic blocks, and the code at the end of each
block is modified so that control is passed to the analysis engine where it can perform
a number of checks, such as whether a system call is being executed [54, 198]. Two of
the most popular frameworks for achieving dynamic instrumentation in Windows are
DynamoRIO [54] and Intel Pin [166].
The main limitation in solutions using JIT compilation is Self-Modifying and Self-
Checking (SM-SC) since DBI solutions can be detected by the modifications they make
to the code. Therefore, SPiKE [253] was proposed as an improvement to such tools
since it uniquely did not use a JIT compiler, but breakpoints in memory. Specifically,
it employs “stealth breakpoints” [252], that retain many of the properties of hardware
breakpoints, but don’t suffer from the limitation that pure hardware breakpoints do of
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only allowing the user to set between two and four. Through using such breakpoints,
it is harder to detect the presence of the monitoring tool and the tool is more immune
to SM-SC code. Reportedly, this even brought a performance gain. [198] built their
solution, Arancino, on top of Intel Pin which is focused on countering all known anti-
instrumentation techniques that are employed by malware to evade detection.
The problems that solutions in this space suffer from is performance and remaining
undetectable by malware. Though [198] make a considerable effort towards improving
this, they admit their solution is unlikely to be undetectable.
2.3.5 SSDT Hook
SSDT hooks modify a structure in kernel memory known as the System Service Descriptor
Table (SSDT). The SSDT is a table of system call addresses that the OS consults when
a process invokes a system call in order to locate the call. An SSDT hook replaces
the system call addresses with addresses to alternative code [208] [49]. SSDT hooks
have been used in a number of solutions proposed in the literature [158, 143, 109, 59],
however, the tools created have never hooked the entirety of the SSDT and therefore
the full potential of such a hook has never been truly studied. This may be because
while SSDT hooks provide the benefit of giving unprecedented access to the internals
of the kernel (allowing one to access system calls and argument values), they are not
supported by Windows and therefore are very challenging to implement (requiring a
great deal of reverse engineering). In addition, not only are SSDT hooks implemented
as kernel drivers, but they require a developer to alter parts of memory belonging to
the OS, therefore there is no room for error as any errors lead to immediate system
crashes.
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2.3.6 IRP Hook/Filter Driver
In IRP hooking, the analysis engine intercepts another driver’s IRPs [49, 208]. IRPs,
are used to communicate requests to use I/O to drivers. This is similar to filter drivers
which are drivers that essentially sit on top of another driver for a device intercepting
all the IRPs intended for that driver [256]. Filter drivers do not directly communic-
ate with the hardware but sit on top of lower-level drivers and intercept any data that
comes their way. The most well-known tools using filter drivers are Procmon [209]
and CaptureBAT [15]. Other examples in the literature where filter drivers are used are
[125] and [271].
The limitation with using filter drivers is that they cannot intercept the same breadth of
API-calls that other hooking methodologies can. They focus on the major operations
in particular categories (such as file system and registry).
2.3.7 Dynamic Analysis Limitations
Dynamic analysis is not without its weaknesses, it is common for malware to hide its
malicious behaviour if it detects that it is being analysed. A study of 4 million samples
found that 72% of the samples contained techniques to detect that they were being run
in a virtual environment [50]. There are a number of methods by which malware can do
this, however, essentially, all of them boil down to attempting to detect features unique
to the dynamic analysis process. An example of a method by which malware does
this is through detecting the environment it is being run in. Since dynamic analysis
is frequently carried out in a virtual or emulated environment, malware can look for
artefacts unique to those environments (in a process known as fingerprinting [179])
and alter its behaviour accordingly. An example of this would be a malware sample
looking for drivers or devices specific to a VM or emulator [98]. Another method
exploits the fact that in dynamic analysis, typically, a binary is not run for more than
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a few minutes, therefore, in order to evade detection, malware could simply delay
performing malicious activities for a few minutes (or even 24 hours). There are a
plethora of additional techniques by which malware can detect whether it is being
analysed or not, all of which are extensively documented in numerous places: [24,
179, 225, 65, 57, 98, 50].
In addition to those, more novel methods have been proposed that take advantage of
the manner in which calls are gathered and then analysed. [202] noticed that most ana-
lysis tools classified processes as malicious or benign one process at a time. Therefore,
they divided a chosen malicious sample into a number of processes that individually
would not be malicious, however, together, these processes could cooperate to achieve
the malicious outcome. They analysed the divided malicious sample using 43 differ-
ent Antiviruses and seven dynamic analysis tools (including Anubis [40], JoeBox [55],
and Norman Sandbox [234]) and found that it evaded detection in every case. [167]
automate the theory of the technique employed by [202] by producing a tool that when
given the source of a malicious sample is able to split it into a number of samples, spe-
cifically splitting the source whenever a potentially incriminating system call is used.
In addition, the tool added the required communication code between the samples cre-
ated. The resulting malware produced by their tool was tested on CWSandbox [259]
and Norman Sandbox [234] and succeeded in evading analysis. [236] evade system call
analysing tools by only ever calling a single system call from their malicious process
that tells a custom-made driver the actual system call the process wants called. Since
the driver runs at kernel mode, it can then call the system call directly (bypassing any
monitoring tools). In doing this, any tools gathering system calls only observe a single
system call coming from the malicious process.
2.3.8 Discussion
Unlike static analysis, in dynamic analysis the number of methods by which the same
information can be extracted (i.e. system calls) is significant. Therefore, the first de-
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cision an analyst must make when performing dynamic analysis is the method by which
they are going to extract system calls. The argument for hooking in user mode is that
the code analysing the sample is “closer” to the application being analysed since the
APIs hooked are the ones that developers are encouraged to use. More technically
speaking, within Windows, kernel-mode hooks tend to hook into what’s known as the
native API, which is mostly undocumented, whilst user mode hooks typically hook the
Win32 API which is documented since it is what Windows encourages developers to
use [174]. Therefore, the advantage of hooking into the Win32 API is that the analyst
is likely to observe the methods that the sample was programmed to call. Whereas,
with the native API, the analyst is likely to observe the methods that are called by the
methods the sample calls. Therefore, the calls made at the Win32 API are likely to
be easier to interpret since they provide more details. In addition, user-mode hooks
lend themselves naturally to hooking and monitoring a single process whereas with
kernel-mode hooks, additional code must be written in order to limit the information
to the process under investigation. This is illustrated in figure 2.3. Figure 2.3, though
simplistic, shows why a kernel-mode hook is better suited to monitoring at a global,
multi-process level. Obviously, there are many features missing from figure 2.3 (such
as communication with the Hardware), however, the main purpose of the diagram is
to show why kernel- and user-level hooks observe a different picture of the system.
Ultimately, despite it’s advantages, the main limitation with user-mode hooks is that
they operate at the same privilege level as the process being examined and therefore,
are much easier for the process being examined to evade and feed misinformation.
The main argument for hooking at kernel mode is that due to the heightened priv-
ilege, it is a lot harder for a malware sample to evade the analysis code. Further, while
user-level hooks can only hook a single process, a kernel-level analysis tool is capable
of observing much more since it has a system-wide view. This is an important dif-
ference as malware may choose to inject its code into a legitimate process and carry
out its activities from there (where it is less likely to be blocked by the firewall). Al-
ternatively, malware could divide its code into a number of independent processes as
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User-mode Hook
Process #1 Process #2 Process #3
NTDLL.DLL
Kernel-mode Hook
SSDT
Kernel Mode
User Mode
Figure 2.3: The different views of kernel and user-mode hooks illustrated
proposed by [202] so that no single process in itself is malicious, but collectively, they
succeed in achieving a malicious outcome. Therefore the choice of hooking method-
ology could affect the quality of the data gained. In addition, hooking the native API
has it’s advantages since malware may decide to directly call methods in the kernel to
evade user-level hooks. While methods called in the native API may not be as easy to
label as a particular behaviour, the advantage of hooking into the native API is that the
analyst mainly sees the important methods.
Regardless of the benefits of each data gathering method, it is clear that the manner in
which data is gathered is more than likely to affect the data obtained. Even methods
gathering data at the same privilege level may gather different data since each method
has its own weakness and is evaded differently [220]. This can be a significant concern
given the pervasiveness of evasive techniques in malware. Its important to emphasise,
that when the word “evasive” is used in this thesis, it is specifically referring to the
behaviours of malware that are used to prevent the data capturing component (hooking
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methodology) from capturing accurate information regarding the behaviour of mal-
ware whilst it is being run. Therefore, if two methods are gathering data at different
privilege levels, hooking into different APIs, and collecting data from different view-
points (local vs global), they are undoubtedly going to get very different views of the
malware sample and the system. Despite this, the focus in the literature of malware
analysis tends to be on the method used to classify the data rather than the actual data
itself. While the detection method is important, unless the data gathered is optimal, the
detection method can only go so far. This is also important because if the literature only
treats the detection method as the variable within malware analysis, it will be difficult
to assess whether an improvement in results is due to the novel detection method used
or the manner in which the data was gathered. Furthermore, while the majority of the
literature uses user-level tools to gather data, there is no evidence for their supremacy
or otherwise over kernel-level tools, despite the significant differences between them.
This provides the motivation for the first three research questions:
RQ1 Does data collected at different privilege levels during dynamic malware analysis
affect classification results?
RQ2 Is data collected at a global level more beneficial for dynamic malware analysis
than that collected at a local level?
RQ3 How does the understanding of malware differ at a kernel and a user level?
2.4 Classifying System Calls
Once system calls have been gathered, the patterns within them need to be extrac-
ted and converted into rules that can be used to distinguish malicious from benign.
While this can be performed manually by experts, the sheer volume of malware be-
ing produced makes this impossible. To obtain complete coverage over all malware
samples produced, an expert would have to analyse each new malware sample within
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1.6 seconds [218]. Therefore, rather than manually extracting patterns to identify mal-
ware from system calls, the process must be automated using machine learning.
In order to do this, the system calls that have been gathered must be be represented
in a form that can be understood by machine learning classifiers. The most common
method is to convert the data into numeric form. This can be as simple as representing a
sample as a frequency histogram showing how many times each system call was made
by that sample. Alternatively, it can be more complex, taking context into consideration
by using call sequences [186]. Regardless, once the data is represented numerically, it
can be passed to a machine learning classifier. Machine learning refers to the process
by which a machine automatically learns how to perform a task (such as distinguishing
malware from benignware). While machines can be manually programmed to perform
a task, some tasks can be very difficult to solve, and are therefore difficult to teach a
machine to perform in a robust manner that generalises well. Machine learning can
help with this.
Classification is the machine learning process in which a machine learning algorithm
is provided with input data and it predicts the category that the data belongs to based
on patterns within the data. In this case, the input data is the API calls made and
the output from the classifier is the label, ‘malicious’ or ‘benign’. There are a wide
range of classifiers that a malware analyst can use to analyse malware. They fall into
two general categories, supervised, and unsupervised. With supervised algorithms,
the classifier is trained on labelled data. In this case, that means that the classifier is
told which data comes from benign and which comes from malicious samples. With
unsupervised algorithms, the classifier is not told the class that the data belongs to
beforehand, it is up to the classifier to decide which data comes from which sources.
For the purposes of this study, however, this research will only focus on supervised
classifiers since they are better suited to this specific task, particularly given that the
number of classes is already known.
The focus of this thesis is to not only assess if there is a difference in the classifica-
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tion results but to understand the features causing the difference. It is for this reason
that deep learning is disregarded for the study. Deep learning is a machine learning
algorithm inspired by the structure of the brain and consists of a large array of neural
networks (similar to neurons in the brain) [104]. Deep learning algorithms are ex-
tremely complex and while deep learning produces promising results, the main aim of
this research is not to obtain exceptional results, but to better understand the difference
in the results. Given these conditions, the main classifiers used within dynamic mal-
ware analysis are summarised in table 2.2. Table 2.2 lists each classifier used within
the recent literature of dynamic malware analysis, provides a short description of the
classifier, and lists the papers that have used that classifier.
Table 2.2: Popular classifiers in Malware analysis
Classifier Description Used By
AdaBoost [91]
AdaBoost is a collection of weak classifi-
ers (frequently Decision Trees) on which
the data is repeatedly fitted with adjus-
ted weights (usually weighting misclassi-
fied samples more heavily) until, together,
the classifiers produce a suitable classific-
ation score or a certain number of itera-
tions are complete.
[244, 130, 133,
126, 273]
Decision Trees [52]
create if-then rules using the training data
which they then use to make decisions on
unseen data.
[244, 89, 25, 169,
95, 130, 120, 126,
132]
Gradient Boosting [92]
A more general version of AdaBoost that
uses a collection of weak learners (De-
cision Trees) and at each stage adds a new
learner to model by fitting the new learner
on the previous learner’s errors
[223, 126]
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Hidden Markov Model
(HMM)s
HMMs predict the values of some hid-
den state using only the current state (and
nothing before it)
[132]
Logistic Regression
One of the simplest classification al-
gorithms. It attempts to separate the data
using a linear boundary and therefore can
only be used if the output variable is cat-
egorical.
[126, 223]
Support Vector Ma-
chine (SVM) [74]
SVMs separate the data by finding the
hyperplanes that maximise the distance
between the nearest training points in
each class.
[244, 89, 25, 169,
95, 248, 130,
223, 165, 132,
226, 275, 242]
K-Nearest Neighbours
K-Nearest Neighbours picks representat-
ive points in each class and when presen-
ted with a new observation calculates its
proximity to the points and assigns it to
whichever is closest.
[130]
Naive Bayes [168]
Uses Bayes’ Theorem to predict the prob-
ability that a sample belongs to each cat-
egory (malicious or benign) and then as-
signs it the category with the highest
probability. It’s described as naive due to
the fact that it assumes that features are
independent [41]
[130, 275]
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Random Forest [51]
Random Forest, like AdaBoost, is a col-
lection of classifiers, and, like AdaBoost,
the classifiers are all decision trees. How-
ever, AdaBoost tends to employ shallow
decision trees while Random Forest tends
to use deep decision trees. Random Forest
splits the dataset between all the decision
trees and then averages the result.
[95, 213, 115,
244, 133, 120,
223, 165, 126,
197, 232, 132]
2.4.1 Limitations of Machine Learning
While machine learning equips a machine to automatically distinguish malicious from
benign without having to manually construct heuristics, it can still be exploited by
attackers in the form of adversarial attacks. An adversarial attack is a technique in
which confidently classified samples are altered using small, but tactical perturbations
in order to cause the classifier to incorrectly classify the sample with confidence. Ad-
versarial attacks first emerged in the field of image recognition, where the alterations
made to images was so slight that there was no observable difference between the ori-
ginal and altered images, however, state of the art classifiers incorrectly classified them
with extremely high confidence [240]. Adversarial attacks work by estimating the de-
cision boundaries of the classifier and then selectively altering input samples using the
smallest number of perturbations necessary so that they fall outside the decision bound-
ary. They can be white-box attacks, in which the attacker has complete access to the
classifier, its hyper-parameters, and the input samples it was trained on. Alternatively,
they can be black-box attacks where the attacker does not have access to the internals
of the classifier but can still view the final classification decision it makes [207, 270].
With white-box attacks, it is relatively trivial to find the classifier’s decision boundary
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due to all the information available to the attacker. However, with black box attacks,
the attacker must create a surrogate classifier that is trained on the classification de-
cisions made by the original classifier being attacked. Samples are then modified to
evade the surrogate classifier in the hope that they will also evade the classifier being
attacked [207]. These attacks have been quite successful as adversarial samples have
been found to be transferable between classifiers trained to make the same decision
[182]. The success of adversarial attacks in general is attributed to the linear behaviour
of some classifiers in high dimensions [103]. Within the field of image recognition,
adversarial attacks are performed through the use of minor perturbations to pixel val-
ues in images. In malware analysis, the general trend is to alter the API-calls called.
Attackers must take care when altering API-calls made by malware as they could un-
intentionally alter the behaviour such that it no longer executes. Therefore, most of the
literature does not subtract or remove system calls made, rather they only add calls to
avoid altering any of the malware’s existing behaviour. However, attackers still need
to be vigilant when adding calls to the feature space, as if a call to ExitProcess is ad-
ded, it would immediately end execution when called thereby significantly altering the
malicious sample’s behaviour.
[47] focus on adversarial attacks against Linear SVMs and Neural Networks using
malware embedded in PDF files. They consider two attack scenarios, one in which
the attacker has perfect knowledge of the model being attacked and one in which the
attacker has a limited knowledge of the model being attacked. They use gradient des-
cent as their attack strategy but they bias it by adding a ‘mimicry component’. The
mimicry component pushes the gradient descent towards the largest cluster of legit-
imate samples. They found that regardless of the information available to the attacker
regarding the target model, they were able to evade it with near identical probability.
In addition, they were able to evade Linear SVM models with as few as five to ten
modifications to a malicious file, whereas neural networks were slightly more robust.
[110] apply adversarial attacks to the field of malware analysis by attacking a neural
2.4 Classifying System Calls 42
network trained to detect malware that targets the Android platform. Specifically, they
train a neural network to obtain the current state-of-the-art performance that has been
achieved when classifying the DREBIN dataset [28] — a dataset consisting of mal-
ware for Android. The features used are API-calls gathered statically from malware
which are represented as a binary vector where ‘1’ means the corresponding call was
imported whilst a ‘0’ indicates otherwise. Adversarial samples are crafted by adding
features once they have deciphered which feature, when modified, would produce the
most change in the classifier’s output. They identify these features using the method
employed by [183] who take the derivative of the trained neural network with respect to
its input features. Through this they manage to make 63% of the previously detectable
malware samples undetectable.
[122] propose MalGAN, a adversarial neural network, which takes malware samples
and produces adversarial samples that can evade classifiers. They perform a black
box attack, assuming that access to the machine learning classifier’s internals is not
available. They tested MalGAN on a number of classifiers, namely, Random Forest,
Logistic Regression, Decision Tree, Support Vector Machine, Multi-Layer Perceptron,
and a voting based ensemble of these classifiers. They manage to alter malware samples
such that the accuracy of many of the classifiers fell from above 90% to 0%.
2.4.2 Discussion
It is clear that classifiers are not impenetrable, therefore, it’s imperative to understand
how the classifiers used are working and what their predictions are based on. This is
the motivation of the fourth and fifth research questions:
RQ4 Does the traditional dynamic malware analysis process create a bias in the data
collected and subsequently classified?
2.5 Emulating Malware 43
To answer this question, this research studies the features that the classifiers favour
when distinguishing malicious from benign (as stated in RQ3). This is done for both
the kernel-level and user-level data in order to better understand the differences in
viewpoints. This will also provide an understanding of the picture of malware that is
built up by classifiers. Using that, this research will test whether classifiers will be able
to correctly classify malware falling outside that picture. For example if classifiers
are distinguishing malware largely through its Internet usage, what happens when it
encounters malware that does not use the Internet? Alternatively, given the prevalence
of evasive features in malware, if solutions and classifiers are robust enough to detect
malware with evasive features, does that come at the cost of being able to detect other
features of malware that have nothing to do with evasion? This is investigated in the
fifth research question:
RQ5 How much malicious behaviour can a malware sample exhibit before it is detec-
ted?
2.5 Emulating Malware
To answer RQ5, an emulated malware generator is used to create malware that is mali-
cious but does not possess properties of malware that the classifiers rank highly. How-
ever, malware emulation is an extremely understudied field, with very few published
solutions.
Malware emulation/simulation suites are used for one of two purposes. To educate a
user to recognise malware, or to test an anti-virus [105]. One of the first educational
suites was the Virus Simulation Suite [117] written by Joe Hirst. It simulated the visible
and audible symptoms of malware. Virlab [84] is another well known educational
malware simulator. It simulates and visualises the spread of DOS viruses for users.
More recently, Spamulator [33] was created to educate students on spyware and bulk-
mailing spam. This was extended to also simulate drive-by download attacks [34].
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Threat Tracer [137] was proposed to demonstrate the risks of Advanced Persistent
Threats (APT). APTs are sophisticated attacks with a long term goal [63]. Threat
Tracer was recently extended to also simulate the Mirai Botnet [262]. However these
solutions represent the extent of malware simulators for educational purposes.
The literature on malware simulators for the testing of Anti-Viruses is also quite scarce.
The Rosenthal Virus Simulator [83] was the first in this category. It is capable of
producing harmless programs that contain virus signatures. Trojan Simulator [164]
goes slightly further, simulating a property of malware that ensures it is run every time
the machine is powered on. However, again, it simulates no malicious symptoms. More
recently, MalSim [156] was proposed. MalSim, written in Java Agent DEvelopment
framework (JADE) [44], is capable of simulating a rich set of malware variants in
addition to generic behaviours seen in malware. However it is careful not to do any
actual harm to the system. Unfortunately malware simulators that do not do any harm
to the system are quite limiting since the full extent of a malware detector cannot be
tested. For this reason, none of the proposed solutions are suitable in this research.
The solution chosen is Amsel [190], a Java-based malware emulator. It is described in
more detail in chapter 4.
One of the observations made from reviewing malware emulators is that Java [107] is
a common choice as a programming language [190, 156, 137, 262]. Java is a general
purpose programming language that is platform independent. In keeping with that, Java
provides the developer with generic methods, which the Java Virtual Machine (JVM)
then translates to more specific methods depending on the platform that the program is
being run on. The JVM is what every Java application runs inside (with a new instance
created for each application) [255]. In addition to running the Java program specified,
the JVM performs a number of jobs on behalf of the developer. For example, the JVM
carries out what is known as “Garbage Collection”. Garbage collection refers to the
free-ing of any memory no longer used by the Java program [255]. In lower-level
languages (such as C), tasks such as these would have to be performed manually by
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the programmer, and if the task is not carried out correctly, it can lead to errors that are
challenging to debug. Therefore, Java and the JVM in general allows the programmer
to focus more on implementing the functionality of the program without having to
worry about the minutiae of how that functionality is achieved.
While Java may provide convenience for programmers and lead to fewer errors in code
[194], there are questions around its suitability to emulate malware for the dynamic
malware analysis process. This is because, when using Java, the developer has very
little control over the exact system calls being made. Therefore, though Java can be
used to faithfully reproduce the effects of a malware infection, the developer has little
control over how the effects are executed. This is essential when monitoring solutions
are monitoring at a low level of abstraction. Furthermore, besides the lack of control on
how the specifics of the functionality are executed, the calls made by the JVM are also
mixed in with the calls made by the program being monitored (emulated malware in
this case). This means that calls made for benign purposes are mixed in with calls made
for a malicious purpose. For example, the garbage collector must periodically check
for any memory to free. This can throw off a machine learning classifier trained on
system call data. Conversely, in the C programming language, this must be performed
manually by the developer. As a result, the developer can minimise the amount of
interference from tasks such as these. Therefore this research also tests the robustness
of Java as a malware emulator. This is summarised in RQ6:
RQ6 Are high-level languages such as Java suitable for emulating malware to test
system call monitoring tools?
Finally, the findings made in this thesis are evaluated and generalised into principles,
that, if followed when performing dynamic malware analysis, will ensure that the res-
ults produced from the process are much more robust. This is summarised in the final
research question:
RQ7 How can the dynamic malware analysis process be amended to prevent uninten-
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ded security flaws from emerging?
47
Chapter 3
Comparison of User-level and
Kernel-level data for dynamic
malware analysis
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, data is collected on malware at the kernel and user level, and then passed
through a number of classifiers. The aim of this is to determine if there is a significant
difference in the ability of the same classifiers to detect malware when provided with
data at different privilege levels. Through doing this, the following research questions
will be answered in this chapter:
RQ1 Does data collected at different privilege levels during dynamic malware ana-
lysis affect classification results?
RQ2 Is data collected at a global level more beneficial for dynamic malware analysis
than that collected at a local level?
RQ3 How does the understanding of malware differ at a kernel and a user level?
In answering these questions, the following contributions are made:
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C2 This thesis contains the first objective comparison on the effectiveness of kernel
and user level calls for the purposes of detecting malware.
C3 This research assesses the usefulness of collecting data for malware detection at
a global system-wide level as opposed to a local individual process level, giving
novel insights into data science methods used within malware analysis.
C4 This research assesses the benefits, or otherwise of combining kernel and user
level data for the purposes of detecting malware;
C5 This research studies and identifies the features contributing to the detection
of malware at kernel and user level and the number of features necessary to
get similar classification results, providing valuable knowledge on the forms of
system behaviour that are indicative of malicious activity;
C9 This research contributes a driver that hooks all but one call in the SSDT and
gathers calls at a global level.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows; the ‘Method’ section describes
the experiments carried out, the ‘Results’ section describes and interprets the results
obtained from those experiments, and the ‘Conclusion’ section summarises the find-
ings.
3.2 Method
In order to conduct the experiments required for this study, 2500 malicious samples
were obtained from VirusShare [18] and 2500 benign samples were obtained from
SourceForge [14] and FileHippo [6]. This sample size correlates with dataset sizes
used in previous literature [245, 70, 75, 97]. The categories of malware collected for
the experiments are shown in table 3.1. Extracting categories for malware is a chal-
lenging task as there is no agreed naming convention for malware [135]. In order to
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obtain this information, VirusTotal [246] was used. VirusTotal scans any files a user
submits to it using over 60 different Antiviruses. It then reports the findings (amongst
a plethora of other information) from each of the antivirus products. If a file is found
to be malicious, VirusTotal shows the label attached to the file by each of the antivirus
products. Developers can access this information via VirusTotal’s API. One of the ob-
servations made during this research is that the Antiviruses within VirusTotal do not
often agree on the label they assign to malware. Furthermore, the naming conventions
used also tend to differ. Therefore, in order to get the most balanced view of the cat-
egories of malware, the labels given to a malware sample by each antivirus are used.
The labels don’t just identify the category of the malware sample, but also it’s family,
the Operating System it’s compatible with, the file format, the programming language,
the variant, and any additional information. Therefore, in order to obtain the category
of each malware sample, the label had to be split on a selection of punctuation char-
acters such as ‘:’ and ‘.’ since each antivirus product used such characters to separate
each piece of information. Then a number of heuristics were used to remove informa-
tion such as the platform or programming language and isolate the category assigned
to the malware sample by each antivirus. Finally, the category assigned to the malware
sample by the majority of vendors was used as the final category. Benign samples were
also run through VirusTotal to ensure that they were not malicious.
3.2 Method 50
Category Quantity
Trojan 1846
Virus 458
Worm 86
Rootkit 34
Ransomware 23
Adware 22
Keylogger 2
Spyware 2
Table 3.1: Quantity of each category of malware in the dataset
Due to the lack of agreement over the use of each of the terms in table 3.1, it is difficult
to objectively define each category. However, in general, the following is meant by
each category:
Trojan: Malicious samples disguised as benign samples are referred to as Trojans. A
user typically willingly downloads the infected file believing it to only perform the
benign function it advertises [134].
Virus: Viruses differ from Trojans in that they usually obtain access to the victim’s ma-
chine via a vulnerability. On infecting a host, they usually attempt to infect additional
files on the victim’s machine [134].
Worm: A worm is a self-replicating program capable of infecting multiple machines
via a network connection (unlike viruses). Worms are often employed in targeted at-
tacks where a particular user is the intended victim [134].
Rootkit: A rootkit is rarely found on its own but as part of another piece of mal-
ware. This is because the sole purpose of a rootkit is to hide the presence of a malware
sample. In addition, it is responsible for ensuring that the attacker continues to have ac-
cess to the machine. In order to hide the attackers presence from the antivirus, rootkits
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sometimes employ hooking techniques to control the output/feedback being given to
the antivirus by the OS. Therefore, it is quite common for rootkits to work in kernel-
mode due to the privileges it brings. This is important because if a monitoring solution
is only monitoring at a user-level, anything bypassing user-mode and going straight to
kernel-mode will not be recorded [49].
Ransomware: Ransomware takes a user’s files or machine hostage by preventing the
user from accessing them and then demands payment (usually in the form of a crypto-
currency) for their safe release.
Adware: Unlike many forms of malware, Adware make their presence known to a
user by bombarding them with advertisements [32]. Adware is delivered in a number
of ways, including as a hidden add-on to a program a user installs or as a drive-by
download [68].
Keylogger: Keyloggers silently record all keys pressed by a user and the application
they were pressed in. Keyloggers can come in the form of a hardware device or be
implemented in software. Within software, they can be implemented at user-mode or
kernel-mode.
Spyware: Spyware is known for its silent invasive monitoring of user activity and be-
haviour. Spyware is frequently paired with Adware and therefore has similar delivery
mechanisms to Adware.
To gather calls made at a kernel level, a Windows Kernel Driver was written to hook all
but one kernel call in the SSDT since none of the tools available currently provide this.
The only call the driver does not hook, NtContinue, was not hooked due to the fact that
hooking it produced critical system errors. A bespoke kernel driver had to be created
for this task since many of the existing tools that hook the SSDT only monitor calls
in a specific category (such as calls relating to the file system or registry) and have no
objective justification as to why they monitor those calls. Therefore, a bespoke kernel
driver was written to hook all the calls in the SSDT to ensure that it can detect any
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subtle details regarding malware behaviour. This also allows it to provide a more ob-
jective recommendation on the most important calls to hook when detecting malware.
Hooking all system calls is quite challenging as it requires exceptional performance on
the part of the kernel driver since as soon as its loaded, it is inundated with calls made
to the kernel. Therefore, if it cannot handle these rapidly, the system will crash. In
addition, due to the number of times some system calls are made, memory use must
be limited as much as possible, even ensuring each string is not taking up more space
then needed. Errors caused to the system by the driver are relatively easy to spot since
even the smallest of errors cause a blue screen of death. However, these can be quite
difficult to locate in the driver source code since the details about the cause of the error
are only made available through a memory dump. The driver was further stress-tested
using Driver Verifier [82]. Driver Verifier is a tool supplied by Windows that runs a
number of tests on a selected kernel-mode driver. Driver Verifier can check for er-
rors such as memory leaks and insufficient error handling (particularly with regards
to resource usage) amongst many other things. If Driver Verifier discovers an error,
it throws a system error (Blue Screen of Death), and provides details of the error in a
memory dump. In order to ensure correctness, the driver created in this research was
run through all the tests provided by Driver Verifier. In addition, the driver has been
written carefully to ensure that it does not gather data regarding its own behaviour, but
only behaviour external to it. The driver is unique in that it collects the SSDT data at
a global system-wide level as opposed to a local process-specific level. This has been
done to determine whether collecting data at a global level assists in detecting malware
or whether it is simply adding noise. Therefore, the data from the tool can be used to
predict whether the machine’s state is malicious or not.
While SSDT hooks have been used in drivers previously, they have not had as com-
prehensive a coverage of calls as the kernel driver used in this research has. [158]
employed an SSDT hook to automatically build infection graphs and construct signa-
tures for their system, AGIS (Automatic Generation of Infection Signatures). AGIS
then monitors a program to see if it contravenes a security policy and matches a signa-
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ture. Therefore, it only focuses on calls from a specific process and ignores all other
calls. [143] propose BareBox to counter the problems associated with malware cap-
able of detecting that it is being run in a virtual environment. BareBox runs malware
in a real system and is capable of restoring the state of a machine to a previous snap-
shot within four seconds. BareBox monitors what the authors perceive to be important
system calls using an SSDT hook. However, as the number of devices attached to the
machine increase, the time it takes BareBox to restore the system to a benign state
increases considerably. [109] propose BehEMOT (Behavior Evaluation from Malware
Observation Tool) which analyses malware in an emulated environment first, then in
a real environment if it does not run within the emulated environment. They use an
SSDT hook to monitor API calls relating to certain operations. However, by perform-
ing analysis on a real environment, BehEMOT suffers a similar problem to BareBox
in relation to restoration time. Furthermore, the focus with BehEMOT seems to be
producing human-readable and concise reports after each analysis and therefore, only
small-scale tests were conducted on a handful of samples.
As mentioned previously, the kernel driver created for this research differs from other
solutions using SSDT hooks in that they only log calls made to certain API calls by
certain processes. The bespoke kernel driver logs all calls (except one) by all processes
in order to determine their utility in classification. TEMU is the only tool to offer sim-
ilar functionality, however, where it differs is that it runs in an emulated environment
(which is easier for malware to detect [57]) and is focused on providing instruction-
level details as opposed to high-level system calls.
To gather user level data, a third party tool that is readily available was used since
there are already well established solutions providing this. Specifically, the tool used is
the one that is most frequently mentioned in the existing literature - Cuckoo (specific-
ally, Cuckoo 2.0.3). Cuckoo is a sandbox capable of performing automated malware
analysis. Cuckoo provides a whole host of features from simulated user interactions
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with the desktop to VM hiding techniques to prevent malware from detecting its en-
vironment. In addition, since Cuckoo is open source, it integrates with a number of
other tools such as inetsim [123], volatility and many others. When given a sample,
Cuckoo can return the VirusTotal [246] results, a memory dump, the network capture
and system calls, amongst many other things. For the purposes of this research, only
the system calls returned are used. As mentioned previously, Cuckoo intercepts system
calls using an inline hook.
The experiments for this research were carried out on a virtual machine with Windows
XP SP3 installed. The reason for choosing Windows XP was that writing a kernel
driver, particularly one delving in undocumented parts of Windows, is frustratingly
challenging. However, this is made slightly easier in Windows XP due to the fact
that it has slowly become more documented through reverse engineering. Another
reason for choosing XP is that all 64 bit systems are backwards compatible with 32
bit binaries [112] and the most commonly prevailing malware samples in the wild are
also 32 bit [62] (with not a single 64-bit sample appearing in the top ten most common
samples). As of 2016, AVTEST found that 99.69% of malware for Windows was 32
bit [31]. The reason for the popularity of 32 bit malware samples over 64 bit is that
its scope is not limited to one architecture. Therefore, given the current prevalence of
32 bit malware, it did not seem that using Windows XP would make the results any
less relevant especially since the method used could be repeated on other versions of
Windows and it would simplify the already challenging engineering task. The host
OS was Ubuntu 16.04 and the Hypervisor used was VirtualBox [12]. Both the host
and guest machine had a connection to the Internet. In order to ensure fairness and
to provide automation, the simulated user interaction features present within Cuckoo
were implemented for the kernel driver. Aside from the sample being investigated and
simulated user behaviour, the only other processes running on the guest machine were
the standard Windows processes. Figure 3.1 shows the system diagram used for this
research describing the entire experimental process in order to obtain the results.
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Figure 3.1: Workflow Diagram of the proposed system’s pipeline
The kernel driver creates one Comma-Seperated Values (CSV) file for each system
call. A new line is written to each file every time the system call associated with the
file is called. The logs are placed in a directory under the Windows directory since that
seemed the safest location given that programs are unlikely to modify files essential
for the OS to function. In fact, it has also been known to be used by malware to hide
its files due to the safety it provides [227]. After the analysis, a shared folder is used
to transfer over the CSV files to the analysis machine. This folder is wiped after each
run. Cuckoo uses a network connection to transfer over analysis files from the VM
to the host machine, after which we transfer the JSON file to the analysis machine.
The output produced from each of the monitoring tools is encoded using a frequency
histogram of calls within a two minute period. This feature representation is used to fit
a classification model for virus detection.
3.2.1 Initial Experiments
The transformed data (frequency histograms) from Cuckoo and the kernel driver was
then classified using a selection of machine learning algorithms provided by scikit-
learn [56]. The machine learning algorithms chosen were drawn from the existing liter-
ature, as the focus of this research was on the utility of different views of machine-level
actions (user vs kernel) rather than new classification algorithms. The classification al-
gorithms used were AdaBoost, Decision Tree, Linear SVM, Nearest Neighbours, and
Random Forest. The reason these algorithms were chosen is that they are used widely
in the literature as shown in table 2.2. In addition, Random Forest frequently achieved
impressive results [95, 213, 115, 244] as has AdaBoost [244]. Finally, Nearest Neigh-
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bours was chosen due to its simplicity in order to set a baseline.
For each classifier, the data was split using 10-fold cross-validation as it is also the
standard in this field [46, 244, 25, 97]. 10-fold cross-validation (an implementation
of k-fold cross-validation) is a statistical method for splitting data in a manner that
minimises bias. 10-fold cross-validation randomly splits the data into 10 subsets and
then trains the classifier on 9 subsets and tests it on 1. Each subset gets a chance to be
the test set. In addition, to increase confidence in the results, 10-fold-cross-validation
was run 100 times, providing 1000 classification results for each classifier. To measure
a classifier’s performance a number of metrics can be obtained. The metrics used
in this research are Area Under the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) Curve
(AUC), Accuracy, Precision, and F-Measure since these are the metrics commonly
reported in the literature [169, 115, 245, 25, 133] and they provide a complete view of
the performance of the classifier without missing out on subtle details. To understand
these measures in this context, it is important to define a few basic terms. For this
research True Positives (TP) are interpreted as malicious samples that are correctly
labelled by the classifier as malicious. False Positives (FP) are benign samples that
are incorrectly predicted to be malicious. True Negatives (TN) are benign samples
that are correctly classified as benign. False Negatives (FN) are malicious samples
that are incorrectly classified as benign. With regards to the actual measures used,
AUC relates to ROC curves. ROC curves plot True Positive Rate (TPR) against False
Positive Rate (FPR). FPR is the fraction of benign samples misclassified as malicious,
while TPR represents the proportion of malicious samples correctly classified. A ROC
curve shows how these values vary as the classifier’s threshold is altered. Therefore the
AUC is a good measure of a classifier’s performance. Accuracy can be described as the
sum of all the correct predictions (malicious and benign) divided by the sum of all the
predictions. Precision refers to the correctly labelled malware divided by the sum of
the correctly labelled malicious samples, and the benign samples incorrectly labelled
( TPTP + FP ). This gives the proportion of correctly labelled malware in comparison to all
samples labelled as malware. Recall is the correctly labelled malicious samples divided
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by correctly labelled malicious samples, and malicious samples incorrectly labelled as
benign ( TPTP + FN ). This gives the proportion of malicious samples that are correctly
identified. Precision has been included since false positives are a common issue in
malware detection. Recall was not included for brevity and since it can be quickly
deduced from the F-Measure (which is included) which is the harmonious mean of
precision and recall.
In order to confirm whether the differences in classification results were statistically
significant or due to randomness, the 1000 classification results (specifically AUC val-
ues) obtained from running 10-fold cross-validation 100 times were utilised. These val-
ues were plotted using Q-Q Plots against a normal distribution. The Q-Q plot provides
a visual comparison of a dataset’s distribution with a chosen theoretical distribution.
In this case the theoretical distribution being compared against is the normal distribu-
tion. Provided the Q-Q plots show the data as being normally distributed, the required
prerequisites for using Welch’s T-Test [258] are satisfied. Welch’s T-Test tests whether
two populations have equal means. In this case Welch’s T-Test is used to determine
whether the differences between the classification results from Cuckoo and the ker-
nel driver are statistically significant or not (with the significance level, α, set to 5%).
Welch’s T-Test was chosen due to its robustness and widespread recommendation in
the literature [76, 212].
In addition, in order to gain insight into whether collecting data at a global level is
more beneficial for classifying malware, the API calls logged by the kernel driver were
reduced to just those coming from the process that was being monitored (and any child
processes that it spawned). It’s important to note that though the data from the kernel
driver is limited to mimic the scope of the data that Cuckoo provides, it will still not
provide the same data as Cuckoo. This is due to a number of reasons. Importantly,
the localised kernel driver is still monitoring a different API to Cuckoo. Therefore,
there are a number of Windows calls that the driver is able to observe that Cuckoo is
not able to and vice versa. Furthermore, rootkits typically operate at kernel-mode and
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therefore would still only be visible to the kernel driver. Therefore it will be useful
to determine how the effectiveness of the data from the kernel driver differs when its
scope is limited.
Finally, the data from Cuckoo and the kernel driver was combined and then classified.
This was done to determine if the combination of user- and kernel-level data would
improve classification results.
To further understand the data recorded from the kernel and user level, and confirm
whether the features being used differ depending on the data collection method used,
the features were ranked by importance using two metrics, the independent feature
ranking metric and the inbuilt feature ranking metric, for the classifier that had the best
classification results.
3.2.2 Independent Feature Ranking
For the independent feature ranking metric, the classifier is only given the data from
one feature (or API-call) at a time. The classifier therefore uses only one feature to
differentiate malicious and benign. The AUC scores obtained from each feature are
noted. This method can give an indication of the strength of individual features. Where
it lacks, however, is in its ability to account for the relationship between features. For
example, a feature on its own may not be that strong, but when paired with another, may
be very strong. Therefore, to account for that, an additional feature ranking method is
used.
3.2.3 Inbuilt Feature Ranking
This feature ranking method ranks features using each classifier’s inbuilt feature rank-
ing mechanism. This ranking mechanism works in different ways depending on the
classifier used. For Decision Trees scikit-learn uses the Gini importance as described
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here [52]. The same is true for Random Forests and AdaBoost since they are composed
of a multitude of Decision Trees. The only difference being that, as they are composed
of multiple Decision Trees, the importance is averaged over each one. Finally, with
Linear SVMs, the coefficients assigned to each feature is used to rank them. In the
case of K-Nearest Neighbour, there is no inbuilt feature ranking mechanism, therefore,
it is not included in this measure.
3.2.4 Global Feature Ranking
The independent and inbuilt feature ranking mechanism show the most influential fea-
tures one classifier at a time. While this is useful in showing how each classifier in-
dividually chose to recognise malware, where it lacks is in providing a overarching
narrative showing the commonalities between each of the classifiers. This can be par-
ticularly difficult to manually determine if many classifiers are used. Therefore to bet-
ter understand the commonalities between classifiers when it came to distinguishing
malware, a new aggregate measure was created.
The purpose of the aggregate measure is to rank features across all the classifiers for
both the inbuilt and independent feature ranking methods. This would highlight which
features are robust since the previous measure only shows the top ten for a chosen
classifier — which could arguably be skewed in its favour. The aggregate measure was
calculated as follows. For each classifier, the features were ranked according to the
score they were given by the independent or inbuilt feature ranking method. Then, the
rank was plotted on the x-axis from 0 (the best rank) to the total number of API-calls
(the worst rank) for each feature. On the y-axis was a score from 0 to 1 and at each rank
1
number of classifiers
was added to the score. Once this was done, the area under the curve
was found which represented the total strength of the features across all classifiers.
This global feature ranking method can be used with any local feature ranking method.
Figure 3.2 shows an example of this global feature ranking method on a dataset with
250 features. In figure 3.2, the feature in question has got the ranks 0, 20, 50, and
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200 in the four classifiers it was used with. At each rank, the value has gone up by
1/4 (since there are four classifiers). If a feature was ranked as the most useful feature
across all classifiers, its ranks would be 0, 0, 0, and 0, and therefore the area under the
curve for it is 1 as shown in figure 3.3.
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Figure 3.2: Example graph of feature ranking mechanism
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Figure 3.3: Example graph of feature ranking mechanism with perfect score
The pseudocode of the global feature rank method that is used to find the global rank
of a particular feature is detailed in Algorithm 1.
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Algorithm 1: Find global rank for a given feature
Input : An integer array ranks_obtained containing the ranks obtained by
a feature from each classifier
Output: The global rank (auc) for the feature
1 curve_array← [0]× number_of_features;
2 for rank ∈ ranks_obtained do
3 curve_array[rank]← curve_array[rank] + 1
number_of_classifiers ;
4 end
5 for i = 1 to number_of_features do
6 curve_array[i]← curve_array[i] + curve_array[i− 1];
7 end
8 total← sum(curve_array);
9 auc← total
number_of_features ;
10 return auc;
The function is provided with an array sorted in ascending order which contains the
ranks that has been assigned to a feature by each classifier used according to some
feature ranking methodology (such as inbuilt or independent). As seen in line 1,
curve_array is an array of size number_of_features in which every element is ini-
tialised to 0. In lines 2 and 3, the rank is used as an index into the array, and the value
at that index is added to 1
number_of_classifiers . The curve_array is then looped through
and every element in the array is equal to its current value added to the previous ele-
ment’s value. At this point the curve_array will represent curves such as those shown
in figures 3.2 and 3.3. Finally, the average of curve_array is found which represents
the feature’s global rank.
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3.2.5 Feature Ranking Evaluation
In order to verify that both of the feature ranking methods were selecting features
that are optimal, and that the results they produced could be relied on, an additional
experiment was conducted. In this experiment, the AUC was calculated using only the
top ‘x’ features where ‘x’ was gradually increased from 10 by increments of 10 up
to the total number of features. This will also show the minimum amount of features
necessary to obtain similar classification results to those obtained when using all the
features.
3.2.6 Additional Data Analysis
To gain insight into the differences in behaviour between malware and benignware,
the data is studied further using simple analysis techniques. To begin with, the mean
frequency with which each call is made by malware and benignware is plotted and
compared. This will reveal differences in both malicious and benign behaviour as well
as differences in Cuckoo and the kernel driver’s data collection methods.
In addition to studying the frequently called features, the features exclusive to malware
or benignware are also studied. In order to glean this data, a binary feature vector is
created where ‘1’ represents a feature being present and ‘0’ represents a feature being
absent. For each malicious sample, its call-histogram is iterated through, and for each
call that is called at least once by a malicious sample, a ‘1’ is added to the binary
feature vector. The same is done for the benignware data. Finally the binary feature
vector for malicious samples is subtracted from the binary feature vector for benign
samples. The resulting vector will contain ‘1’ for features present in benign samples
but not malicious samples and ‘-1’ for features present in malicious samples not present
in benign samples. If the unique feature only appears in a few samples (less than 15),
it is ignored as it is considered an outlier. This comparison is performed for the both
the Cuckoo and kernel data independently. In addition, this analysis is carried out to
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understand the differences between the different data collection methods (such as local
and global).
3.2.7 Sample Size Verification
In order to verify that the sample size chosen was suitable, the initial experiments
described above were conducted using different sample sizes. Specifically, 10-fold
cross-validation was conducted with the classifiers being used in this chapter, however,
the classifiers were gradually given larger subsets of the whole dataset. The sample
size was increased from 100 samples up to over 2000 in increments of 100. For each
sample size, 10-fold cross-validation was repeated 100 times and the average AUC was
recorded. The AUC values were plotted in order to observe when the curve plateaued
for each classifier.
3.3 Results
In this section, the results from classifying the data collected at a kernel and user level
are described. In order to understand the contributing factors to the results, additional
experiments are conducted using modified forms of the data. Feature ranking is used
(among other things) to analyse the ten most significant features in order to gain a better
understanding of what the machine learning algorithms are using to identify malware.
3.3.1 Initial Experiments
The results from classifying data collected using the kernel driver at a global level and
data collected from Cuckoo are shown in Table 3.2
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Machine Learning Algorithm
Kernel Driver Cuckoo
AUC Accuracy Precision F-Measure AUC Accuracy Precision F-Measure
AdaBoost 0.983 94.1 0.934 0.941 0.973 91.8 0.911 0.920
Decision Tree 0.944 92.3 0.906 0.925 0.943 87.8 0.918 0.913
Linear SVM 0.945 90.3 0.873 0.906 0.932 86.9 0.835 0.870
Nearest Neighbour 0.964 90.3 0.896 0.903 0.942 86.2 0.877 0.863
Random Forest 0.986 95.2 0.960 0.944 0.984 94.0 0.958 0.942
Table 3.2: Comparison of classification results of data from Cuckoo and kernel
driver.
On the whole, the results show that the data from the kernel driver is marginally better
for the purposes of differentiating between benign and malicious states regardless of
the machine learning algorithm used. The algorithm with the best performance for
both the kernel driver and Cuckoo was Random Forest, obtaining an AUC of 0.986
and 0.984, and an accuracy of 95.2 and 94.0 respectively. In addition, it was found
that on average, 93% of the samples were given the same label regardless of the data
used by the best performing classifier (Random Forest). This shows that while there
was agreement on a large number of samples, there were still some samples where data
from one was better than the other for detecting malware.
In order to verify whether the difference between the kernel and Cuckoo classification
results are statistically significant and not just occurring by chance, Welch’s T-Test was
performed on the AUC values as described earlier. A prerequisite for using Welch’s
T-Test is that the data must be normally distributed. This was verified using Q-Q plots
as shown in Figure 3.4.
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Figure 3.4: Q-Q Plots of AUC values from kernel data
The Q-Q plots show the distribution of the AUC values and how closely (or otherwise)
it relates to the normal distribution (shown as a red line). The plots show that the
AUC values barely deviate from the normal distribution, and therefore, Welch’s T-Test
would be an appropriate test to observe if the difference between the kernel and Cuckoo
values are statistically significant. Given that the Q-Q plots for the Cuckoo data were
very similar, they are not shown here for brevity.
In Welch’s T-Test, the null hypothesis is that the means are equal (i.e., H0: µ1 =
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µ2), and therefore the alternative hypothesis is that the means are not equal (i.e., Ha:
µ1 6= µ2). The threshold α value was set to 0.05 as it is an appropriate level for the
experiments. Therefore if the p-value returned from performing Welch’s T-Test is less
than α, the null hypothesis can be rejected. Table 3.3 shows the results of performing
Welch’s T-Test on the AUC values from each classifier.
Machine Learning Algorithm p-value
AdaBoost 1.80× e−208
Decision Tree 1.41× e−6
Linear SVM 8.41× e−78
Nearest Neighbour 9.29× e−290
Random Forest 2.29× e−10
Table 3.3: p-values returned from Welch’s T-Test using AUC values
As Table 3.3 shows, the p-values returned are considerably lower than the threshold,
0.05. Therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected meaning that the means of the kernel
and Cuckoo AUC values for each classifier are not the same. This shows that, at a
significance level of 0.05, the difference between the kernel and Cuckoo results are
statistically significant and not just due to chance. Therefore, it can be concluded that
the data collected at the kernel level produces slightly better classification results than
that collected at a user level.
3.3.1.1 Independent Feature Ranking
In order to further understand and confirm the differences between the data gathered
by Cuckoo and the kernel driver, the top ten features using the independent and inbuilt
feature ranking methods are compared. Table 3.4 compares the top ten features (in
order of score) using the independent feature ranking method for Cuckoo and the kernel
driver. The feature importance is shown only for Random Forest since it had the best
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performance. While it would have been ideal to show a comparison of all the calls
rather than simply the top ten, due to space restrictions, it was limited to ten.
Cuckoo Kernel Driver
GetSystemMetrics NtQueryDebugFilterState
LoadResource NtEnumerateKey
FindResourceExW NtQueryFullAttributesFile
NtQueryInformationFile NtReleaseSemaphore
SetFileTime NtEnumerateValueKey
NtUnmapViewOfSection NtReadVirtualMemory
NtOpenSection NtSetInformationProcess
NtWriteFile NtSetValueKey
FindResourceA NtOpenEvent
CreateDirectoryW NtNotifyChangeKey
Table 3.4: Top ten features using independent feature ranking with Random
Forest.
From table 3.4, it can be seen that there are no features in common between Cuckoo
and the kernel driver within the top ten using the independent feature ranking method.
This suggests that both views used very different indicators to distinguish malware. In
terms of the actual methods in the top ten for each tool, Cuckoo contains some highly
specific calls such as SetFileTime (to set MAC (modify, access, and create) times on
a file) and GetSystemMetrics (to get information about the system). The presence of
SetFileTime is not surprising as it is often used by malware to conceal its accesses of
a file (and thereby conceal its malicious activity) [227]. GetSystemMetrics is used by
malware to evaluate whether it is running in a virtual environment or a real one (since
virtual machines tend to have low memory and storage). NtUnmapViewOfSection (and
NtMapViewOfSection) can also be used to evade detection as malware can use it to
replace the code of a legitimate process in memory with its code so that the legitimate
process runs its code. This could be the reason why the kernel driver monitoring at
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a global level performed better than Cuckoo monitoring at a local level as it was able
to capture this behaviour better. The top ten also includes some methods relating to
resources (LoadResource and FindResourceExW), malware tends to hide its payload
inside the resource section of a PE file, and therefore these methods would be used
to extract it into memory. What is also noticeable in Cuckoo’s top ten is a mix of
calls from the native API (usually starting with Nt) and Win32 API. An example of
that is NtQueryInformationFile, used to obtain information about a file. The reason
for malware using this method over an equivalent Win32 call is that it provides more
information.
On the other hand, the kernel driver contains relatively generic calls relating to the re-
gistry, threading, memory, events, and processes. However, there are a few interesting
calls on the kernel side. There is the method NtSetInformationProcess, which has been
known to be used by malware to disable Data Execution Prevention (DEP). DEP is a
protection in memory which prevents malware from running code in non-executable
sections of memory [22]. Another method in the top ten likely to be directly related to
malware is NtNotifyChangeKey. This is used by a process to ask Windows to notify
it whenever any changes are made to the registry. This could be used by malware to
monitor what is being done on the system or even prevent any changes to the keys
that it created. On the whole, it’s clear that the vast majority of features favoured by
classifiers to distinguish malware in the Cuckoo data are the evasive features of mal-
ware, whereas the kernel driver uses differences in the general behaviour of malware
to distinguish it from benignware.
3.3.1.2 Inbuilt Feature Ranking
Table 3.5 shows the top ten features using the inbuilt feature selection method.
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Cuckoo Kernel Driver
GetSystemMetrics NtWriteFile
FindResourceA NtFlushVirtualMemory
LdrGetProcedureAddress NtReadFile
LoadResource NtUnlockFile
NtReadFile NtOpenMutant
NtQueryInformationFile NtLockFile
SetFileTime NtNotifyChangeDirectoryFile
GetFileAttributesW NtOpenEvent
NtOpenSection NtDeleteAtom
NtUnmapViewOfSection NtQueryValueKey
Table 3.5: Top ten features using inbuilt feature ranking with Random Forest
Much of the discussion about the top ten features in Cuckoo for table 3.4 applies to
the features of Cuckoo in table 3.5. However, unlike table 3.4, there is one method in
common between the kernel and Cuckoo features, NtReadFile. This suggests that this
feature is important regardless of the perspective from which data is being gathered.
Another interesting observation is that there are seven methods in common between
Cuckoo’s independent (Table 3.4) and inbuilt feature ranking (Table 3.5). This suggests
that many of the contributing features in Cuckoo’s case can be used alone to detect
malware (which is worth considering when selecting feature representation methods).
Due to this, many of the observations made about Cuckoo’s top ten in Table 3.4 apply
here (such as Cuckoo focusing more on malware’s evasive behaviour over the general
behaviour of malware). Aside from this, Cuckoo’s top ten in Table 3.5 also contains
LdrGetProcedureAddress. This is important as it can be used by malware to evade
static analysis and dynamic heuristic analysis by loading all the routines it needs at
runtime and therefore malware can achieve all that it intends to with only that method
linked at compile time.
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On the kernel side, there is one method in common between the inbuilt and independent
feature ranking method, NtOpenEvent. This is no surprise as this method can be used
to interact with Windows Events which malware could use to ensure it is run every day,
for example. In general, the top tens for the kernel data for both tables are more focused
on differences in general process behaviour with fewer methods directly related to
specific behaviour exhibited by malware. However, there are a few exceptions.
One such exception is NtNotifyChangeDirectoryFile, a completely undocumented method.
This method is used by a process to ask Windows to notify it when any changes oc-
cur in a directory. Malware could be using it to simply monitor system activity and
protect itself or to attach itself to any file moves. However, another possible reason
is that this method is responsible for a well publicised vulnerability [9] that could be
used to expose parts of kernel memory and defeat Address Space Layout Randomisa-
tion (ASLR). NtNotifyChangeDirectoryFile is not the only undocumented method in
the top ten; NtDeleteAtom and NtOpenMutant are also completely undocumented by
Windows. This could explain why the kernel data was able to better distinguish mal-
ware from benignware as it is able to capture behaviour that cannot be captured at user
level. Aside from that, the differences in general process behaviour are being used to
detect malware.
In conclusion, tables 3.4 and 3.5 demonstrate that Random Forest utilises different
behavioural aspects to identify malware . While Cuckoo and the kernel driver generally
monitor equivalent calls, the fact that the observed rankings are different suggests that
the scope (local or global) of the calls is an important factor. Another contributing
factor could be that malware evades or detects the inline API hooking technique used
by Cuckoo but not the SSDT hooking method employed by the driver (since it requires
a more sophisticated approach to evade).
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3.3.1.3 Call Frequencies
To gain a better understanding of the data and the differences in each data collection
method, the mean frequency with which each system call was called was plotted as
histograms in figures 3.5 and 3.6. In order to keep the graph neat, each system call
name has been replaced by an index, hence each number on the x-axis represents a
single system call.
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Figure 3.5: Mean call frequency (y-axis) for each call (x-axis) as recorded by the
kernel driver.
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Figure 3.6: Mean call frequency (y-axis) for each call (x-axis) as recorded in
Cuckoo.
These graphs show some of the overarching differences between each data collection
method. The data from Cuckoo only has two real peaks, interestingly, for both those
peaks, the mean value for malware is lower than that for benignware. On the other
hand, the kernel data has more peaks due to the fact that it is collected globally and
therefore representing all processes running on the system.
In order to better interpret the graphs, the top ten most frequently occurring calls in
malware and benignware are listed for Cuckoo and the kernel driver. Table 3.6 shows
the top ten for Cuckoo.
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Benignware Malware
NtReadFile NtReadFile
SetFilePointer SetFilePointer
GetSystemTimeAsFileTime NtClose
NtWriteFile GetSystemTimeAsFileTime
NtClose RegCloseKey
NtAllocateVirtualMemory NtDelayExecution
RegCloseKey RegOpenKeyExA
RegOpenKeyExW NtCreateFile
RegQueryValueExW RegQueryValueExA
LdrGetProcedureAddress GetAsyncKeyState
Table 3.6: Most frequently occurring features in benignware and malware for
Cuckoo.
Table 3.6 contains many features in common between benignware and malware (NtRead-
File, SetFilePointer, NtClose, GetSystemTimeAsFileTime and RegCloseKey), and some
interesting differences. NtDelayExecution is among the most frequent system calls
used by malware which is unsurprising since it is commonly used by malware to hide
it’s behaviour. Malware calls this method to sleep for a duration of time before finally
executing. This can be quite effective since most analysis tools only tend to run for a
few minutes at most [179]. Given how frequently it is called, this could suggest that
the malware samples being used are not showing much of their malicious behaviour.
Another method that is known to be used by malware is GetAsyncKeyState. This al-
lows malware, or, more specifically, keyloggers, to poll the state of keys to determine
what keys have been pressed [227].
Another interesting observation from table 3.6 is that malware calls the methods RegOpen-
KeyExA and RegQueryValueExA with high frequency, whereas, benignware calls
RegOpenKeyExW and RegQueryValueExW with a high frequency. These methods
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are essentially the same, as, within Windows, methods ending with ‘A’ refer to the
ASCII version of the call, whereas methods ending with ‘W’ refer to the Unicode ver-
sion of the call. The ASCII version of every call eventually calls the Unicode version.
To gain further insight into the extent of this difference in system calls, the frequency
with which all ASCII calls were used by benignware and malware have been plotted
as histograms. The same has been done for Unicode calls. This is shown in figures 3.7
and 3.8.
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Figure 3.7: Mean call frequency (y-axis) for ASCII calls (x-axis) from Cuckoo
data.
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Figure 3.8: Mean call frequency (y-axis) for Unicode calls (x-axis) from Cuckoo
data.
Figures 3.7 and 3.8 show that in general, malware tends to use the ASCII versions
of Windows methods whereas benignware tends to opt for the Unicode versions of
methods. There are many possible reasons for this, Windows recommends developers
use Unicode versions of system calls since Unicode supports more characters providing
support for more languages. Therefore, developers of legitimate applications are likely
to use Unicode versions of system calls since they are more extensible. However,
malware authors are unlikely to be concerned with supporting multiple languages and
ASCII strings tend to be simpler to use and more familiar.
Table 3.7 shows the ten most frequently occurring features for benignware and malware
as seen by the kernel driver.
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Benignware Malware
NtClose NtClose
NtQueryPerformanceCounter NtOpenKey
NtOpenKey NtQueryPerformanceCounter
NtYieldExecution NtQueryValueKey
NtWaitForSingleObject NtWaitForSingleObject
NtQueryValueKey NtDeviceIoControlFile
NtDeviceIoControlFile NtQueryInformationProcess
NtClearEvent NtClearEvent
NtWaitForMultipleObjects NtQueryInformationToken
NtQueryInformationToken NtDelayExecution
Table 3.7: Most frequently occurring features in benignware and malware for the
kernel driver.
There is less variation in top ten for benignware and malware here with eight features
in common. The two differing features of malware, NtDelayExecution and NtQueryIn-
formationProcess, are known to be used by malware. NtDelayExecution was discussed
previously as it was also in the most frequent features for Cuckoo. NtQueryInforma-
tionProcess is commonly used by malware to detect if its being debugged [88]..
3.3.1.4 Exclusive Features
Table 3.8 shows the system calls in malware samples not found in benign samples for
the kernel data and the number of samples they appeared in. The benignware data
did not contain any calls that were never called in the malicious data from the kernel
driver. In addition, the Cuckoo data did not contain any calls that were exclusive to
either benignware or malware and above the threshold defined in section 3.2.6.
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System call No. of samples
NtGetWriteWatch 64
NtResetWriteWatch 62
Table 3.8: System calls in malware not present in benignware for kernel driver
data.
Though there are not many features that are unique to malware, these two features
emphasise an interesting feature of malware behaviour. NtGetWriteWatch/NtReset-
WriteWatch can be used by malware to check if they are being debugged. It provides a
mechanism by which malware can monitor sections of memory they use and detect if
anything else tries to access it. Therefore, it is not unusual to see that it in the malware
data.
In conclusion, the additional data analysis has also suggested that anti-analysis features
are prominent in the data gathered on malware. Even a few have been seen in the kernel
data.
3.3.2 Localised Kernel Data Results
Currently it is still unclear if the kernel data’s results were assisted by the fact that
the data is being collected on a global scale and observing all processes. To gain
further clarification regarding whether collecting the data at a global level assisted the
classification process, the kernel data was limited to the data produced by the process
being analysed and any processes it created. The results from this are shown in Table
3.9.
From Table 3.9, it can be seen that the classification results have decreased when col-
lecting data from the kernel driver at a local, process-specific, level. For example,
with Random Forest the AUC has decreased from 0.986 to 0.978 and the accuracy
from 95.2% to 92.3%. The differences between global and local kernel data were also
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Machine Learning Algorithm
Localised Kernel Driver
AUC Accuracy (%) Precision F-Measure
AdaBoost 0.962 89.6 0.902 0.891
Decision Tree 0.901 83.8 0.855 0.825
Linear SVM 0.884 82.0 0.893 0.788
Nearest Neighbour 0.934 86.6 0.875 0.858
Random Forest 0.978 92.3 0.944 0.921
Table 3.9: Classification results of data from the kernel driver focusing on the
process under investigation.
found to be statistically significant. Therefore, it is evident that collecting data at a
kernel level is not the only contributing factor to the improved classification results,
the data must also be collected at a global-level to obtain better classification results.
It’s also interesting to note that, at a significance level of 0.05, the classification results
from localised kernel data are statistically significantly lower than the Cuckoo results
as well. This shows that if data is going to be collected at a process-specific level,
user-level hooks provide more value since they will also observe many of the process’
interactions that did not reach the kernel. In addition, this shows that simply collecting
at a kernel privilege is not enough. The scope of the collection (local vs global) is
also important. It may be possible to improve the localised kernel results slightly by
attempting to detect when malware injects its payload into benign software and runs
it from there. However, that data would be captured by a global kernel capture and
therefore the results are unlikely to improve beyond the global kernel results.
To gain further insight into the differences between a classifier’s view of the system at
a local kernel level and a global kernel level, the top ten features of the local kernel
data are compared with those obtained previously from the global kernel data. As
with the global kernel data, the random forest classifier was used since it was the best
performing classifier.
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3.3.2.1 Independent Feature Ranking
Table 3.10 compares the results of the independent feature ranking method on the local
kernel data and the global kernel data.
Local Kernel Driver Kernel Driver
NtQueryValueKey NtQueryDebugFilterState
NtQueryKey NtEnumerateKey
NtQueryAttributesFile NtQueryFullAttributesFile
NtQueryInformationProcess NtReleaseSemaphore
NtEnumerateValueKey NtEnumerateValueKey
NtQueryVirtualMemory NtReadVirtualMemory
NtProtectVirtualMemory NtSetInformationProcess
NtQueryDebugFilterState NtSetValueKey
NtOpenKey NtOpenEvent
NtOpenFile NtNotifyChangeKey
Table 3.10: Top ten features using independent feature ranking on local kernel
data with Random Forest.
There are quite a few similarities between the top ten features of the local kernel data
and global kernel data. They have two methods in common, NtEnumerateValueKey
and NtQueryDebugFilterState. In addition, they both have three methods relating to
the Windows registry and one method relating to processes. The local kernel data has
two methods regarding files in comparison to the global kernel data’s one method. The
same is true for the methods regarding virtual memory. The local kernel data contains
the method NtProtectVirtualMemory in its top ten. This method is normally used by
software to prevent triggering a major exception. The call itself is used to mark a page
in memory so that when it is accessed, an exception is triggered. That page is then
placed at the bottom of the stack so that software is prevented from popping an empty
stack. However, this can also be used as an anti-debug trick. Malware can mark a page
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as protected using NtProtectVirtualMemory, trigger an exception by accessing it, and
then watch to determine if a debugger intercepts the exception.
The main difference between the local and global kernel data is that there is more
diversity in the global kernel data’s top ten as it contains two methods in categories
not captured by the local kernel data’s top ten. These are NtReleaseSemaphore and
NtOpenEvent. Semaphores are sometimes used by malware to avoid reinfecting its
victim. This is achieved by creating a semaphore with a unique name and then when
assessing if a victim has already been infected, malware just needs to check for the
presence of that semaphore object [241]. Another observation that can be made is that
while each has the same amount of methods relating to the registry, there is one in
the global kernel data which is particularly important with regards to detecting mal-
ware that is not present in the local kernel data. That is NtNotifyChangeKey. NtNoti-
fyChangeKey can be used to monitor and prevent any changes to specific keys. This
can be used by malware to ensure that nothing else tampers with its data.
3.3.2.2 Inbuilt Feature Ranking
Table 3.11 compares the results of the inbuilt feature ranking method on the local kernel
data and the global kernel data.
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Localised Kernel Driver Kernel Driver
NtReadFile NtWriteFile
NtQueryVirtualMemory NtFlushVirtualMemory
NtOpenEvent NtReadFile
NtOpenMutant NtUnlockFile
NtQueryValueKey NtOpenMutant
NtFlushVirtualMemory NtLockFile
NtUnlockFile NtNotifyChangeDirectoryFile
NtAllocateVirtualMemory NtOpenEvent
NtClose NtDeleteAtom
NtQueryInformationProcess NtQueryValueKey
Table 3.11: Top ten features using inbuilt feature ranking with Random Forest
In table 3.11 there are even more similarities with a total of six methods in com-
mon (NtReadFile, NtOpenEvent, NtOpenMutant, NtQueryValueKey, NtFlushVirtual-
Memory, NtUnlockFile). An interesting method on the local kernel side is NtQuery-
InformationProcess. This method is commonly used by malware to detect if its being
debugged [88]. A notable absence in the local kernel top ten is NtNotifyChangeDirect-
oryFile, which, as discussed previously can be used to monitor changes to a directory.
This method is likely to be used by a kernel-mode rootkit. Since rootkits tend to be
installed silently (via process injection, for example), the local kernel method will not
detect its creation and therefore not monitor its activity.
Therefore, it can be observed that limiting the kernel data to that produced by the
process under investigation and its children has the effect of reducing the diversity in
the malware behaviour observed. The local kernel data misses out on any activity that
results from malware injecting its code into another process. In addition, limiting the
kernel data has increased the probability of classifiers using the more explicit evasive
features of malware to detect it. As a result, the local kernel data is not able to produce
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as strong classification results as the global kernel data.
3.3.2.3 Exclusive Features
To further understand the data that is lost at a local level, the features of malware that
were present in the global data but not the local data were analysed. This is shown in
table 3.12.
System call No. of samples
NtCreateToken 352
NtExtendSection 52
NtMakeTemporaryObject 2457
NtQuerySystemInformation 2456
NtSetEvent 2455
Table 3.12: System calls in malware recorded at global kernel level but not local
level.
As can be seen, there are a number of features that are not captured in the data gathered
at the local kernel level. Perhaps, the most crucial of them is NtQuerySystemInforma-
tion. This call is frequently used by malware to get information about the system such
as a list of running processes [159]. It can even be used by rootkits to hide a malware
sample from the user [118]. Another system call that would not be unusual to see in
malware is NtCreateTokens. Each process and thread in Windows has a token that
determines its privileges. Therefore it is quite common for rootkits to modify these
tokens to give a malware sample elevated privileges [118].
The missing features provide insight into some of the important behaviour not captured
by the local kernel driver. This further explains why the local kernel driver data was
unable to obtain similar results to the global kernel driver data.
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3.3.3 Combined User and kernel data results
Since limiting the data from the kernel driver did not improve results, and given that
Cuckoo and the kernel driver seemed to fail on different samples, the next step was to
combine the data from Cuckoo and the kernel driver to determine if the classification
results are improved by the combination of data. The results of this are also shown in
Table 3.13
Machine Learning Algorithm
Cuckoo and Kernel Driver
AUC Accuracy (%) Precision F-Measure
AdaBoost 0.990 94.9 0.956 0.960
Decision Tree 0.954 92.4 0.924 0.936
Linear SVM 0.952 91.5 0.916 0.915
Nearest Neighbour 0.960 90.3 0.873 0.888
Random Forest 0.990 96.0 0.962 0.942
Table 3.13: Classification results from combining Cuckoo and kernel data
Table 3.13 shows that combining data from both tools produces classification results
that are slightly stronger for the purposes of malware classification with an AUC of
0.990 for both AdaBoost and Random Forest. The only classifier with reduced results
was K-Nearest-Neighbours suggesting that it struggles to classify data beyond a cer-
tain number of dimensions. Again, as with all the data, the differences shown in this
table (improvements or otherwise) are statistically significant. Therefore, this further
validates the claim that there is a difference in the data between Cuckoo and the kernel
driver since the results would not have improved had this not been the case.
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3.3.4 Feature Ranking Evaluation
To confirm the correctness of both of the feature ranking methods employed throughout
this research, simple feature reduction (described in the method section) was performed
using the feature ranking methods. The results of this are shown in figures 3.9 and 3.10.
These graphs were created for both the data from the kernel driver, and the data from
the Cuckoo driver. However, since the graphs were a very similar shape, for brevity’s
sake, only the graphs for the data from the kernel driver are shown.
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Figure 3.9: Feature selection using inbuilt feature selection method
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Figure 3.10: Feature selection using independent feature selection method
For most of the plots in figures 3.9 and 3.10 the AUC is at its lowest with just ten
features, however, as the number of features that the machine learning algorithms use
increases, the AUC increases until it reaches its peak at around 50 features. After 50
features, the introduction of new features does not add any more useful information,
thereby reducing or not contributing to the difference in the AUC. This highlights that
the feature ranking method is correctly deciphering which features are important. In
addition, it shows that in most cases no more than 50 API-calls need to be hooked for
similar results.
3.3.5 Global Feature Ranking
Finally, the global feature ranking metric was applied to get a concise yet comprehens-
ive view of the features of malware that were consistently considered important by all
classifiers. The results from applying the global feature ranking for both the inbuilt and
independent feature selection methods are shown in Tables 3.14 and 3.15.
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Cuckoo Kernel Driver
GetSystemMetrics NtReleaseSemaphore
NtQueryInformationFile NtLockFile
LoadResource NtUnlockFile
RegQueryValueExW NtEnumerateKey
NtUnmapViewOfSection NtWriteFile
NtDuplicateObject NtOpenMutant
RegOpenKeyExW NtReadFile
RegCloseKey NtOpenThreadToken
NtOpenSection NtReplyWaitReceivePortEx
NtWriteFile NtQueryVirtualMemory
Table 3.14: Top ten features using independent feature selection considering all
classifiers.
Cuckoo Kernel Driver
NtOpenSection NtFlushVirtualMemory
InternetCloseHandle NtOpenMutant
LoadResource NtFilterToken
SetUnhandledExceptionFilter NtUnlockFile
SetFileTime NtAccessCheckByTypeAndAuditAlarm
LdrLoadDll NtQueryVirtualMemory
CreateActCtxW NtDeleteAtom
getaddrinfo NtWriteFile
LdrGetDllHandle NtReadFile
LdrGetProcedureAddress NtCompleteConnectPort
Table 3.15: Top ten features using inbuilt feature selection considering all classi-
fiers.
3.3 Results 88
These tables show which features perform best across all the classifiers that were used.
This provides a clearer picture of which features are extremely strong when it comes to
differentiating malware from benignware. With regards to the Cuckoo data, table 3.14
contains some of the features used to evade detection that are also in table 3.4 (GetSys-
temMetrics, NtUnmapViewOfSection, and NtOpenSection). There are also resource
related methods (LoadResource) and the native API method (NtQueryInformationFile)
that was observed in table 3.4. Of the new methods, NtDuplicateObject is interesting
because it is used by malware to evade antivirus heuristics, as antiviruses would ex-
pect malware to call the more commonly used DuplicateHandle to duplicate a process
handle to kill or inject into it and would therefore be less likely to flag a call to NtDu-
plicateObject as suspicious [224]. From this it can be concluded that, regardless of the
classifier used, when trained on data from Cuckoo, malware will be largely recognised
using its evasive features.
Cuckoo’s top ten in table 3.15 places an even stronger emphasis on the evasive be-
haviour of malware. For example, LdrLoadDll, LdrGetDllHandle and LdrGetProced-
ureAddress are in the top ten and are known to be used by malware to load DLLs
dynamically in order to import methods from them. This can also be used to avoid
being detected by IAT hooks. In addition, the method SetUnhandledExceptionFilter in
the Cuckoo top ten is also used as an anti-debugging trick by malware as this method is
used to specify a function to be called in the event of an exception occurring that is not
handled by any exception handler. However, the function specified will only be called
if the process that raised the exception is not being debugged. Therefore, malware can
register a function to deliver its payload and then throw an exception, and if the process
is being debugged, that function will not be called, and hence the malware will not dis-
play its malicious behaviour [88]. SetFileTime, which has been described previously,
is also used to curb suspicions. Finally, NtOpenSection, as mentioned previously, can
be used to embed malicious code in a benign process (however, it can also be used for
benign purposes). Therefore, as can be seen, much of the top ten for Cuckoo in table
3.15 suggest that classifiers utilise the evasive behaviour of malware to detect it.
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On the kernel side, each table contains methods from a wide range of categories (such
as file-system, threading, networking etc.), making it more general than the top ten calls
in the Cuckoo data. While many of the methods in these tables are likely to be used
by malware, they are not used solely by malware (as would be expected from a tool
monitoring at a global level). On the whole, it can be seen that with the Cuckoo data,
malware is detected through the techniques it uses to detect a monitoring or virtual
environment, whereas, with the data from the kernel driver, malware is differentiated
from benignware through how its general behaviour differs from the norm.
3.3.6 Sample Size Verification
To confirm that the dataset size used was suitable, the experiments described in section
3.2.7 were conducted. The results are shown in figure 3.11.
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Figure 3.11: How the AUC responds as sample size is increased
Figure 3.11 shows that after 1000 samples, the AUC values almost completely plateau.
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This suggests that after this point, adding more samples will not have a significant
effect on the classification results. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that 2000
samples is more than enough.
3.4 Conclusion
Motivated by a hypothesis that kernel level API calls and user level API calls do not
produce the same classification results, experiments were conducted to study the dif-
ferences. This was achieved by collecting data at different privilege levels within the
Windows Operating System. Data was collected at a user level using Cuckoo, and at
the kernel level using a custom made kernel driver since there are no existing tools
that hook all the calls in the SSDT on a global scale. The data collected was classi-
fied using several state-of-the-art machine learning algorithms to determine whether
collecting data at different levels altered classification results. The results showed ker-
nel data to be statistically significantly better for all classification algorithms despite
the fact that user level methods are significantly more popular in the literature. Ran-
dom Forest performed the best with an accuracy of 94.0% for Cuckoo and 95.2% for
the kernel driver. In addition, limiting the kernel data to that produced by the process
under observation (and its subprocesses) had a negative impact on the classification
results suggesting that the collection of data at a global, system-wide level aided the
classification process. The strongest classification results were observed by combining
the data from Cuckoo (user level) with that from the kernel driver; achieving an AUC
of 0.990 and accuracy of 96.0% for Random Forest.
In order to understand why the differences in data collection methods had contributed
to the different classification results, feature ranking was conducted for Random Forest
and collectively for all classifiers used, and it was found that the features focused on
by classifiers differed depending on the data used. The main observation from this was
that monitoring on a process specific level as Cuckoo does caused the machine learn-
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ing algorithm to detect malware using its evasive properties. Whereas, when trained on
data obtained from monitoring at a global, kernel level, the machine learning algorithm
used the more general behaviour of malware (and processes in general) to distinguish
it from benignware. Limiting the kernel data to that produced by the process under in-
vestigation and its sub-processes did not produce as strong a performance as the global
kernel data since it missed malicious activity carried out through process injection. In
addition, when the data was limited, classifiers placed more emphasis on the evasive
features to recognise malware. The differences resulting from collecting data at dif-
ferent privilege levels highlighted the benefit gained from collecting data at a kernel
level (or both levels) in order to detect malware and the importance of the literature
carefully detailing the data collection method that has been used since the results are
affected by it. Table 2.1 shows that while there exists a plethora of well established
tools for collecting data at a user level, there are only a handful of established tools to
collect data at a kernel level, and fewer still that are freely available. While the driver
used in this research is specific to Windows XP, the main contributions of this research
(a comparison of user and kernel level calls) will apply to future releases of Windows.
In conclusion, this chapter conducted the first objective, evidence-based comparison of
kernel level and user level data for the purposes of malware classification and found
that more thought must be given to the data collection method when conducting dy-
namic malware analysis as the most optimal tool does not yet exist.
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Chapter 4
Assessing the effectiveness of classifiers
to detect non-evasive malware
4.1 Introduction
One of the observations from the previous chapter was that malware possesses a signi-
ficant amount of evasive/anti-VM/anti-debug properties. Paradoxically, the classifiers
were using the very existence of those features to detect malware. Therefore, this
chapter assesses the degree to which this biases the classifiers’ results. This is the
inspiration behind the fourth research question:
RQ4 Does the traditional Dynamic Malware Analysis process create a bias in the data
collected and subsequently classified?
If found to be true, this question raises many issues. One being that if classifiers trained
in the traditional dynamic malware analysis process are placed in a real environment,
there is a possibility that many malware samples would go undetected since they would
not exhibit as many anti-VM features once they realise they are in a real environment.
To provide an example, many malware samples do not run if there is no internet con-
nection, as is commonly the case in an analysis environment. Therefore, if data from
an analysis environment without an internet connection is used to train a classifier,
the classifier would probably recognise malware by its inactivity. Subsequently, when
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that classifier is placed in a real environment, where it is highly likely that an internet
connection would exist, malware will go unnoticed [140].
This chapter aims to assess whether there is a threshold number of malicious symp-
toms that malware must exhibit to avoid detection from classifiers trained through the
standard dynamic malware analysis process. This is summarised in the fifth research
question:
RQ5 How much malicious behaviour can a malware sample exhibit before it is detec-
ted?
In answering these questions, this chapter will provide the sixth and seventh contribu-
tion of this research:
C6 This research assesses whether popular classifiers can generalise to detect ransom-
ware that does not contain the most distinguishing features that were found in
chapter 3.
C7 This research assesses whether kernel-level or user-level data is better at gener-
alising towards malware that does not contain the distinguishing features found
in chapter 3.
4.2 Background
The literature highlighted in Chapter 2 makes it clear that there are a significant number
of methods that malware can utilise to evade classifiers; furthermore, as an increasing
number of evasive methods are identified and defended against, malware authors re-
spond by adding new evasive techniques. As it becomes more common for malware
samples to contain evasive features, the classifiers trained on data obtained from run-
ning malware for a few minutes will only recognise malware from its evasive attributes
as opposed to its malicious properties. Therefore, while most of the literature looks
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at adding evasive features to malware to make it undetectable, this chapter attempts to
make malware undetectable by removing evasive behaviour. When referring to mal-
ware in this chapter, the category of malware being alluded to is Ransomware.
The reason for focusing on ransomware in this chapter is due to the surge in its pop-
ularity recently. In 2017, Symantec reported a 46% increase in the number of ransom-
ware variants. In addition, successful ransomware attacks have been quite costly, the
notable attack on the NHS by the ransomware variant called WannaCry was estim-
ated to cost £92 million [29]. Another reason to focus on ransomware in this study is
that its malicious behaviour is relatively simple to automate (without requiring human
intervention) and is very well documented. The tool used to simulate the malicious
symptoms of ransomware is called Amsel.
4.2.1 Amsel
Amsel [190] is a tool written in Java that is designed to simulate malware for research
purposes. Amsel is essentially composed of two libraries, the symptom injectors and
the models. The symptom injectors library consists of various malicious symptoms that
a user may want to emulate. Potential symptoms include the generation of suspicious
network traffic to the encryption of files on the host. Symptom injectors do not have
to be used in isolation but can be combined to create a complete attack chain. For
example, a complete attack chain may consist of connecting to a server, stopping a
running process, running a new process and then reconnecting to a server. The models
library consists of stochastic models, in particular, Continuous Time Markov Chains
(CTMC). The purpose of this library is to decide how long Amsel should spend in each
stage/symptom of the attack chain. It also determines how long to wait between each
symptom. Each symptom in itself may have random elements controlled by the model
library. For example, if one of the symptoms is to send network traffic to a server, the
models library can be used to define the size of the traffic in each iteration. Amsel
provides a user with complete control when creating a kill chain; nevertheless, a user
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may choose to relinquish some of that control if the addition of randomness makes for
a more accurate representation of an attack. The user can specify the exact order of
symptoms in an attack chain, or the user can assign a probability with which each step
may be taken and then leave it to Amsel to create the final kill chain. This has the
advantage of adding an element of randomness each time Amsel is run, as, in some
cases, Amsel may skip a step, or change the order in which steps are taken for each
run. This allows a user to thoroughly test the robustness of their security system and
determine if it can detect an attack regardless of the sequence. It is this mix of structure
with controlled randomness that allows for very realistic modelling of actual attacker
behaviour. More information regarding Amsel can be found at [191], [192] and [193].
4.3 Method
4.3.1 Initial Experiments
As the aim of this chapter is to assess if there are flaws in the traditional dynamic
malware analysis process, the first step is to conduct the standard dynamic analysis
experiments using real ransomware and benignware. To begin with, 2500 ransomware
samples were collected from VirusShare [18] and 2500 benign files were collected from
SourceForge [14] and FileHippo [6]. The ransomware samples used are all crypto-
ransomware as opposed to locker ransomware. The reason for this is that the locker
variants do not represent much of a threat since their actions are easily reversible [204].
Besides, they are relatively simple to detect since they almost immediately make their
presence known to the user. Furthermore, crypto-ransomware are more commonly
used [216]. The crypto-ransomware used was largely labelled as Trojan:W32/Ransom
[16].
Once the samples were collected, they were run for two minutes in a virtual machine
running Windows XP SP3. To increase the likelihood of the ransomware exhibiting
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malicious behaviour, real files (such as documents, presentations, images, and videos
etc.) were placed in the user’s home directory since this would make the environment
look more realistic. When a sample was run, the system calls it made were mon-
itored and extracted at both user-level and kernel-level separately. User-level system
calls were gathered using Cuckoo Sandbox [111]. Kernel-level calls were gathered
using the custom-built kernel driver described in the previous chapter. The calls made
by each sample were then represented numerically as frequency histograms. Before
passing the data to the classifiers, the frequency histograms were normalised using
L1-normalisation to reduce noise and overfitting. This was done separately for both
Cuckoo and the kernel driver. The classifiers that were used for this chapter are the
same as those used in the previous chapter (AdaBoost, Decision Tree, Linear SVM,
Nearest Neighbours, and Random Forest) with the addition of Gradient Boost. The
reason for including Gradient Boost is the impressive results it has obtained in previ-
ous research focused solely on ransomware [223, 272]. The classifiers were initially
trained and tested on the calls from the real ransomware and benignware using 10-fold-
cross-validation. The results from this are reported using the same metrics as in the
previous chapter, namely, AUC, accuracy, precision, and F-measure. This information
will give a clear picture of the classifiers’ performance when it comes to differentiating
ransomware from benignware.
4.3.2 Amsel Experiments
After analysing the results from the initial experiments, the next step is to observe
how those same classifiers perform when detecting ransomware emulated by Amsel.
The functionality required of Amsel for the experiments in this chapter is relatively
simplistic to reduce the possibility of the classifiers being biased by additional beha-
viours. The only symptom used was the file encryption symptom since that is the main
malicious symptom of ransomware that solutions try to prevent. The behaviour of this
symptom is to encrypt files in the directory specified (including all sub-directories).
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The encryption algorithm used by default is a simple XOR operation. There are sev-
eral parameters within the symptom’s settings that can be altered; however, for the
experiments carried out in this chapter, only one parameter is altered between each
run, the interarrival time. This parameter determines how long the emulated malware
sample should wait between encrypting each file in the directory specified. The in-
terarrival time was gradually incremented from 1.0 × 10−6 to just below 60 seconds.
The size of the increment was 0.01 initially. After reaching 1 second, the increment
was increased to 2 seconds. The reason for only altering a single parameter is that it
makes it a lot easier to interpret the results from the classifiers (since there is only one
variable). The reason the interarrival time, in particular, was chosen is that, depending
on its value, it makes it possible to emulate malicious and evasive behaviour.
When the time between encrypting each file, a.k.a the interarrival time, is set to a lower
value, the emulated ransomware is encrypting more frequently and thereby exhibiting
malicious behaviour much more frequently. Whereas when the interarrival time is at
higher values, the emulated malware is idle for more extended periods which, when
observing system calls, would look very similar to evasive malware. When the time
between encrypting files is set to its highest value (57 seconds), Amsel will only en-
crypt two files at most before analysis is complete. While it is true that all evasive
behaviour cannot be described by idleness, it encompasses a wide variety of evasive
behaviours. This is because the goal of most evasive techniques is to stall execution.
Therefore, a lack of behaviour is often the result of most evasive techniques. To provide
an example, the system call NtDelayExecution can be used by malware to delay ex-
ecuting its payload.
To ensure that the results obtained are not due to chance, each unique emulated sample
(unique because of the interarrival time value it is given) is replicated ten times. This
provides more than enough samples per unique time value to ensure that the results are
consistent rather than an accident. It is also not so high that the experiments become
infeasible due to the constraints of time. Finally, as with the traditional dataset, each
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emulated sample is run on the same virtual machine, and the system calls it makes are
recorded by Cuckoo and the kernel driver, and converted into frequency histograms.
Since the goal of these experiments is to evaluate how well classifiers trained on real
ransomware and benignware can detect malicious symptoms, the emulated ransom-
ware dataset is treated as an unseen test set. As a result, the classifiers are trained on
all the real ransomware and benignware data, and then those same classifiers are made
to classify the emulated ransomware. Since some of the classifiers used have a random
element (such as Decision Trees), each classifier is trained and tested 1000 times and
the mean accuracy is reported. The overall experimental process described so far is
summarised in figure 4.1.
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Figure 4.1: System Diagram
4.3.3 Misclassified Samples
An important aspect of this chapter is to determine the rate of encryption at which emu-
lated ransomware goes undetected and to ascertain if that value differs depending on
whether Cuckoo or the kernel data is used. This can be calculated using the prediction
results that are produced from the “Amsel Experiments” section (4.3.2). In the previous
subsection, the classifiers were tested against all emulated ransomware samples 1000
times. Using the data obtained from that, the mean prediction value for each emu-
lated ransomware sample can be found separately for each classifier. The reason that
the mean value must be used is that some classifiers show slightly different results on
every run due to the fact that they make use of a random element (Random Forest, for
example). Therefore, a sample may be correctly classified in one run but incorrectly
classified in the next even though the exact same data was used for both. Therefore,
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if the mean prediction value for a sample is below 0.5, that sample can be considered
incorrectly classified (since ‘1’ represents malicious and ‘0’ represents benign as in
the previous chapter). Once the incorrectly classified samples have been found, they
can be correlated to the interarrival time (i.e. time between encrypting each file). This
information is important as if it is found that a classifier trained on real ransomware
and benignware is better at detecting the emulated ransomware when it frequently ex-
hibits idle behaviour, it would suggest that a simple way to evade classifiers trained
using the traditional dynamic malware analysis process is to create malware without
evasive features. On the other hand, if the classifier is better at detecting the emulated
ransomware when it exhibits its malicious features (which in this case is file encryp-
tion) more frequently, this would suggest that the classifier is recognising malware by
its malicious activity (or activity in general).
4.3.4 Call Categories
A simple method through which data from multiple sources can be better understood
is by grouping the data into categories and comparing the distribution of categories in
each source. With system call data this presents a few challenges. There is no generally
accepted standard on the categories of system calls or the categories that each call
belongs to. Another challenge is that some calls can belong to multiple categories. For
example NtClose can be used to close a file handle or process handle amongst many
more. Furthermore, the list of all possible categories will differ between kernel- and
user-level data. In order to conduct the call category analysis as fairly as possible,
the categories for the Cuckoo data were taken from one of the configuration files in
the Cuckoo source code. For the kernel driver, there is the added challenge that some
calls are not documented at all and are therefore difficult to categorise. Therefore,
the categories for the kernel calls were taken from the “Windows NT/2000 Native
API Reference” [174]. This is the most comprehensive documentation available of
the kernel calls. The calls not listed in either category were manually placed into a
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category after careful research.
After the categories and the calls belonging to each category had been decided, the data
from Cuckoo and the kernel driver was split into the benign, malicious and emulated
data for both. For each call (NtCreateProcess, for example), the number of times it
was called by all samples belonging to a class (e.g., benign) was added to the category
the call belonged to (Process, for example). Once this was performed for each call, the
total number of times each category was called within each class (benign, malicious
and emulated) was produced and visualised as pie charts.
4.4 Results
4.4.1 Initial Results
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 show the results from classifying real ransomware and the accuracy
obtained when those same, trained classifiers are used to detect Amsel for the Cuckoo
and kernel data.
Machine Learning
Algorithm
Ransomware Amsel
AUC Accuracy (%) Precision F-Measure Accuracy (%)
AdaBoost 0.992 96.6 0.958 0.959 40.5
Decision Tree 0.959 95.7 0.976 0.950 76.7
Gradient Boost 0.996 97.3 0.969 0.967 64.0
Linear SVM 0.861 78.1 0.840 0.687 0.867
Nearest Neighbour 0.969 91.1 0.921 0.889 1.33
Random Forest 0.994 96.8 0.976 0.961 35.0
Table 4.1: Classification results using Cuckoo data
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Machine Learning
Algorithm
Ransomware Amsel
AUC Accuracy (%) Precision F-Measure Accuracy (%)
AdaBoost 0.996 97.7 0.981 0.973 4.0
Decision Tree 0.969 97.0 0.964 0.964 67.0
Gradient Boost 0.997 98.2 0.990 0.979 0.540
Linear SVM 0.557 57.4 0.0 0.0 0.20
Nearest Neighbour 0.975 92.1 0.926 0.905 3.87
Random Forest 0.995 97.7 0.990 0.973 48.6
Table 4.2: Classification results using kernel data
When differentiating real ransomware from benignware, the kernel data is shown to be
more useful for the task. Though the differences in results are small, they are similar to
what is expected, given the results from the previous chapter. The only classifier that
performs better using the Cuckoo data is Linear SVM. When using the kernel data,
Linear SVM obtains a precision (and therefore F-measure) of 0. Taking into consider-
ation the formula for precision, this means that Linear SVM classified all samples in
the kernel data as benign. This suggests that the kernel data is not as linearly separable
as the Cuckoo data. That being said, Linear SVM obtains the lowest performance in
comparison to the other classifiers for both sets of data. On the other hand, the clas-
sifier that obtained the strongest performance is Gradient Boost, obtaining accuracy
values of 98.2% and 97.3% for the kernel and Cuckoo data.
The last column in both tables shows the accuracy obtained when classifying the emu-
lated ransomware. These results do not bear much resemblance to the results obtained
when classifying real ransomware. On the Cuckoo side, the only classifiers with a
mildly respectable performance are Decision Tree with an accuracy of 76.7% and
Gradient Boost (64%). For the kernel data, the only classifier with an accuracy higher
than 50% is Decision Tree (67%). As can be seen, when classifying emulated ransom-
ware, the Cuckoo data seems to have produced a better performance than the data from
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the kernel driver. To obtain a better understanding of the results from classifying the
emulated ransomware, they have been illustrated in figure 4.2.
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Figure 4.2: Results of classifying Amsel data 1000 times
The graphs above show the results from testing each of the classifiers on the emulated
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ransomware data 1000 times (as described previously). For most of the classifiers,
the accuracy obtained from each run was the same. However, when using the Cuckoo
data, Decision Tree and Random Forest are the only classifiers where the results vary
significantly. This is likely due to the random element within these two classifiers
that guides how the trees are constructed. Remarkably, Decision Tree is able to get
100% accuracy on occasion when using the Cuckoo data. However, as the results vary
so widely, that cannot be relied on. The modal value reveals a bit more information
regarding the classifier’s performance since it shows the most likely value that would
be obtained. The modal values for Decision Tree and Random Forest using the Cuckoo
data are 68% and 0.07%.
With regards to the kernel data, figure 4.2 shows that only Random Forest has a spread
of results. Its modal accuracy value is 67% . Therefore, when comparing modal val-
ues, there is little difference between the Cuckoo and kernel data. In addition, while
the Cuckoo data is seemingly more effective than kernel data when it comes to de-
tecting the emulated ransomware, neither have produced strong results. Therefore, the
next step is to ascertain the emulated ransomware samples that the classifiers failed to
correctly classify. By determining which emulated samples were incorrectly classified,
it will be possible to ascertain whether the classifiers are better at detecting emulated
malware when the interarrival time is higher or lower.
4.4.2 Misclassified Samples
In order to visualise the results per sample, two histograms had to be created due to
the large spread in times used for the experiments. For each new emulated ransom-
ware sample, the interarrival time was incremented very gradually between 0 and 1
second. After 1 second, the magnitude of the increment for each new sample was
increased. Figures 4.3 and 4.4 show how Decision Tree performed when classifying
emulated ransomware samples with times ranging from 1.0×10−6 to 2 seconds for the
Cuckoo and kernel data. The reason for selecting Decision Tree is that it obtained the
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best performance for both the kernel and Cuckoo data when classifying the emulated
ransomware produced from Amsel.
Figure 4.3: Results of classifying Amsel data (with time between encryption <=2s)
obtained by Cuckoo.
Figure 4.4: Results of classifying Amsel data (with time between encryption <=2s)
obtained by the kernel driver.
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Figure 4.3 shows the results using Cuckoo data. It can be seen that initially at ex-
tremely low time intervals between encrypting each file, Decision Tree is able to
identify some, but not all emulated ransomware samples. However, as the time ap-
proaches two seconds, the classifier’s performance in detecting emulated ransomware
using the Cuckoo data decreases significantly.
Figure 4.4 shows the results from Decision Tree attempting to detect emulated ransom-
ware using the kernel data. When using the kernel data, Decision Tree is able to cor-
rectly classify the emulated malware samples as malicious in almost every instance.
Figures 4.5 and 4.6 show the remaining results from classifying emulated ransomware
samples with the time between encrypting each file (interarrival time) ranging from 2
seconds to 57 seconds.
Figure 4.5: Results of classifying Amsel data (with time between encryption >2s)
obtained by Cuckoo.
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Figure 4.6: Results of classifying Amsel data (with time between encryption >2s)
obtained by the kernel driver.
Figure 4.5 shows a very different picture to the previous results, as, in this case De-
cision Tree is able to detect all the emulated ransomware samples using the Cuckoo
data. This suggests that the ability of the classifier to detect emulated ransomware
(when trained on real ransomware and benignware) improves as the evasiveness in its
behaviour increases.
Figure 4.6 is the complete opposite of figure 4.5 visually. When using the Cuckoo data,
Decision Tree’s performance improved as the evasiveness of the emulated samples in-
creased, whereas, as figure 4.6 shows, the opposite occurred when using the kernel
data. This shows that when a classifier is attempting to detect malware using global
kernel-level data, the presence of malicious activity (as opposed to inactivity) is re-
quired for the classifier to correctly classify it. This is, in part, to do with the fact that
the kernel driver is monitoring at a global level. Therefore as the activity of the mali-
cious sample reduces, it is much more likely to fade into the background (and get lost
amongst the general system activity).
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The results in this section have shown that the Decision Tree classifier obtains a stronger
performance using the Cuckoo data, provided that the delay between encrypting each
file is 2 seconds or more. Below 2 seconds, the kernel data is better suited to identifying
ransomware. This suggests that when monitored using Cuckoo (or another user-level
monitoring tool), the likelihood of ransomware being identified increases as the amount
of evasiveness in its behaviour increases. The opposite is true for the kernel-level data.
4.4.3 Hyper-parameter Results
Given that Gradient Boost was the best performing classifier on the training data, and
that it is quite closely related to Decision Tree (as it is composed of multiple regression
trees), its vastly different results when tested on the emulated ransomware was unex-
pected. The same can be said for Random Forest. Due to the fact that Gradient Boost
and Random Forest are composed of Decision Trees, they have many hyper-parameters
in common with Decision Tree. Therefore, a brief analysis of the hyper-parameters in
common is performed in order to gain more insight into the reasons behind the dif-
ferences. In all experiments for this thesis, the default parameters for each classifier
in sklearn are used. Of the parameters that Decision Tree and Gradient Boost have in
common, the only one where the default value differs is that of ‘max_depth’.
As its name suggests, max_depth defines how deep a tree can be. The deeper the tree,
the more minutiae it can capture, however, this also puts it at greater risk of over-fitting.
For Decision Trees, this parameter is set to “None” by default which means the tree
is expanded as much as possible (since there is no limit). With Gradient Boost, this
parameter is set to ‘3’ by default. Therefore, for this experiment we changed the value
of max_depth for Gradient Boost to match the default value for Decision Tree.
Likewise, Random Forest only differs with Decision Tree on one shared hyper-parameter,
‘max_features’. This parameter dictates the number of features that should be con-
sidered when making a split. For example, if a dataset consists of 100 features and
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max_features is set to 20, when the classifier is making a decision on which feature to
split on, it will consider 20 random features and choose the best amongst them. Again,
this can be set to lower values to guard against overfitting. For Decision Trees the
default value of this parameter is “None”, which means that at each split, all features
are considered for the split. For Random Forest this value is set to the square root of
the number of features. Therefore, for this experiment, the value of this parameter in
Random Forest is altered to match that of the value in Decision Tree.
The results from classifying emulated ransomware using the new hyper-parameter val-
ues for the Cuckoo and kernel data are shown in tables 4.3 and 4.4.
Classifier Amsel Accuracy
Decision Tree 76.7
Gradient Boost 78.5
Random Forest 75.0
Table 4.3: New emulated ransomware results on Cuckoo data after modifying
hyper-parameters.
Classifier Amsel Accuracy
Decision Tree 67.0
Gradient Boost 67.0
Random Forest 67.0
Table 4.4: New emulated ransomware results on kernel data after modifying
hyper-parameters.
As can be seen in tables 4.3 and 4.4, by simply modifying one hyper-parameter for
Gradient Boost and Random Forest the results have been rectified so that they are equi-
valent to that of Decision Tree. However, given the purpose of the hyper-parameters, it
also suggests that the behaviour exhibited by the emulated ransomware is only detected
if the classifiers are set to capture the subtler details within the training data. Both must
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be set to their maximum possible values as it were in order to ensure that the classifiers
correctly classify the emulated ransomware.
This also highlights the importance of careful hyper-parameter tuning, as the impact
it can have on the results is very significant. The modified versions of Gradient Boost
and Random Forest obtained the same results on the training data as their unmodified
counterparts. However, with regards to the testing data, as can be seen, the results were
affected.
4.4.4 Cuckoo Feature Ranking Results
To further understand the reasons behind the results, it can be helpful to look at the
features that the best performing classifier considers the most important. Given that
the best performing classifier on real ransomware (Gradient Boost) is not the same
as the classifier that performs best at detecting emulated ransomware (Decision Tree),
the best features for both are studied for the kernel and Cuckoo data. For the sake
of brevity, only the top ten features are discussed here. The feature ranking method
used here is the inbuilt feature ranking method described in the previous chapter in
section 3.2.3. For completeness, the top ten features of all classifiers used are shown in
table 4.5 (barring Nearest Neighbours since it has no inbuilt feature ranking method),
however, the focus of this section is on Decision Tree and Gradient Boost. Table 4.5
shows the top ten features for the Cuckoo data.
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AdaBoost Decision Tree Gradient Boost Linear SVM
NtTerminateProcess FindResourceA FindResourceA GetSystemMetrics
NtUnmapViewOfSection CreateDirectoryW CreateDirectoryW NtReadFile
CoInitializeEx NtProtectVirtualMemory NtProtectVirtualMemory LdrGetProcedureAddress
RemoveDirectoryA NtOpenKey NtOpenSection NtTerminateProcess
CreateActCtxW __exception__ WriteProcessMemory LdrGetDllHandle
NtProtectVirtualMemory WriteProcessMemory CreateActCtxW GetUserNameExW
LdrGetProcedureAddress CoUninitialize NtTerminateProcess CreateToolhelp32Snapshot
GetDiskFreeSpaceExW FindResourceExW NtOpenKey NtOpenSection
GetSystemMetrics CreateProcessInternalW LdrGetProcedureAddress GetVolumePathNameW
NtQueryDirectoryFile LdrGetDllHandle NtUnmapViewOfSection NtSetValueKey
Table 4.5: Top ten features using the inbuilt feature ranking method for Ada-
Boost, Decision Tree, Gradient Boost, and Linear SVM when considering the data
from Cuckoo .
With regards to the classifiers that did not obtain a strong performance, Linear SVM
placed a lot of importance on specific evasive calls that Decision Tree and Gradi-
ent Boost ignored such as GetUserNameExW, CreateToolhelp32Snapshot and Get-
VolumePathNameW. GetUserNameExW and GetVolumePathNameW are used to de-
tect the use of specific virtualisation tools. Whilst, CreateToolhelp32Snapshot is used
to obtain a list of running processes that malware can then terminate (if they are anti-
virus processes) or inject its code into [227]. On the other hand, AdaBoost does not
give as much focus to evasive calls and contains only one additional evasive call in its
top ten, GetDiskFreeSpaceExW. This is used by malware to obtain the hard-disk space
to determine if its running in a VM (since VMs tend to have smaller hard disks than
real machines).
Focusing on Gradient Boost and Decision Tree, there are five features in common
between the two classifiers in table 4.5. The reason for Decision Tree’s superior per-
formance over Gradient Boost is not immediately clear from just the features. Decision
Tree contains a few features that are known to be used by malware for evasive purposes.
WriteProcessMemory, for example, is commonly used by malware to write malicious
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code into a benign process’ memory space [227]. In addition, the calls NtProtectVir-
tualMemory and LdrGetDllHandle can be used for evasive purposes as discussed in
the previous chapter (in sections 3.3.2.1 and 3.3.5). Aside from that, the calls relate to
resources, processes and the registry.
Besides the features in common, Gradient Boost contains a few additional features that
can be used by malware to evade detection. The combination of NtOpenSection and
NtUnmapViewOfSection was seen in the previous chapter (section 3.3.1.1). Obviously
there are many legitimate uses for it, but it can also be used by malware to insert code
into another process’ memory. In addition, LdrGetProcedureAddress, can be used
to dynamically load an external call. This would evade any tool only looking at the
statically declared calls, or those monitoring using an IAT hook. The lack of file-related
calls in both classifiers’ top tens suggests that excessive levels of file activity is not
the distinguishing characteristic being observed of ransomware (as would have been
expected). This explains why the Cuckoo data was unsuitable for detecting emulated
ransomware when the frequency of encryption was high.
However, despite the differences, it is not obvious as to why Decision Tree performed
better than Gradient Boost when it comes to detecting the emulated ransomware. Both
classifiers only have one file related call in their top ten and therefore, it would seem,
that they have equal chance of detecting the emulated ransomware. In order to better
understand the reason for the differences in detecting the emulated ransomware, the top
ten features of the optimised version of Gradient Boost were extracted and analysed.
Interestingly, those top ten were exactly the same as the top ten features of Decision
Tree. Therefore to better understand the reason for the difference, the differences in
frequencies for each feature in the top ten are plotted for benignware, malware, and
emulated ransomware in a bar chart. This is shown in figures 4.7 and 4.8.
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Figure 4.7: Frequencies (y-axis) of the top ten features (x-axis) of Decision Tree in
order (from left to right) for malicious, clean, and Amsel data from Cuckoo.
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Figure 4.8: Frequencies (y-axis) of the top ten features (x-axis) of Gradient Boost
in order (from left to right) for malicious, clean, and Amsel data from Cuckoo.
The graph for Decision Tree is dominated by NtProtectVirtualMemory which is heav-
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ily used by beningnware. Gradient Boost is dominated by LdrGetProcedureAddress,
which is commonly used by malware to dynamically load calls and evade analysis.
Interestingly, Amsel seems to use LdrGetProcedureAddress frequently. This is a side-
effect from using Java to emulate ransomware. Java is likely to opt for dynamic linking
since it is platform independent and uses a JIT compiler.
However, the presence of features with extremely high frequencies makes it difficult
to view the trends in the remaining features. Therefore, to better understand the dif-
ferences between Decision Tree and Gradient Boost, the features that are in common
and dominant within the top ten are removed and the graphs redrawn. This is shown in
figures 4.9 and 4.10.
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Figure 4.9: Frequencies (y-axis) of the unique features (x-axis) within the top ten
of Decision Tree in order (from left to right) for malicious, clean, and Amsel data
from Cuckoo.
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Figure 4.10: Frequencies (y-axis) of the unique features (x-axis) within the top
ten of Gradient Boost in order (from left to right) for malicious, clean, and Amsel
data from Cuckoo.
As can be seen figure 4.10 contains features that separate benign and malicious well,
however, many of them are not used by the emulated ransomware, therefore they are
unlikely to assist Gradient Boost in classifying it. On the other hand, some of the
unique features of Decision Tree (which are the features Gradient Boost uses when
max_depth is altered) in figure 4.9 are used by the emulated ransomware. Interestingly,
the emulated ransomware makes use of LdrGetDllHandle. This is again due to the fact
that it is written in Java and Java tends to opt for dynamic linking.
The top ten features have shown that Cuckoo is very dependent on evasive features for
identifying ransomware (as in the previous chapter). Therefore, it is primarily identify-
ing emulated ransomware from the evasive behaviour it displays. In addition, it can be
seen that Decision Tree’s superior performance in detecting emulated ransomware is
in part due to some unforeseen functionality shown by the JVM, rather than any actual
malicious behaviour. In particular, the high rank given to LdrGetProcedureAddress by
the Gradient Boost and its use by the JVM seems to have impacted its performance.
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4.4.5 Kernel Feature Ranking Results
Moving on to the kernel data, table 4.6 shows the top ten features using the inbuilt
feature ranking method for all classifiers used (except Nearest Neighbours). As with
the Cuckoo data, the focus in this section is on Decision Tree and Gradient Boost.
AdaBoost Decision Tree Gradient Boost Linear SVM
NtOpenObjectAuditAlarm NtOpenObjectAuditAlarm NtOpenObjectAuditAlarm NtYieldExecution
NtFlushVirtualMemory NtRequestWaitReplyPort NtRequestWaitReplyPort NtCompactKeys
NtOpenMutant NtCreateDebugObject NtSetInformationThread NtCompareTokens
NtQuerySystemTime NtQueryAttributesFile NtFlushVirtualMemory NtCompressKey
NtReadFile NtReadFile NtAccessCheck NtCreateDebugObject
NtRequestWaitReplyPort NtRaiseHardError NtReadFile NtCreateJobSet
NtWriteFile NtUnmapViewOfSection NtCreateDebugObject NtCreateKeyedEvent
NtCompareTokens NtPulseEvent NtYieldExecution NtDebugActiveProcess
NtAcceptConnectPort NtCreateIoCompletion NtOpenMutant NtDebugContinue
NtAccessCheckByType NtQueryValueKey NtWriteFile NtDeleteBootEntry
Table 4.6: Top ten features using inbuilt feature ranking for AdaBoost, Decision
Tree, Gradient Boost and Linear SVM when considering the data from the kernel
driver.
From table 4.6, it is immediately clear why Linear SVM did not perform well. Many
of the features focused on are quite obscure and not known to be used by malware or
benignware. AdaBoost, on the other hand, has more in common with Decision Tree
and Gradient Boost. Uniquely, it contains NtQuerySystemTime, an operation that can
be used to detect delays caused by the presence of debuggers. Interestingly, although
AdaBoost ranks NtReadFile and NtWriteFile highly, this does not seem to help its
classification results.
From comparing Decision Tree and Gradient Boost, it can be seen that they four fea-
tures in common (NtOpenObjectAuditAlarm, NtRequestWaitReplyPort, NtCreateDebugOb-
ject and NtReadFile). NtCreateDebugObject is an interesting addition to both top tens
as it can be used in a very powerful anti-debug trick to detect a debugger [23]. In fact,
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NtCreateDebugObject had a very low mean frequency, however, it was still consider-
ably larger for malware than benignware. The remaining methods in common relate
to networking (NtRequestWaitReplyPort), file handling (NtReadFile), and monitoring
changes (NtOpenObjectAuditAlarm). Three of the calls in the top ten for Decision
Tree relate to file handling (NtQueryAttributesFile, NtReadFile and NtCreateIoCom-
pletion), whereas only two calls in the top ten of gradient boost relate to file handling
(NtReadFile and NtWriteFile). When using the kernel data, the classifiers are clearly
much more likely to focus on file-related behaviour than when data from Cuckoo is
used.
In order to further understand the reasoning for the differences in classification results,
the mean frequencies of the top ten calls are plotted for both Gradient Boost and De-
cision Tree. As with the Cuckoo data, when the max_depth hyper-parameter is altered,
the top ten features of Gradient Boost are exactly the same as Decision Tree. The
frequency plots are shown in figures 4.11 and 4.12.
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Figure 4.11: Frequencies (y-axis) of the top ten features (x-axis) of Decision Tree
in order (from left to right) for malicious, clean, and Amsel data from kernel
driver.
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Figure 4.12: Frequencies (y-axis) of the top ten features (x-axis) of Gradient Boost
in order (from left to right) for malicious, clean, and Amsel data from kernel
driver.
Figure 4.11 shows the mean frequencies of the top ten features for the kernel data.
The most prominent call, NtQueryValueKey is used heavily by both ransomware and
emulated ransomware. Again this is likely the Java Virtual Machine that checks the
registry for various configuration parameters. This is also the reason behind the pres-
ence of NtRequestWaitReplyPort in the emulated ransomware. This call is used by the
JVM to listen for connections.
Moving onto the calls relating to file-handling, an interesting phenomenon is that
NtReadFile is not called as frequently by ransomware as benignware. This is signi-
ficant since many solutions use file activity as an indicator of ransomware [217, 138,
73, 120, 223, 131, 139, 180]. However, ransomware calls NtQueryAttributesFile much
more frequently than benignware. This call is used to obtain information about a file
and can be used by ransomware for a number of purposes. One possibility is as an
anti-VM trick since when sandboxes are created, they tend to be populated with files
that are never again modified. Therefore this call can be used to examine files on the
system for those properties. Another possibility is that ransomware is using the call to
select what files to encrypt, since ransomware tends not to encrypt every file, but just
4.4 Results 118
those it deems invaluable to the user.
In figure 4.12, the main call that eclipses the others is NtYieldExecution. This is used to
stop execution of the current thread and start the execution of another. It is most prom-
inently used by the emulated ransomware. The presence of this call is a side-effect from
the emulated ransomware “sleeping” for a certain amount of time as NtYieldExecution
is used to stop executing the current thread and start executing a new one. The high
importance given to this call is very likely partially responsible for Gradient Boost’s
poor performance detecting emulated ransomware since real ransomware does not use
it much. Interestingly, as with NtReadFile, NtWriteFile is used even more rarely by
ransomware. In order to get an understanding of the behaviour of the remaining fea-
tures in the top ten, rather than simply removing the common features, the features
whose behaviourial trend is already obvious from these graphs are removed in order to
observe the trend in the less prominent features. The features that have been removed
are: NtRequestWaitReplyPort, NtReadFile, NtWriteFile, NtYieldExecution, NtQuery-
AttributesFile, NtUnmapViewOfSection and NtQueryValueKey. The new graphs are
shown in figures 4.13 and 4.14
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Figure 4.13: Frequencies (y-axis) of the less prominent features (x-axis) within
the top ten of Decision Tree in order (from left to right) for malicious, clean, and
Amsel data from the kernel driver.
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Figure 4.14: Frequencies (y-axis) of the less prominent features (x-axis) within
the top ten of Gradient Boost in order (from left to right) for malicious, clean, and
Amsel data from the kernel driver.
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Figure 4.13 shows the trends in call frequencies for some of the features for Decision
Tree. Again, the file-related call NtCreateIoCompletion is called more frequently by
benignware than ransomware. In figure 4.14, the feature NtSetInformationThread
stands out. Ransomware uses this call significantly more than benignware. One of
the parameters in this call contains the attribute ThreadHideFromDebugger, which,
as its name suggests can be used by malware to hide its actions from any debugger
[88, 50]. However, the emulated ransomware does not use it much, thereby making it
more difficult for gradient boost to correctly classify it.
The results from analysing the top ten features used by Decision Tree and Gradient
Boost show that the classifiers are still partially reliant on evasive features. However,
there is a larger proportion of file related calls compared to the Cuckoo top ten and also
a smattering of calls from other categories. Therefore, the classifiers are not completely
dependent on evasive features in order to detect ransomware. This is why Decision
Tree is more likely to correctly classify the emulated ransomware with shorter interar-
rival times when using kernel data. Gradient Boost performs worse than Decision Tree
on the emulated ransomware for a number of reasons, namely, its overemphasis on
evasive techniques (NtSetInformationThread) and interference from the JVM assisting
Decision Tree’s results (NtRequestWaitReplyPort and NtQueryValueKey). In addition,
the call NtYieldExecution, which is used both by the JVM and emulated ransomware to
encrypt files at regular time intervals seems to have played a part in damaging Gradient
Boost’s ability to detect emulated ransomware.
4.4.6 Combined Data Results
Having carefully studied the ability of classifiers to detect the emulated ransomware
using kernel-level and user-level data separately, the next approach is to determine how
well classifiers perform when the data is combined. This is particularly relevant as one
of the findings from the previous chapter (chapter 3) was that the combination of user
and kernel-level data produced the best classification results. Therefore the aim in this
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subsection is to see if that remains true when the dataset is different and whether the
combination of data improves the performance when detecting emulated ransomware.
The results from these experiments are shown in table 4.7 and figure 4.15.
Machine Learning
Algorithm
Ransomware Amsel
AUC Accuracy (%) Precision F-Measure Accuracy (%)
AdaBoost 0.998 98.6 0.985 0.979 0.07
Decision Tree 0.968 97.2 0.955 0.958 1.85
Gradient Boost 0.999 98.7 0.990 0.980 88.5
Linear SVM 0.539 66.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Nearest Neighbour 0.973 91.6 0.908 0.871 32.4
Random Forest 0.996 98.0 0.987 0.969 43.0
Table 4.7: Classification results using Cuckoo and kernel data combined
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Figure 4.15: Results of classifying Amsel data using the Cuckoo and kernel data
together 1000 times.
Table 4.7 shows that combining the kernel and Cuckoo data improves the results in
distinguishing real ransomware from benignware, as expected. When it comes to de-
tecting emulated ransomware, the results differ significantly from the trend seen in the
previous set of results. Table 4.7 shows that while the maximum accuracy obtained in
detecting emulated ransomware has improved significantly by combining the Cuckoo
and kernel data (from 76% to 88%), the classifier that obtains the highest accuracy
has changed from Decision Tree to Gradient Boost. Unlike the previous results, the
only classifier that has obtained an accuracy detecting the emulated ransomware that
is higher than 50% is Gradient Boost. Even Decision Tree, which on the Cuckoo and
kernel data separately is the strongest, performs poorly when the data is combined.
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4.4.6.1 Feature Ranks
To try understand some of the reasoning behind the stark difference in results between
Decision Tree and Gradient Boost, the top ten features were found using the inbuilt
feature ranking method. These are shown in table 4.8.
Decision Tree Gradient Boost
FindResourceA NtOpenObjectAuditAlarm (Kernel)
NtOpenObjectAuditAlarm (Kernel) FindResourceA
CreateDirectoryW NtReadFile
NtQueryValueKey (Kernel) CreateDirectoryW
WriteProcessMemory GetSystemMetrics
NtLockFile (Kernel) WriteProcessMemory
NtWriteFile (Kernel) NtFlushVirtualMemory (Kernel)
NtDeleteKey (Kernel) NtYieldExecution (Kernel)
NtReadRequestData (Kernel) NtQueryValueKey (Kernel)
GetFileAttributesExW NtProtectVirtualMemory
Table 4.8: Top ten features using inbuilt feature ranking for Decision Tree and
Gradient Boost when considering the data from the kernel driver and Cuckoo
combined. The calls that came from the kernel data have been labelled as such.
Many of the features in table 4.8 are features that have been encountered previously.
Since the number of features have now doubled, it would seem from the top ten fea-
tures that Decision Tree is overfitting to the data (hence why it cannot correctly classify
the emulated ransomware). This is evidenced by calls like NtLockFile, NtReadRe-
questData and NtDeleteKey which are not known to be good distinguishing features
for ransomware. In addition, they are not heavily used (or used at all) by the emulated
ransomware. To further clarify the reasons behind the results, the frequency of the
features not in common have been plotted. In addition, NtYieldExecution has been re-
moved from the Gradient Boost plot since, as seen previously, it tends to dominate the
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plot making it difficult to see the trends in other calls. The trends are shown in figures
4.16 and 4.17.
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Figure 4.16: Frequencies (y-axis) of the unique features (x-axis) within the top ten
of Decision Tree in order (from left to right) for malicious, clean, and Amsel data
from the combination of the kernel driver and Cuckoo.
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Figure 4.17: Frequencies (y-axis) of the unique features (x-axis) within the top
ten of Gradient Boost in order (from left to right) for malicious, clean, and Amsel
data from the combination of the kernel driver and Cuckoo.
The most noticeable feature in figure 4.17 is NtReadFile. The call shown in this figure
is the one recorded by Cuckoo. What is remarkable about this call is that the frequency
with which it has been called by benignware far exceeds that of emulated ransomware.
Furthermore, the frequency with which it was called on average by emulated ransom-
ware is very similar to that of actual ransomware. In comparison in figure 4.16 the
most prominent feature is NtWriteFile. Here, the frequency with which it was called
by emulated ransomware far exceeds that of ransomware and is closer to that of be-
nignware (but still far beyond it). This gives additional insight as to why Gradient
Boost outperformed Decision Tree when it comes to detecting emulated ransomware.
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4.4.6.2 Misclassified Samples
In order to get a better understanding of the results from the best performing classi-
fier, the classification results per emulated ransomware sample are plotted. For each
sample, the time between encrypting each file is extracted and plotted. This is de-
scribed in more detail in section 4.3.3 - Misclassified Samples.
Figure 4.18: Results of classifying Amsel samples (with time between encryption
<=2s) using the combined data of Cuckoo and the kernel driver.
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Figure 4.19: Results of classifying Amsel samples (with time between encryption
>2s) using the combined data of Cuckoo and the kernel driver.
As can be seen from figures 4.18 and 4.19, in general, gradient boost is able to identify
the emulated ransomware as malicious regardless of the time spent between encrypt-
ing each file. However, interestingly, when the time intervals are very short (below
half a second), gradient boost is much more likely to classify the sample as benign.
This could be due to the fact that many benign tools that use similar calls to ransom-
ware (such as 7zip and WinRaR) tend to encrypt/zip the files requested as quickly as
possible. Therefore, the results are not necessarily problematic since it protects from
false positives. However, it is important to remember that ransomware could utilise
this knowledge to evade traditional classifiers.
The combination of Cuckoo and the kernel driver data can be seen to be more effect-
ive when it comes to detecting real and emulated ransomware. The classifiers still
rank evasive features highly, however, additional features are taken into account, in
particular, file-handling related calls, forming a more holistic picture of ransomware.
Gradient Boost showed the best performance classifying emulated ransomware, strug-
gling the most when the time between encrypting each file (interarrival time) was very
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low (almost zero).
4.4.7 Call Category Frequency
In order to better understand the data that the classifiers are being fed, a study of the
type of calls being made most frequently by ransomware, benignware, and emulated
ransomware (Amsel) was conducted. The frequency with which calls in each category
were made are depicted as pie charts. The spread of calls in the Cuckoo data are shown
in the pie charts in figures 4.20, 4.21 and 4.22.
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Figure 4.20: Distribution of call categories in data recorded by Cuckoo for clean
samples.
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Figure 4.21: Distribution of call categories in data recorded by Cuckoo for
ransomware samples.
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Figure 4.22: Distribution of call categories in data recorded by Cuckoo for emu-
lated malware samples.
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An interesting observation when comparing figures 4.20 and 4.21 is that 46% of the
calls relate to file handling for benignware while only 19% of the calls relate to file
handling for ransomware. Given that the main aim of ransomware is to encrypt a
user’s files, the expectation is that it would contain a larger proportion of file calls.
While that may be the case in a real, unmonitored environment, a large proportion of
what a dynamic analysis tool observes when analysing malware is evasive behaviour
(as seen previously). The remaining categories of calls commonly used by benignware
relate to synchronisation and registry usage. Ransomware, on the other hand, consists
largely of calls relating to processes. 50% of the calls made in the process category for
ransomware come from one call, ReadProcessMemory. This can be used by malware
to read the memory of another process [227]. The purpose of ReadProcessMemory is
further confirmed when looking at the next most frequently made call in the process
category for ransomware, Process32NextW. This is used by malware to cycle through
a list of running processes (usually obtained by calling CreateToolhelp32Snapshot)
to find a process to inject its code into. The last major category of calls made by
ransomware samples is system. In system, 50% of the calls from ransomware belong
to LdrGetProcedureAddress. This call was also in the top ten features for Gradient
Boost as it has been known to be used to evade specific analysis mechanisms.
The category of calls used by emulated malware samples is largely dominated by calls
made to the file system. Hence, it can be seen that the emulated samples are, for the
most part, behaving in an expected manner.
The distribution of call categories within the kernel data is shown in figures 4.23, 4.24,
and 4.25.
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Figure 4.23: Distribution of call categories in the data recorded by the kernel
driver for clean samples.
 ( [ H F X W L R Q  3 U R I L O L Q J         
 ) L O H V          
 - R E V         
 0 L V F H O O D Q \         
 2 E M H F W V  D Q G  6 \ P E R O L F  / L Q N V          
 3 Q 3  D Q G  3 R Z H U  0 D Q D J H P H Q W         
 3 R U W V         
 3 U R F H V V H V         
 5 H J L V W U \  . H \ V          
 6 H F W L R Q V         
 6 H F X U L W \  D Q G  $ X G L W L Q J         
 6 \ Q F K R Q L ] D W L R Q          
 6 \ V W H P  , Q I R U P D W L R Q  D Q G  & R Q W U R O         
 7 K U H D G V         
 7 L P H         
 7 R N H Q V         
 9 L U W X D O  0 H P R U \         
Figure 4.24: Distribution of call categories in the data recorded by the kernel
driver for ransomware samples.
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Figure 4.25: Distribution of call categories in the data recorded by the kernel
driver for emulated malware samples.
The pie charts of the call categories for the malicious and benign samples is quite
evenly distributed. This is partly down to the fact that the kernel driver records the
calls for all processes in the system. The largest difference between figures 4.23 and
4.24 is within the “time” category. The call in this category that contributes the most
to this difference is NtYieldExecution which has been seen previously (4.4.5). This
difference is possibly due to the fact that the main reason ransomware (and malware in
general) is likely to use the calls in this category is to detect whether they are running
in a virtual/emulated environment. Though there are many legitimate uses for the calls
in this category, they do not interest malware authors as much as general software
developers. In addition, calls relating to synchronisation are used more frequently by
benignware as would be expected given the previous observation.
Another category with an interesting difference is “Sections”. Whereas 3% of the calls
relate to sections in malware, only 0.8% of the calls relate to sections in benignware.
Looking deeper into the difference, it’s evident that it is due to the fact that malware
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makes much more use of NtMapViewOfSection and NtUnmapViewOfSection (whose
purpose has been described in section 3.3.1.1). On the other hand, the top two calls
in this category for benignware is NtMapViewOfSection and NtCreateSection. This
is because benignware is more likely to actually create its own sections, rather than
attempt to inject itself into another process’ memory.
The “processes” category contributes 4% of the calls for the average ransomware
sample and only 1% for the average benignware sample. The reason for this is that
ransomware (and malware in general) uses NtQueryInformationProcess much more
frequently than benignware since it can serve as anti-debugging method. While NtQuery-
InformationProcess contributes 66% to the processes category in ransomware, it only
contributes 53% to the equivalent for benignware.
Finally, the pie chart for emulated malware in figure 4.25 bears a strong resemblance
in shape to the equivalent chart from Cuckoo in figure 4.22. However, there is a major
difference. With Cuckoo the main category of calls were file related. On the kernel
side, the most dominant category of calls relate to time. The main reason for this is
that the two calls contributing to the most to the time category - NtQueryPerform-
anceCounter and NtYieldExecution - are not monitored by Cuckoo. This means that
Cuckoo misses out on a major element of a program’s behaviour. However, it can be
argued that it helps in stopping classifiers from learning unnecessary behaviours that
can lead to over-fitting. In fact, removing those two features from the kernel dataset
improves the base random forest accuracy (before hyper-parameter tuning) from 48.6%
to 51.0% when detecting emulated malware. With Gradient Boost, the accuracy jumps
from 0.540% to 67.1%. These calls are used very heavily by the emulated ransomware
to schedule the encryption of each file.
The call category data has further confirmed the pervasiveness of evasive techniques
in the ransomware data in addition to the relative lack of file handling calls. An inter-
esting observation is between the pie charts of the Cuckoo data and kernel data with
regards to the emulated ransomware data. The reason for the difference is mainly down
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to the fact that Cuckoo does not monitor some calls that the kernel driver does. These
calls can be considered important for detecting malware by some analysts (particularly
NtQueryPerformanceCounter), however, they can also be seen to be at risk of causing
overfitting. In addition, these visualisations have highlighted some unintended con-
sequences due to the manner in which the emulated ransomware was implemented,
some of which would be difficult to overcome completely.
4.4.8 Cuckoo Missing Calls
In most of the experiments performed in this thesis, the UI calls monitored by Cuckoo
are ignored. This is so that the comparison between the kernel driver and Cuckoo
are fair (since the UI calls are not monitored on the kernel side). In addition, if a
classifier is identifying malware by its UI activity (or lack of), it is unlikely to be robust
since malware can easily alter its UI activity as it is not its primary concern. This is
best evidenced in the change in results for the Cuckoo data in detecting the emulated
ransomware as shown in table 4.9 and figure 4.26.
Machine Learning
Algorithm
Ransomware Amsel
AUC Accuracy (%) Precision F-Measure Accuracy (%)
AdaBoost 0.992 96.6 0.959 0.959 1.80
Decision Tree 0.953 95.4 0.941 0.950 35.4
Gradient Boost 0.995 97.4 0.966 0.967 45.8
Linear SVM 0.863 75.3 0.860 0.687 1.07
Nearest Neighbour 0.969 91.4 0.927 0.889 1.47
Random Forest 0.994 97.0 0.975 0.961 60.0
Table 4.9: Classification results using Cuckoo data with UI features
4.4 Results 135
AdaBoost Decision Tree
Gradient Boost Linear SVM
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Accuracy
200
400
600
800
1000
P
er
ce
n
ta
g
e
o
f
ru
n
s
Nearest Neighbors
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Random Forest
Figure 4.26: Results of classifying Amsel data from Cuckoo 1000 times
In distinguishing real ransomware from benignware using the additional calls provided
by Cuckoo, it can be seen from table 4.9 that there is barely any difference in the results.
Therefore, the additional calls neither add nor take away anything with regards to the
training data. However, when it comes to detecting the emulated ransomware, the drop
in results is significant. Without the additional features, Decision Tree was the best
performing classifier on the emulated ransomware data from Cuckoo with an accuracy
of 77%. In addition, two classifiers were able to obtain an accuracy higher than 50%.
When the UI features are added, however, only Random Forest is able to get above
50% on the Amsel data from Cuckoo with an accuracy of 60%. This is significantly
worse than the original classification results.
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This highlights the importance of feature selection, particularly with regards to the
Cuckoo data. When hooking at user-level, there is an abundance of calls available
to hook, some of which can be very specific. Therefore, care must be taken when
choosing which calls to hook to ensure that the calls chosen are not likely to result in
over-fitting as that can be easily evaded. This also shows that though certain calls were
removed from the default set provided by Cuckoo for this research, it has not had a
negative impact on the results.
4.4.8.1 Feature Ranks
In order to confirm that the UI calls are responsible for the significant dip in results
when detecting emulated ransomware, the top ten features using the inbuilt and inde-
pendent feature ranking methods were extracted. They are shown in table 4.10
Independent Feature Ranking Inbuilt Feature Ranking
DrawTextExA DrawTextExA
FindWindowA FindWindowA
CreateDirectoryW NtReadFile
FindResourceA DrawTextExW
LdrGetProcedureAddress FindResourceA
SetWindowsHookExA NtOpenSection
NtReadFile LdrGetProcedureAddress
DrawTextExW CreateDirectoryW
SetFileTime NtTerminateProcess
NtOpenSection GetForegroundWindow
Table 4.10: Top ten features for Random Forest on all Cuckoo data
As can be seen the top ten is now dominated by UI calls. Three calls in the independent
top ten (DrawTextExA, FindWindowA and DrawTextExW) and four in the inbuilt top
ten (DrawTextExA, FindWindowA, DrawTextExW and GetForegroundWindow) relate
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to UI. The decision making process is now centred around UI activity. This can be
easily evaded by malware, particularly Trojan horses which tend to attach themselves
to legitimate programs and therefore would not differ at all from benignware with
regards to UI calls.
4.5 Conclusion
The aim of this chapter was to assess whether the dynamic analysis process is biased
by the change in behaviour malware displays when under investigation. To help with
this, a tool called Amsel was used to generate samples that emulate the malicious
behaviour of ransomware without any evasive properties. To begin with, the initial ex-
periments were conducted using real ransomware and benignware. These revealed that
the data from the kernel driver is more effective than that from Cuckoo for differenti-
ating ransomware from benignware. The classifier that showed the best performance
was Gradient Boost, obtaining an accuracy of 97.3% on the Cuckoo data and 98.2%
on the kernel data. Using Amsel, emulated ransomware samples were created. These
same trained classifiers were then made to classify data from running 1500 variations
of emulated ransomware. Samples only varied on one parameter, the interarrival time
or the time spent waiting between encrypting each file. This time, the best perform-
ing classifier was Decision Tree, obtaining an accuracy of 76.7% on the Cuckoo data
and 67.0% on the kernel data. Further analysis revealed that, when trained on Cuckoo
data, Decision Tree showed the strongest performance when the interarrival time was
higher. In other words, when Decision Tree was trained on data from Cuckoo, it was
more likely to classify a sample as ransomware as the time it spent encrypting files
was reduced. The opposite was true for the kernel data. It was also found that by
modifying a single hyper-parameter of gradient boost and random forest, they were
able to get the same performance detecting emulated ransomware as that obtained by
decision tree. The hyper-parameter in question increased the risk of both classifiers
over-fitting, thereby suggesting that malicious behaviour of real ransomware is not the
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most distinguishing behavioural trait seen in ransomware when under analysis.
Through studying the ten most useful features for Decision Tree and Gradient Boost, it
was possible to identify the reasons behind the results. When identifying ransomware
using the Cuckoo data, the primary attribute used by classifiers to detect ransomware
were its evasive attributes. In addition, the reason for Decision Tree performing better
than Gradient Boost using the Cuckoo data was, in part, due to a unintended behavi-
oural side effect of the emulated ransomware. Using the kernel data, the classifiers
placed more emphasis on file-handling calls explaining why Decision Tree performed
better when the emulated ransomware had higher rates of encryption. Likewise, De-
cision Tree’s superiority to Gradient Boost on emulated ransomware was also due to
unintended behavioural traits present in Amsel’s design.
As with the previous chapter, the best performance came from combining the user and
kernel-level data. However, this time, the best performing classifier on real ransomware
and emulated ransomware was Gradient Boost. Its accuracy detecting real ransomware
was 98.7%, and its accuracy detecting emulated ransomware was 88.5%. With the
increase in features, Decision Tree overfitted to the training data, which, in this case,
did not help it in detecting emulated ransomware.
This research has shown that the dynamic analysis process, as is currently carried out,
encourages classifiers to identify malware using the evasive properties that they show.
This presents some risks, since, in a real environment, malware may not show as many
evasive properties once it establishes it is running in a real environment. In addition,
all it would require of a malware author to evade classifiers trained using the traditional
dynamic malware analysis approach is to remove all evasive behaviour from their mal-
ware. Another observation made from this research is the impact on performance that
the hyper-parameter values can have.
Despite not setting out to do so, this research discovered some of the limitations with
using Java to develop malware simulators to run on Windows. Its compatibility with
multiple OSes makes it a popular choice, even for malware simulators [156]. Though it
4.5 Conclusion 139
allows for the quick development of complex algorithms, the JVM’s interference with
the system call data gathered is too large to be ignored. This highlights the sensitivity
of system call data and the importance of ensuring any additional tools present on the
monitoring system have little to no impact on the system call data gathered.
Finally, these experiments have highlighted the importance of taking due consideration
when selecting features to monitor. This will define what the classifiers use to identify
malware. As shown, if allowed to identify malware through the use of UI features,
classifiers are likely to. This would make them extremely susceptible to adversarial
attacks. Therefore, feature selection must be performed with the malicious behaviour
in mind that needs to be blocked.
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Chapter 5
Testing the robustness of emulated
ransomware results
The results in the previous chapter were affected by the interference from the JVM.
Therefore, the purpose of this chapter is to determine the results that would be obtained
if the experiments carried out in the previous chapter used an emulator that does not
suffer the same shortcomings. By using the same emulator but written in a different
language (C), it will be possible to either reject or further confirm the conclusions made
in chapter 4. This will provide the answer to the sixth research question:
RQ6 Are high-level languages such as Java suitable for emulating malware to test
system call monitoring tools?
In addition, through answering this question, this chapter tests the robustness of classi-
fiers to detect malware that is functionally exactly the same but different with regards
to the system calls used. This provides the eighth contribution:
C8 This research determines the sensitivity of classifiers trained in the traditional
dynamic malware analysis process to changes in system calls made.
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5.1 Method
The method employed in this chapter is exactly the same as that used in chapter 4 as it is
an extension of it. The only difference in this chapter is that the emulated ransomware
samples are written in C. The theory behind using C is that C provides more control
over the system calls made by the program. In addition, the developer can specifically
choose the system calls made.
Therefore, as mentioned previously, the functionality of Amsel employed in chapter 4
is implemented in C for this chapter. Much of the implementation is quite straightfor-
ward, as the program simply encrypts files in a specified directory and waits a specified
amount of time between encrypting each file. However, in order to test the robustness
of the trained classifiers, the delay between encrypting each file was implemented in
two different ways. The first set of emulated ransomware used the time function
provided by C. This function returns the number of seconds since January 1, 1970. It
is used to implement the delay as follows:
1 delay = time(0) + secondsToWait;
2 while(time(0) < delay);
Listing 5.1: Delay implemented using a standard C method
The function time() is defined in time.h. Behind the scenes, time calls
GetSystemTimeAsFileTime when run on Windows. The return value when
time(0) is called is the number of seconds since January 1, 1970 at that point in
time. The variable secondsToWait contains the user specified time to wait. This
is added to the current time. After that, on line 2, a while loop is used to prevent
progress until the current time exceeds the time in the future that it needs to wait until.
The second set of emulated ransomware was implemented using the delay function
provided by Windows. In C, this function is called Sleep and it goes on to call the
Windows system call NtDelayExecution. Implementing a delay with this is very
straightforward:
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1 Sleep(millisecondsToWait);
Listing 5.2: Delay implemented using a recommended Windows method
The reason for creating two types of emulated ransomware samples is to further test the
robustness of the classifiers. The use of NtDelayExecution by malware is already docu-
mented [179]. It has also been encountered in this research in the top ten most frequent
calls in tables 3.6 and 3.7. GetSystemTimeAsFileTime has not been encountered as
much, although it appeared in the top ten most frequent calls for benignware and mal-
ware in table 3.6. Despite the fact that both system calls can be used to implement the
same functionality, there is a possibility that the difference in behaviour of these calls
will affect the classification accuracy of the emulated ransomware.
The experiments carried out in this chapter are identical to those carried out in the
previous chapter. As with Amsel, 1500 emulated ransomware samples using the C time
function were generated with the same spread of time delays as Amsel. Likewise, 1500
emulated ransomware samples using the Windows Sleep function were also generated.
As before, the classifiers were trained on the real ransomware and benignware from
chapter 4 and then separately tested on each group of emulated ransomware. These
experiments were conducted for the Cuckoo and Kernel data.
5.2 Results
5.2.1 Standard C time method
The results from testing the classifiers on the emulated ransomware samples using the
C time function are shown in table 5.1
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Machine Learning Algorithm Kernel Driver Accuracy (%) Cuckoo Accuracy (%)
AdaBoost 83.1 0.0
Decision Tree 60.0 0.0
Gradient Boost 60.1 0.0
Linear SVM 0.0 0.0
Nearest Neighbour 6.07 2.27
Random Forest 48.6 3.54
Table 5.1: Classification accuracy of emulated ransomware with C time function
using data from Cuckoo and the Kernel driver.
On the Cuckoo side, the results are considerably worse compared to the results when
Java was used to emulate ransomware. Not a single classifier correctly classifies even
50% of the samples. On the other hand, using the kernel data, the classifiers obtain
much better results. AdaBoost gets the best results with 83.1%. Therefore the most
influential features are studied to determine what contributed to these results.
5.2.1.1 Influential features
To understand what contributed to the results, the most important features were ana-
lysed using the inbuilt feature ranking method described in section 3.2.3. Unlike
chapter 4, the top 20 features are analysed since the emulated ransomware samples
used in this chapter are very minimal with regards to the system calls they use. Given
that AdaBoost is the best performing classifier for the kernel data, the top 20 features
from this classifier are analysed. The same is used for the Cuckoo data since there
were no outstanding classifiers. The first top ten features and the frequencies with
which they were called are shown in figures 5.1 and 5.2
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Figure 5.1: Frequencies (y-axis) of the top ten features (x-axis) of AdaBoost in
order (from left to right) for malicious, clean, and emulated ransomware data
(using C time) from the kernel.
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Figure 5.2: Frequencies (y-axis) of the top ten features (x-axis) of AdaBoost in
order (from left to right) for malicious, clean, and emulated ransomware data
(using C time) from Cuckoo.
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Figure 5.1 shows the sheer volume of file-handling related calls made by the emulated
ransomware. The two peaks in the call frequency are due to NtReadFile and NtWrite-
File. The importance that AdaBoost has placed on file-handling calls when trained on
the kernel data is also quite evident from figure 5.1. As observed previously, these two
calls seem to be called more frequently by benignware than ransomware.
In contrast, figure 5.2 does not focus on features used by the emulated ransomware.
The only feature in figure 5.2 that emulated ransomware uses is NtQueryDirectory-
File. This is also used by ransomware to obtain information regarding files and dir-
ectories [227]. Besides that, the main focus in figure 5.2 is on features frequently
used for evasive purposes (NtUnmapViewOfSection, LdrGetProcedureAddress, Get-
SystemMetrics).
Already, some important differences can be seen between the graphs here and those
in chapter 4. In chapter 4, the calls LdrGetProcedureAddress and NtProtectVirtual-
Memory were also utilised by the emulated ransomware with a frequency similar to
that employed by ransomware. However, the presence of these calls in the emulated
ransomware was due to using Java as opposed to being intentional design choices.
Moving on to the next ten most influential features according to AdaBoost, figures 5.3
and 5.4 show their mean frequencies for the kernel data and Cuckoo data.
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Figure 5.3 shows the next ten most important features according to AdaBoost when
using the kernel data. Of note is NtCreateFile, which, unlike the previous file-handling
calls, is called more frequently by ransomware than benignware, and even more fre-
quently by the emulated ransomware. The frequency of the remaining features for
emulated ransomware are not caused by its operation but are just due to the general
system activity.
Figure 5.4 shows the next ten most important features when using the Cuckoo data.
The most prominent peak comes from the emulated ransomware and is due to the time
function that it calls (which goes on to call GetSystemTimeAsFileTime). The only
other feature used by emulated ransomware is NtReadFile, whose call frequency is
similar to that of real ransomware.
5.2.1.2 Misclassified samples
The classification results of the best performing classifier are further dissected to de-
termine the time delay values at which the best performing classifier was able to
identify emulated ransomware samples. Since classifiers were only able to produce
an acceptable result using the kernel data, the Cuckoo data is not analysed here. The
method employed to obtain this data is described in section 4.3.3. Figures 5.5 and
5.6 breakdown AdaBoost’s performance based on the time delay between each file
encryption.
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Figure 5.5: Results from AdaBoost classifying emulated ransomware samples us-
ing C time (with time between encryption <=2s) with the data from the kernel
driver.
Figure 5.6: Results from AdaBoost classifying emulated ransomware samples us-
ing C time (with time between encryption >2s) using the data from the kernel
driver.
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The results show the misclassified samples to be spread across all the times. The main
cluster of misclassified samples is between 1 and 10 seconds. AdaBoost seems to
perform best at both extremes, either when the frequency of encryption is very high or
very low. By correlating these plots with the top twenty features, it becomes clear that
this is likely due to the fact that when the rate of encryption is average, the amount of
file-handling calls correspond quite closely to those made by benignware.
5.2.1.3 Call category frequencies
Finally, to get an understanding of the data behind the results, the distributions of the
categories of calls obtained from running the emulated ransomware are plotted into a
pie chart for both Cuckoo and the kernel driver. The process involved in creating the
pie charts is described in section 4.3.4. The distribution of call categories for the kernel
data and Cuckoo data is shown in figures 5.7 and 5.8.
Figure 5.7: Distribution of call categories in data recorded by the kernel driver
for emulated ransomware using C time function.
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Figure 5.8: Distribution of call categories in data recorded by Cuckoo for emu-
lated ransomware using C time function.
Figure 5.7 shows the call category distribution on the kernel side. The distribution
of calls are dominated by calls to the file-system. This is not surprising given the
volume of calls made by the emulated ransomware. Though the calls in the additional
categories are also used, that is because the kernel driver is monitoring at a system-wide
level.
Figure 5.8 shows the call category distribution on the Cuckoo side. There is even
less distribution in the pie chart in this case. However, in this case, it is because it is
dominated by synchronisation calls. Further analysis reveals that every single call in
the synchronisation category comes from one system call, GetSystemTimeAsFileTime.
The domination by synchronisation calls is unsurprising given that the time function
needs to be called repeatedly to get the current time and compare with the projected
end time within the while loop.
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5.2.1.4 Combined data results
Finally, the data from Cuckoo and the kernel driver was combined to determine if the
results would be aided by this. Due to the fact that only the kernel driver was able to
produce a suitable performance, it would be unusual for the results to improve by com-
bining the data since that would add more noise. Previously, the results improved from
combining the data due to the fact that the classifiers misclassified different samples
depending on whether they were given the Cuckoo or kernel driver data. In this case,
since the classifiers were barely able to classify any samples correctly when using the
Cuckoo data, it was unlikely that combining the data would help the results. In ad-
dition, the emulated ransomware in this chapter uses very few features, therefore the
addition of more features was likely to add too much noise. To verify this hypothesis
the classification experiments were performed using the data from Cuckoo and the
kernel driver. The results are shown in table 5.2.
Machine Learning Algorithm Accuracy
AdaBoost 21.3
Decision Tree 33.0
Gradient Boost 53.5
Linear SVM 0.0
Nearest Neighbour 1.17
Random Forest 53.7
Table 5.2: Classification accuracy of emulated ransomware with C time function
using data from Cuckoo and the kernel driver.
As expected, the results from combining the Cuckoo and kernel driver data have pro-
duced weaker classification results than when the kernel data was used on its own.
Though some classifiers suffered more than others with the addition of features, ulti-
mately, none were able to obtain an accuracy higher than 54%.
The experiments carried out in this section reveal the lack of robustness in the classi-
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fiers trained on system call data from Cuckoo. Even though the emulated ransomware
demonstrated a mix of malicious and evasive symptoms, the classifiers using Cuckoo
data were not even able to detect more than 10% of the samples. This is due to the fact
that many of the features that were ranked highly by the classifiers were not used at all
by the emulated ransomware. In addition, the feature used to create the time delay is
not commonly used for this purpose by malware. On the other hand, the classifiers us-
ing the kernel data had more success, but were unable to get up to 90% accuracy. The
classifiers did not perform as well when the amount of file-handling activity exhibited
by the emulated ransomware matched that exhibited by benignware. An analysis of
the data revealed that due to the manner in which the delay was implemented for the
emulated ransomware, the amount of synchronisation calls far exceeded the number of
file-handling calls recorded by Cuckoo. However, since these calls did not reach the
kernel, the kernel data was dominated by file-handling calls.
5.2.2 Windows C Sleep method
In this section, the emulated ransomware using the Windows ‘Sleep’ method to im-
plement delay is evaluated. Table 5.3 shows the results from classifying emulated
ransomware using the Windows Sleep function to implement the delay between en-
crypting each file.
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Machine Learning Algorithm Kernel Driver Accuracy (%) Cuckoo Accuracy (%)
AdaBoost 6.40 74.4%
Decision Tree 2.21 10.7%
Gradient Boost 2.33 0.0%
Linear SVM 0.0 0.0%
Nearest Neighbour 0.33 27.9
Random Forest 3.13 8.08
Table 5.3: Classification accuracy detecting emulated ransomware using Win-
dows Sleep function (NtDelayExecution) using data gathered by Cuckoo and the
kernel driver.
The results in table 5.3 show how a small change in the function used (but little change
in functionality) can dramatically change the results. This time, the classifiers were
unable to get more than 10% accuracy when using the kernel data. Whereas, using
the data from Cuckoo, AdaBoost was able to obtain an accuracy of 74.4%. To get an
understanding into why the results have changed so drastically, the top 20 features are
analysed.
5.2.2.1 Influential features
As the top 20 features are obtained using best performing classifier (AdaBoost) on the
training data (as described in section 3.2.3), they are the same as the top 20 features
shown for the emulated ransomware using the C time function (in section 5.2.1.1).
However, it is still useful to analyse the average frequencies of each call in the top 20
since they are likely to differ. The top ten for the kernel and cuckoo data are shown in
figures 5.9 and 5.10.
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Figure 5.9: Frequencies (y-axis) of the top ten features (x-axis) of AdaBoost in
order (from left to right) for malicious, clean, and emulated ransomware data
(using Windows Sleep) from the kernel.
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Figure 5.10: Frequencies (y-axis) of the top ten features (x-axis) of AdaBoost in
order (from left to right) for malicious, clean, and emulated ransomware data
(using Windows Sleep) from Cuckoo.
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The distribution of calls in figure 5.9 is quite similar to that seen when the C time
function was used. However, one difference is the amount of file-handling calls made.
With the Windows Sleep function, the amount of file-handling calls made is consid-
erably less. This is unusual given that the emulated ransomware using the Windows
Sleep function should function in exactly the same manner as the emulated ransomware
using the C time function. The only difference is in the method used to implement the
time delay. After careful analysis, it became clear that the reason for this difference is
within the time function itself. The C time function is documented to return the num-
ber of seconds since January 1, 1970, however, this is not guaranteed. It may return
the number of milliseconds, for example. In addition, due to the fact that it is run on
a virtual machine (that has just been restored from a snapshot) rather than directly on
the hardware, it is even less likely to function as expected. Furthermore, the manner
in which the delay is implemented with the time function is through the use of a while
loop. This is not as efficient or accurate as the Sleep function. The reason being that
the Sleep function suspends the running thread and interrupts the CPU when it requires
attention again. Whereas the while loop is constantly executing on the CPU meaning
that it’s more likely to be affected by CPU load. The Sleep function, however, did
call a hooked system call, so this would add some delay to the call being resolved
which could have also impacted its accuracy. When testing an emulated ransomware
sample with the C time function and giving it the same time delay value as an emulated
ransomware sample using the Windows Sleep function, it was observed that occasion-
ally they both had the same amount of file-related calls, but not always. The C time
emulated ransomware sample occasionally made more file-related calls than the Win-
dows Sleep emulated ransomware. This explains why the classifiers using data from
the kernel driver did not detect the emulated ransomware with the Windows Sleep as
effectively, since it did not make as many file-handling calls.
The frequencies for the top ten in the Cuckoo data in figure 5.10 are similar to that seen
when the C time function was used. This is due to the fact that most of the functions in
the top ten for Cuckoo are not used by the emulated ransomware. Therefore the next
5.2 Results 156
ten features must be analysed to obtain a better understanding of the results.
Figures 5.11 and 5.12 show the next ten most influential features and the frequency
with which they were called by malware, benignware, and the emulated ransomware
using the Windows Sleep function.
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data (using Windows Sleep) from the kernel.
5.2 Results 157
Fin
dR
eso
urc
eA
NtO
pe
nS
ect
ion
NtD
ela
yE
xe
cut
ion
Sh
ellE
xe
cut
eE
xW
Ge
tSy
ste
mT
im
eA
sFi
leT
im
e
Wr
ite
Pro
ces
sM
em
ory
Op
en
Se
rvi
ceW
NtR
ea
dF
ile
Rtl
De
com
pre
ssB
uff
er
Ge
tSy
ste
mD
ire
cto
ryW
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
Emulated Ransomware (Sleep)
Clean
Ransomware
Figure 5.12: Frequencies (y-axis) of the features (x-axis) ranked 10-20 of Ada-
Boost in order (from left to right) for malicious, clean, and emulated ransomware
data (using Windows Sleep) from Cuckoo.
Figure 5.11 again highlights the reduction in file-handling calls made by the emulated
ransomware using the Windows Sleep function. The frequency of benignware is now
closer to the frequency of emulated ransomware.
Figure 5.12 differs significantly from the emulated ransomware using C time (figure
5.4) with regards to the frequency with which the delay function is called. Obviously,
the emulated ransomware using Windows Sleep does not call GetSystemTimeAsFile-
Time at all, rather, it calls NtDelayExecution (the function called by Sleep). Although,
it calls it significantly less than benignware and ransomware on average. This is be-
cause the Sleep function only needs to be called once to suspend execution unlike the
time function which is inside a while loop. Due to this, AdaBoost is able to correctly
classify a significant portion of the emulated ransomware samples correctly. To under-
stand what caused AdaBoost to incorrectly classify emulated ransomware samples, the
classification results per sample are analysed.
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5.2.2.2 Misclassified samples
The previous section showed how AdaBoost was able to detect the emulated ransom-
ware samples. However, it is not clear why AdaBoost did not detect all the emulated
samples. To understand this, the time delays of the samples that were correctly and
incorrectly classified are plotted. This is shown in figures 5.13 and 5.14.
Figure 5.13: Results from AdaBoost classifying emulated ransomware samples
using Windows Sleep function (with time between encryption <=2s) using the data
from Cuckoo.
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Figure 5.14: Results from AdaBoost classifying emulated ransomware samples
using Windows Sleep function (with time between encryption >2s) using the data
from Cuckoo.
From figure 5.13, it is immediately clear as to where AdaBoost misclassified samples.
The samples that had a large proportion of file activity compared to evasive activity
were not detected. Once the time delay between each encryption increased beyond
half a second, AdaBoost was able to correctly classify the samples. In other words,
as the evasive behaviour became more prominent in the Cuckoo data, the classification
accuracy of AdaBoost improved. The results here are similar to those seen in figure 4.3
when Java was used to emulate ransomware. However, the difference here (figure 5.13)
is that almost all samples with a delay below half a second went undetected, whereas
in figure 4.3 some samples were detected.
5.2.2.3 Call category frequencies
To get an understanding of the data seen by the classifiers and how it differs to the data
from the emulated ransomware using the C time function, the various categories of
calls made by the average sample is visualised in the form of a pie chart for the kernel
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and Cuckoo data in figures 5.15 and 5.16.
Figure 5.15: Distribution of call categories in data recorded by the kernel driver
for emulated ransomware using the Windows Sleep function.
Figure 5.16: Distribution of call categories in data recorded by Cuckoo for emu-
lated ransomware using the Windows Sleep function.
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The distribution of the categories of calls in figure 5.15 for the kernel data shows a re-
latively even distribution (unlike figure 5.7). The files category is the largest in the pie
chart, however, it does not show the same dominance as in figure 5.7 further showing
why AdaBoost was unable to correctly classify the Windows Sleep emulated ransom-
ware.
In the Cuckoo data, this time the dominant category is the file calls. Figure 5.16 shows
file calls make up 97% of an emulated ransomware sample. This is to be expected since
the call to Sleep does not need to be called as frequently as the C time call. In addition,
in this case, all the calls in the synchronisation category came from NtDelayExecution.
5.2.2.4 Combined data results
Finally, as with the C time emulated ransomware, the data from Cuckoo and the kernel
driver was combined. However, as before, it is not likely that the results will improve
since in this case, only the Cuckoo data was able to obtain an acceptable level of
accuracy. The results are shown in table 5.4.
Machine Learning Algorithm Accuracy
AdaBoost 0.20
Decision Tree 9.76
Gradient Boost 1.2
Linear SVM 0.0
Nearest Neighbour 0.07
Random Forest 15.4
Table 5.4: Classification accuracy of emulated ransomware using Windows Sleep
function from Cuckoo and Kernel driver.
As expected, the results are considerably worse when the data from Cuckoo and the
kernel driver is combined. Therefore, this chapter has revealed that it is not always
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appropriate to combine the Cuckoo data with the data from the kernel driver as it will
not always lead to improved results.
Studying emulated ransomware using the Windows Sleep function as opposed to the C
time function has revealed the lack of robustness within classifiers using system calls.
The data from the kernel driver was found to be insufficient for detecting the emulated
ransomware. While the data from Cuckoo was used to obtain an accuracy of 74.4%,
this was largely helped by the Sleep function used. When emulated ransomware slept
for very short time periods, and spent more time encrypting files, the Cuckoo data was
not suitable for detecting the emulated ransomware.
5.3 Conclusion
This chapter set out to determine whether Java is a suitable medium to use to emulate
malware and whether the classifiers trained on system calls are vulnerable to minor
changes in calls used. It tested this by re-implementing the emulated ransomware used
in chapter 4 in C. Two implementations were created that were identical except with
regards to the function used to create the delay between encrypting each file. One
implementation used the C standard time method to create the delay while the other
used the Windows Sleep function to achieve it. The results showed that when the
function used to implement the evasiveness/delay was the standard C time function,
the emulated samples went completely undetected using the Cuckoo data. However,
since the function commonly used by malware to implement evasiveness in that manner
is the Windows Sleep function, one classifier using Cuckoo data was able to detect
74.4% of the samples. The only samples it did not detect were those where the amount
of evasiveness was low relative to the file calls (or malicious behaviour). The results
provided further evidence that the features being focused on within the Cuckoo data
relate to the evasive behaviour of malware.
On the other hand, since the kernel data was focusing largely on the file activity, it
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was not changes in the delay function that affected it. Rather, it was the changes that
resulted from using a different delay function that affected it. When the emulated
ransomware was using the Windows Sleep function, it did not display as much file
activity as when the C time function was used. This is partially due to the manner
in which the Windows Sleep is implemented. Therefore, when using the kernel data,
AdaBoost was able to detect 83.1% of the emulated ransomware samples using the C
time function.
Therefore, it can be concluded that when using system-call data from Cuckoo, the
classifiers are particularly vulnerable to changes in the system calls used to achieve
the same functionality. This is partly down to the low level of abstraction at which
Cuckoo monitors programs. This is less of a problem in the kernel data where there
are fewer redundant calls. A simple remedy for this would be to represent features that
are practically identical as the same feature (for example, GetSystemDirectoryA and
GetSystemDirectoryW).
Another remedy is to gather the data at both levels, so that each can offset the short-
comings of the other. However, unlike chapter 4, this chapter has found that it must
not be blindly combined, or combined at all. Rather, each dataset should be consulted
independently since combining the data can cause one to bring down the accuracy of
the other.
Therefore this chapter has shown that while some of the general conclusions that were
made when using Amsel in chapter 4 are similar to those made in this chapter, the
interference from the JVM showed the classifiers to be much less vulnerable than they
are. In addition, Java does not provide the flexibility and control required to test a
classifier’s vulnerability to small changes in system calls. Java is more suitable to test
programs operating at higher levels of abstraction.
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Chapter 6
Discussion
This thesis looked at some of the assumptions within the field of dynamic malware
analysis to determine whether they needed rethinking. The findings indicate that the
process requires some refining. Therefore this chapter proposes some general prin-
ciples for dynamic malware analysis that have been extrapolated from the findings in
the previous chapters. This is detailed in the final research question:
RQ7 How can the dynamic malware analysis process be amended to prevent uninten-
ded security flaws from emerging?
In answering this question, the final contribution of this thesis is provided:
C9 The findings from this research are generalised to inform the general dynamic
malware analysis process.
In addition, this chapter discusses some of the limitations in this work as well as the
future directions for this research.
6.1 General Principles for Dynamic Malware Analysis
This thesis has studied some of the basic assumptions in the dynamic malware analysis
process and questioned the lack of theory behind them. In doing so, it has discovered
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some inherent flaws in the traditional dynamic malware analysis pipeline. Therefore,
to help future publications in this field, this section makes some recommendations to
strengthen the traditional dynamic malware analysis process. Each recommendation is
listed as a subsection.
6.1.1 Analyse the contributing features
When analysing the classification results from differentiating malware and benignware
in chapter 3 (table 3.2) and chapter 4 (table 4.1 and 4.2), it would seem that the classifi-
ers are extremely adept at detecting malware. However, from studying the contributing
features (table 3.4, 3.5, 4.5 and 4.6) and subsequently the results from the experiments
with emulated ransomware in chapter 4 and chapter 5 (table 4.1, 4.2, 5.1 and 5.3),
it became clear that the classifiers are not as robust as the original results suggested.
This realisation would not have occurred had the most influential features informing
the classifiers not been analysed. Studying them highlighted the dependence that the
classifiers had placed on evasive features. This also highlights the importance of hav-
ing an understanding of the features being provided to the classifiers. For example,
in knowing that GetSytemDirectoryA and GetSystemDirectoryW are essentially the
same feature, the analyst can consider combining them to avoid overfitting. Without
studying the features, a solution’s robustness cannot be guaranteed.
6.1.2 Document the analysis tool used
Within dynamic malware analysis, the tool being used to capture the data can have a
profound effect on the classification results. Chapter 3 illustrated this point by showing
the differences in classification results just from using different hooking strategies.
However, hooking strategies aside, tools can come with a variety of additional features
that can be enabled. Using Cuckoo as an example, in addition to gathering system calls,
it simulates user activity which includes clicking the mouse and pressing buttons on the
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keyboard. In addition, it can be made to simulate network activity amongst many other
things. Therefore, it’s not enough to simply state the name of the tool being monitored,
but, any parameter values that were modified must be listed to aid reproduce-ability.
This is particularly important since much of the additional functionality mentioned can
significantly affect classification results. For example, malware frequently looks for
user activity before actually running. This includes mouse movements and recently
created files [179]. Furthermore, if a relatively new and undocumented tool is being
used, it’s essential that its functionality and, in particular, call capturing methodology
are carefully documented. Another important aspect that needs to be highlighted when
describing the tool being used is the level at which it gathers calls. Tools can gather
calls at a local process level (where they only monitor the process being investigated)
or a global system level (where they monitor the entire system). Within the local
level, however, tools could also monitor child processes created by the process under
investigation. In addition, they may be concerned with monitoring a process that the
process under investigation injected itself into. All of these can have a significant
effect on the calls captured and therefore must be documented. The reason for such
a strong emphasis on accurately documenting the methodology employed by the tool
being used is due to the fact that its effect on the results is significant (refer to table 3.2
and 3.9). This transparency will also allow other researchers to faithfully reproduce
the results.
6.1.3 Document the features used
In addition to analysing and discussing the influential features, chapter 4 showed the
importance of carefully considering the categories of calls being monitored (refer to
section 4.4.8). For the research in this thesis, the UI calls were ignored. Part of the
reason for this is the obvious risk from overfitting that can occur. Since UI activity
is non-essential, it is trivial to alter it to avoid detection. Section 4.4.8 analysed the
performance of Cuckoo with and without the addition of UI calls and while it did
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not change much for differentiating ransomware from benignware, when classifiers
were trained on data with UI calls, the ability to detect emulated ransomware dropped
considerably. Therefore, it is important to carefully select calls to monitor with the
help of expert knowledge in the domain.
6.1.4 Document the hyper-parameters
Chapter 4 briefly showed the effects of hyper-parameters on classification results (sec-
tion 4.4.3). Though brief, section 4.4.3 found that the values of the hyper-parameters
could have a significant effect on the results, particularly when it came to detecting
the emulated ransomware. The values of the hyper-parameters can also reveal whether
the classifier is more likely to overfit the data. Therefore, the hyper-parameters values
must be clearly documented to aid reproducibility.
6.1.5 Monitor at multiple levels of abstraction
The best classification results in chapter 3 and chapter 4 came from using system calls
gathered at both a user- and kernel-level (sections 3.3.3 and 4.4.6). Conversely, in
chapter 5 (sections 5.2.1.4 and 5.2.2.4) it was found that combining the data from both
levels caused the results to drop significantly. However, while combining the data
from different views can be dangerous, consulting the data from each independently
can be very beneficial. Chapter 5 also found that classifiers were able to detect different
types of emulated ransomware depending on what data was used, since each focused
on different elements of the malware’s behaviour. Therefore using an additional layer
of security is likely to be beneficial. In addition to monitoring at user- and kernel-
level, monitoring at a global as well as local level can be beneficial. Monitoring at a
local level allows the analysis tool to observe the minutiae of the sample’s behaviour,
however, this could miss malicious activity that malware forces benignware to perform
on its behalf. Therefore, monitoring at a global level can remedy this. Monitoring at
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a global level also allows a tool to observe changes in the general behaviour of the
system. In more general terms, when monitoring malware, it’s important not to rely on
only one data source since there is less chance of malware evading or compromising
multiple data capturing sources.
6.1.6 Evaluate available hooking methodologies
The results from chapters 3, 4 and 5 all unequivocally show that the choice of hooking
methodology affects the classification results obtained. Therefore, as alluded to in
section 6.1.2, the hooking methodology used must be carefully considered. Aside
from the general differences in data captured, a number of considerations must be
made when selecting an appropriate hooking methodology. At the kernel-level, the
three main distinctions between each hooking methodology is performance, scope and
difficulty. Performance is very important at a kernel-level and poor performance can be
exploited by malware to detect the presence of an analysis tool since it will affect the
performance of the whole system [65]. Scope refers to the categories of system calls
that are available to be intercepted by the hooking methodology chosen. Most of the
hooking methodologies have the potential to intercept all system calls, but not all. Filter
drivers for example, tend to observe events from specific categories (as mentioned in
section 2.3.6). In addition, as some hooking methodologies have a greater impact on
performance, the actual quantity of calls available to them is limited. Finally, another
important consideration is the difficulty of implementing the hook. With some hooking
methodologies (such as VMI), the implementation is complicated by the size of the
semantic gap that needs to be bridged to create a working solution. This is not trivial
as the location of the hook will determine whether the analysis tool has to decipher and
interpret register values or simple data structures.
In terms of user-level hooks, there is little difference between the inline and IAT hooks,
therefore, both are interchangeable. DBI, on the other hand, allows for an analyst to
obtain detailed information regarding a sample’s behaviour but unless that level of
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information is required, it is not worth the performance impact that it brings.
As can be seen, there are a number of factors that must be considered when selecting a
hooking methodology. Each of these factors can also have a small but noticeable affect
on the data gathered and therefore must be carefully evaluated within the context of the
tool they will be deployed in.
6.1.7 Conclusion
Much of the principles detailed in this section relate to transparency. The effects that
each component of the dynamic malware analysis pipeline can have is often underes-
timated or not anticipated. Therefore, by providing more information on the matter, it
makes it possible for both the authors and others to accurately verify the robustness of
the results produced from the research.
6.2 Limitations & Future work
Despite the extensive analysis conducted in this thesis, it is not without its limitations.
There are still many aspects within the dynamic malware analysis process that could
not be studied. However, these understudied areas provide plenty of opportunities for
future work.
The main limitation in this work relates to the platform chosen. While the work con-
ducted in this thesis can be generalised to other platforms, it would have been better to
have conducted the experiments in this thesis on each version of Windows that came
after XP as well. The reason for choosing XP over the latest version of Windows is
that, as explained previously, malware still targets older versions of Windows. Un-
supported versions tend to be the low hanging fruit in any organisation. This was
evidenced by the recent cyber-attack by WannaCry targeting NHS systems still using
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Windows XP [64, 81]. Therefore, ideally, it would be more beneficial to use each ver-
sion of Windows from XP onwards. This would show if the results differ on different
versions of Windows. Unfortunately, due to the constraints of time, this could not be
achieved. With each new version of Windows, the kernel is updated with additional
calls to support new functionality. Therefore a modified kernel driver would be needed
for each version. Furthermore, with the introduction of 64 bit versions of Windows
came PatchGuard [229]. PatchGuard provides Kernel Patch Protection for Windows
by triggering a blue screen of death as soon as it sees that structures within the kernel
(such as the SSDT) have been modified. Though there are ways to get around Patch-
Guard [231, 228], and methods provided by Microsoft to intercept kernel activity, it
would require a considerable development effort to create kernel drivers for both 32
and 64 bit versions of Windows.
Throughout the research in this thesis, the focus was on system calls made. For sim-
plicity’s sake, and due to the constraints of time, the arguments of each system call
were not considered. In addition, gathering the arguments from every system call in
the SSDT would have had a considerable effect on the system’s performance. Cuckoo
already provides this information, and the kernel driver could quite easily be modified
to supply this information (since it is already embedded in each system call). To work
around the performance issue, a reduced feature set using the results in chapter 3 in
section 3.3.4 could be used to guide the process. This is a potential future work.
The localised kernel results in chapter 3 - section 3.3.2 only included calls made by the
process under investigation and any child processes it created. However, malware is
known to inject its code into a benign process and execute it from there. The localised
kernel driver would not see any calls executed in this manner. This severely limits the
amount of data that can be captured as evidenced in a report by Pao Alto Networks
in 2013 that found injection techniques were being used in 13.5% of the samples they
analysed [181]. Therefore, a potential future work could be to compare the localised
kernel driver’s results with a version of the kernel driver that is also gathering calls from
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malware samples using process injection. The prevalence of process injection also
brings into question the suitability of user-level hooks in dynamic malware analysis
tools. Currently the only method by which user-level tools can combat injection is
if the designers of the tools are aware of the injection method beforehand. However,
process injection methods are on the rise. In 2019, Safebreach labs documented 26
techniques by which process injection can be achieved in Windows [144]. Therefore, it
would also be useful to study which hooking methodology suffers more from malware
employing unseen process injection techniques.
This thesis tested whether classifiers trained on malware and benignware could cor-
rectly classify malware that didn’t look like the typical malware sample and found them
lacking. However, it would also be useful to determine whether classifiers trained on
malware from the previous decade, for example, are able to detect malware in the cur-
rent decade. This is important since one of the claimed benefits of machine learning in
malware analysis is that solutions will not need to be constantly updated since the rules
learned will be generic enough to cover a wide range of malicious behaviours. There-
fore, it would be beneficial to determine how the accuracy of the classifiers changes
over time and how long the classifiers will be relevant.
Besides some of the basic defences against anti-analysis techniques provided by Cuckoo,
no additional techniques were applied to defeat anti-analysis techniques within mal-
ware. Though there have been a number of solutions proposed in the literature to
counter anti-analysis techniques [38, 143, 155], it was important in this research to fol-
low the most commonly used technique in dynamic malware analysis. This is because,
the aim of the thesis was to test flaws with the most commonly used technique which
is why Cuckoo was chosen. In the future, it would be interesting to compare how the
behaviours of malware learned by classifiers differ based on the environment that was
used (environment with anti-anti-analysis vs environment without anti-anti-analysis).
The malware datasets used in this thesis consist solely of Portable Executable files.
This is due to the fact that PE files are easier to run and determine the compatibility
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requirements for. However, it would be interesting to determine whether malware dis-
tributed through other means (for e.g. Word documents, PDF files) produce similar
results.
The dataset used in chapter 3 consisted of a random collection of malware. However,
the results may have been different had an equal amount of malware been gathered
for each category. The difficulty with doing this is that currently there is not a signi-
ficant amount of agreement amongst Anti-Virus vendors regarding the definitions of
categories or the category that the various malware samples belong to. The benefit of
having an equal spread of malware from each category is that it would show how user
and kernel level differ within each category. For example, rootkits tend to operate in
kernel mode to avoid user mode detectors, therefore, it would have been interesting to
determine whether rootkits are more likely to be detected by the kernel driver.
The research in this thesis compared one user-level hooking methodology against one
kernel-level hooking methodology. However, as chapter 2 showed, there are many
hooking methodologies within both categories. Therefore, it is not completely clear
that all kernel hooking methodologies would outperform all user level hooking meth-
odologies. As a result, the next potential avenue that could be explored is how each
hooking methodology differs in the information it gathers and whether there is one
particular method that stands above the others.
The research performed in chapter 4 and chapter 5 focused solely on ransomware,
however, the study can certainly be extended to other types of malware (some of which
may be more or less evasive than ransomware). This is important as the results may
differ for different malware families. This would be a more holistic test for classifiers
trained in the traditional dynamic malware analysis process.
In chapter 4, two of the hyper-parameters were found to have a significant effect on the
classifiers’ results on the test set. This highlighted the importance of carefully tuning
the hyper-parameters. However, there are many hyper-parameters that were not studied
that would could also have a significant impact on results. Therefore, in the future, this
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would be an interesting avenue to explore.
The research in this thesis aimed to study the differences in different hooking methodo-
logies rather than find the best machine learning method for dynamic malware analysis.
Therefore, the feature representation method used was quite simplistic (frequency his-
tograms). As mentioned in chapter 2, there are other feature representation methods
whose impact on the results could be compared. In future, it would be interesting to
compare the performance of each feature representation method when it comes to de-
tecting emulated malware. It’s possible that using a feature representation method at a
higher level of abstraction will help classifiers to detect emulated malware and reduce
their sensitivity to small changes in system calls.
Chapter 4 and chapter 5 studied the dependence of classifiers on evasive behaviour to
detect malware. Only one evasive technique was studied to ensure that the reasons
for the results would be easily interpretable. However, many more exist and they may
effect classification results differently. Therefore, in future, experiments in chapter 5
will be repeated using different evasion tactics to study their effects on classification
accuracy.
Chapter 4 and chapter 5 employed similar techniques to those used in adversarial learn-
ing, however, they do not fall directly under the banner of adversarial learning. This
will be an important avenue to explore in future particularly with regards to whether
kernel- or user-level data produces more vulnerable classifiers.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
In this chapter, the research conducted in this thesis is summarised and the main con-
tributions are highlighted.
This thesis started by assessing the current state of the literature. This involved ex-
amining each of the tools used to conduct dynamic malware analysis to determine
their novelty. The findings from this were highlighted in chapter 2 - Background.
Chapter 2 found that the literature in the field of malware analysis was moving away
from static analysis due to its inherent weakness to obfuscation and polymorphism,
and moving towards dynamic analysis [171, 75]. Within dynamic analysis the general
trend was to gather and use system calls to identify malware since all behaviours are
ultimately expressed in system calls. System calls can be gathered using a number of
hooking methodologies. These can be broadly separated into two categories; those that
intercept calls at a user-level privilege, and those that intercept calls at a kernel-level
privilege. A number of different hooking methodologies seemed to be in use within the
literature and authors did not always justify why they chose the hooking methodology
that they did. Furthermore, the literature was not clear on the advantages and disad-
vantages of each hooking methodology. Rather, the focus in dynamic analysis seemed
to be on the machine learning method used to classify the data gathered as opposed to
the method by which the data was gathered. In fact, there was not much agreement on
the method by which system calls should be gathered for optimal results. In addition,
there did not seem to be an industry standard tool that was recommended.
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Table 2.1 shows the sheer volume of tools in use within the field of dynamic malware
analysis and this excludes single-use tools (tools used only in the paper they are pro-
posed in). The lack of consensus regarding the most appropriate hooking methodology
is reflected in the overabundance of tools available. Part of the reason for there being
so many tools is that as dynamic analysis experienced a surge in popularity, malware
authors started adding more evasive behaviours to their samples to escape analysis.
Therefore, new tools were proposed to defeat a new anti-analysis technique.
Table 2.1 did, however, show a growing consensus forming around Cuckoo Sand-
box [111]. Although table 2.1 did not show the reason behind the consensus around
Cuckoo. There are many reasons to prefer Cuckoo to other tools; it’s free, open source,
expandable, and easy to integrate with other tools. Though these are all valid reasons
to choose Cuckoo over another tool, they do not say anything about its ability to gather
reliable data regarding the behaviour of malware. The risk with using a tool that has not
been carefully analysed and compared to other tools is that it may not be most optimal
tool for the task. In particular, it could be missing essential information regarding the
behaviour of malware. If this data is never gathered, regardless of how powerful the
machine learning classifiers used are, a detection tool can only do so much.
This was the motivation behind chapter 3. Chapter 3 sets out to discover if the ability
of classifiers to distinguish malicious from benign differs significantly if the classifiers
are given data from different privilege levels in the OS. A collection of malware and
benignware totalling 5000 samples was gathered. Each sample was analysed by a tool
operating at user-level and a tool operating at kernel-level. The user-level tool used
was Cuckoo since this tool had the largest consensus around it. Tools monitoring at
a kernel-level were harder to source. Many of the respected tools appropriate for the
task had been commercialised. None of the tools available were able to monitor the
amount of system calls required. Therefore a kernel driver was written specifically for
this thesis (available here: [176]).
The data gathered was then used to train and test commonly used machine learning
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classifiers in the field. Of the classifiers, Random Forest produced the best performance
distinguishing malicious from benign. It obtained an accuracy of 94.0% using the
data from Cuckoo and 95.2% using the data from the kernel driver. This difference in
results was found to be statistically significant, thereby showing that data from different
privilege levels could not be used interchangeably.
To obtain an understanding into the reason behind the difference in the results from
chapter 3, the features contributing the most towards the results for the best perform-
ing classifier were analysed separately for the data from Cuckoo and the kernel driver.
This revealed that, when trained on data from Cuckoo, the main behavioural feature
of malware that was being used by the classifiers to distinguish malicious from benign
was the evasive behaviour of malware. In other words, the behavioural properties of
malware that were being used by classifiers to identify it was the very behaviour that
malware contained to evade detection. This observation was noted to a lesser degree
within the kernel-level data. When using the kernel data, classifiers also used the differ-
ences in general behaviour to distinguish malware from benignware. Therefore, since
the behavioural properties used to distinguish malicious from benign differed depend-
ing on the level that the data was gathered from, the data from the kernel driver and
Cuckoo was combined. As expected, this caused the classification results to improve
with the accuracy of Random Forest rising to 96.0%.
Given the behavioural properties of malware being used by the classifiers to distin-
guish it in chapter 3, chapter 4 sought to determine whether this presented a security
risk. The question that chapter 4 attempted to answer is that if classifiers are identi-
fying malware largely through their evasive behaviour, can they detect samples that
only present malicious behaviour? To answer this question, classifiers were trained in
the traditional dynamic malware analysis process as performed in chapter 3. Then, the
trained classifiers were tested against emulated malware that contained varying degrees
of evasive behaviour. The category of malware focused on in this chapter was ransom-
ware. Ransomware was chosen due to its recent surge in popularity. In addition, the
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malicious symptoms of ransomware are quite straightforward to emulate (since it is
simply the encryption of files) and extensively documented [101, 140, 177].
The emulated malware being used as a test set was written in Java. It essentially en-
crypts a file and then waits for a specified period of time before encrypting another
file. The file encryption represented the malicious behaviour while the wait represen-
ted the evasive behaviour (since evasive behaviour largely aims to stall the execution of
malicious behaviour). To determine how vulnerable classifiers were to such samples,
the rate of encryption of each emulated ransomware sample was varied. In total 1500
emulated ransomware samples were created.
The results from these experiments showed that while the classifiers had no trouble
distinguishing real ransomware from benignware, they were not able to detect the emu-
lated ransomware with the same confidence. Using the Cuckoo data, the highest ac-
curacy detecting real ransomware came from Gradient Boost at 97.3%. On the other
hand, the highest accuracy detecting the 1500 emulated ransomware samples using the
Cuckoo data came from Decision Tree at 76.7%. Similarly, using the Kernel data,
the highest accuracy detecting real ransomware (also from Gradient Boost) was 98.2%
and the highest accuracy detecting the emulated ransomware (also from Decision Tree)
was 67.0%. The accuracy values alone indicated that data gathered by Cuckoo was
better suited to detecting the emulated ransomware than data gathered by the kernel
driver. Analysing the influential features revealed some interference from the JVM
that might have assisted with the classification results, particularly given the features
ranked highly by classifiers using the Cuckoo data.
However, the real goal was not to simply compare accuracy values with regards to the
emulated ransomware. The goal was to determine the file encryption rate at which
classifiers can no longer detect the emulated ransomware. The results from this indic-
ated that when using data from Cuckoo, Decision Tree was unable to detect emulated
ransomware that frequently encrypted files with little time delay. In other words, as
the evasiveness of the emulated ransomware sample increased, so did the detection ac-
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curacy. When using the data from the kernel driver, the opposite was true. Decision
Tree was able to detect emulated ransomware with high file encryption rates, but as the
activity of the emulated sample dropped, it got lost amongst every other process being
monitored by the kernel driver. As with chapter 3, combining the Cuckoo and kernel
data produced the best results when detecting the emulated ransomware, obtaining an
accuracy of 88.5%.
As the emulated ransomware used in chapter 4 was written in Java, a high-level lan-
guage, there is not complete control over each system call made. Given that uninten-
ded activity from the emulated ransomware was observed in chapter 4 due to the JVM,
chapter 5 verifies the integrity of the emulated ransomware results. In chapter 5, the
emulated ransomware was recreated in C due to the level of control it provides. Two
variants of the emulated ransomware were recreated in C, one used the delay function
frequently seen in malware, NtDelayExecution. The other implemented the delay us-
ing the standard C time function. Apart from that, the experiments carried out were
identical to the experiments in chapter 4.
The results in chapter 5 showed that when the C time function was used to implement
the delay, the emulated ransomware was not detected by classifiers using the Cuckoo
data at all. However, it was detected when the kernel data was used with an accuracy of
83.1% by AdaBoost. The only time it was incorrectly classified was when the average
file activity of the emulated ransomware closely resembled that of real ransomware.
When using NtDelayExecution, AdaBoost performed much better with the Cuckoo
data, obtaining an accuracy of 74.4%. The only time AdaBoost was unable to detect
the emulated ransomware was when it had a high rate of encryption. Using the kernel
data, AdaBoost was unable to detect the emulated ransomware using NtDelayExecu-
tion. This seemed to be due to a reduction in average file activity caused by internal
differences between NtDelayExecution and the C time function. Finally, unlike previ-
ous chapters, combining the user- and kernel-level data did not improve results in this
case but caused them to drop.
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The results from chapter 5 further confirm that classifiers trained on user-level data use
evasive behaviour to identify malware. In addition, the huge swing in results after chan-
ging a single system call shows the lack of robustness in classifiers trained on system
calls. Finally, while some of the conclusions concur with those made in chapter 4, the
results from chapter 4 suggested that the classifiers were not as vulnerable as they are.
In addition, many of the results were not as convincing and interpretable in chapter 4
due to noise from the JVM. Therefore, using Java to emulate malware for the purposes
of testing detectors monitoring at a system call level is not appropriate.
Chapter 6 combined the findings from chapter 3, chapter 4 and chapter 5 into general
principles to abide by when performing dynamic malware analysis. For example, with
data collection, the recommendation is to gather data at multiple levels of abstraction
that are consulted independently. This adds an extra layer of security and provides
much better protection against malware with novel anti-analysis techniques. The re-
maining principles outlined aim to ensure that newly proposed detectors are robust to
trivial attacks. They also ensure that the manner in which new solutions function is
transparent to the rest of the research community, so that they can be peer-reviewed.
This will also allow for a fair comparison to existing solutions.
To conclude, this thesis looked at some of the assumptions within the field of dynamic
malware analysis to determine whether they needed rethinking. In particular, whether
the data deserves as much attention as the method. The findings indicate that the data
collection method requires much more study if the detectors produced are to be robust.
This thesis has shown that a detector cannot be evaluated on its classification results
alone. In a field as critical as security, the inner workings of the detector must also be
evaluated before it can be ratified.
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Copyright c© 2000, 2001, 2002 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
Everyone is permitted to copy and distribute verbatim copies of this license document,
but changing it is not allowed.
0. Preamble
The purpose of this License is to make a manual, textbook, or other functional and use-
ful document free in the sense of freedom: to assure everyone the effective freedom
to copy and redistribute it, with or without modifying it, either commercially or non-
commercially. Secondarily, this License preserves for the author and publisher a way
to get credit for their work, while not being considered responsible for modifications
made by others.
This License is a kind of “copyleft”, which means that derivative works of the docu-
ment must themselves be free in the same sense. It complements the GNU General
Public License, which is a copyleft license designed for free software.
We have designed this License in order to use it for manuals for free software, because
free software needs free documentation: a free program should come with manuals
providing the same freedoms that the software does. But this License is not limited to
software manuals; it can be used for any textual work, regardless of subject matter or
whether it is published as a printed book. We recommend this License principally for
works whose purpose is instruction or reference.
1. Applicability and Definitions
This License applies to any manual or other work, in any medium, that contains a
notice placed by the copyright holder saying it can be distributed under the terms of
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this License. Such a notice grants a world-wide, royalty-free license, unlimited in
duration, to use that work under the conditions stated herein. The “Document”, below,
refers to any such manual or work. Any member of the public is a licensee, and is
addressed as “you”. You accept the license if you copy, modify or distribute the work
in a way requiring permission under copyright law.
A “Modified Version” of the Document means any work containing the Document or
a portion of it, either copied verbatim, or with modifications and/or translated into
another language.
A “Secondary Section” is a named appendix or a front-matter section of the Document
that deals exclusively with the relationship of the publishers or authors of the Document
to the Document’s overall subject (or to related matters) and contains nothing that could
fall directly within that overall subject. (Thus, if the Document is in part a textbook of
mathematics, a Secondary Section may not explain any mathematics.) The relationship
could be a matter of historical connection with the subject or with related matters, or
of legal, commercial, philosophical, ethical or political position regarding them.
The “Invariant Sections” are certain Secondary Sections whose titles are designated, as
being those of Invariant Sections, in the notice that says that the Document is released
under this License. If a section does not fit the above definition of Secondary then it is
not allowed to be designated as Invariant. The Document may contain zero Invariant
Sections. If the Document does not identify any Invariant Sections then there are none.
The “Cover Texts” are certain short passages of text that are listed, as Front-Cover
Texts or Back-Cover Texts, in the notice that says that the Document is released under
this License. A Front-Cover Text may be at most 5 words, and a Back-Cover Text may
be at most 25 words.
A “Transparent” copy of the Document means a machine-readable copy, represented in
a format whose specification is available to the general public, that is suitable for revis-
ing the document straightforwardly with generic text editors or (for images composed
of pixels) generic paint programs or (for drawings) some widely available drawing ed-
itor, and that is suitable for input to text formatters or for automatic translation to a
variety of formats suitable for input to text formatters. A copy made in an otherwise
Transparent file format whose markup, or absence of markup, has been arranged to
thwart or discourage subsequent modification by readers is not Transparent. An image
format is not Transparent if used for any substantial amount of text. A copy that is not
“Transparent” is called “Opaque”.
Examples of suitable formats for Transparent copies include plain ASCII without markup,
Texinfo input format, LATEX input format, SGML or XML using a publicly available
DTD, and standard-conforming simple HTML, PostScript or PDF designed for human
modification. Examples of transparent image formats include PNG, XCF and JPG.
Opaque formats include proprietary formats that can be read and edited only by pro-
prietary word processors, SGML or XML for which the DTD and/or processing tools
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are not generally available, and the machine-generated HTML, PostScript or PDF pro-
duced by some word processors for output purposes only.
The “Title Page” means, for a printed book, the title page itself, plus such following
pages as are needed to hold, legibly, the material this License requires to appear in the
title page. For works in formats which do not have any title page as such, “Title Page”
means the text near the most prominent appearance of the work’s title, preceding the
beginning of the body of the text.
A section “Entitled XYZ” means a named subunit of the Document whose title either
is precisely XYZ or contains XYZ in parentheses following text that translates XYZ in
another language. (Here XYZ stands for a specific section name mentioned below, such
as “Acknowledgements”, “Dedications”, “Endorsements”, or “History”.) To “Preserve
the Title” of such a section when you modify the Document means that it remains a
section “Entitled XYZ” according to this definition.
The Document may include Warranty Disclaimers next to the notice which states that
this License applies to the Document. These Warranty Disclaimers are considered to
be included by reference in this License, but only as regards disclaiming warranties:
any other implication that these Warranty Disclaimers may have is void and has no
effect on the meaning of this License.
2. Verbatim Copying
You may copy and distribute the Document in any medium, either commercially or
noncommercially, provided that this License, the copyright notices, and the license
notice saying this License applies to the Document are reproduced in all copies, and
that you add no other conditions whatsoever to those of this License. You may not
use technical measures to obstruct or control the reading or further copying of the
copies you make or distribute. However, you may accept compensation in exchange
for copies. If you distribute a large enough number of copies you must also follow the
conditions in section 3.
You may also lend copies, under the same conditions stated above, and you may pub-
licly display copies.
3. Copying in Quantity
If you publish printed copies (or copies in media that commonly have printed covers) of
the Document, numbering more than 100, and the Document’s license notice requires
Cover Texts, you must enclose the copies in covers that carry, clearly and legibly, all
these Cover Texts: Front-Cover Texts on the front cover, and Back-Cover Texts on the
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back cover. Both covers must also clearly and legibly identify you as the publisher
of these copies. The front cover must present the full title with all words of the title
equally prominent and visible. You may add other material on the covers in addition.
Copying with changes limited to the covers, as long as they preserve the title of the
Document and satisfy these conditions, can be treated as verbatim copying in other
respects.
If the required texts for either cover are too voluminous to fit legibly, you should put
the first ones listed (as many as fit reasonably) on the actual cover, and continue the
rest onto adjacent pages.
If you publish or distribute Opaque copies of the Document numbering more than 100,
you must either include a machine-readable Transparent copy along with each Opaque
copy, or state in or with each Opaque copy a computer-network location from which the
general network-using public has access to download using public-standard network
protocols a complete Transparent copy of the Document, free of added material. If
you use the latter option, you must take reasonably prudent steps, when you begin
distribution of Opaque copies in quantity, to ensure that this Transparent copy will
remain thus accessible at the stated location until at least one year after the last time
you distribute an Opaque copy (directly or through your agents or retailers) of that
edition to the public.
It is requested, but not required, that you contact the authors of the Document well
before redistributing any large number of copies, to give them a chance to provide you
with an updated version of the Document.
4. Modifications
you may copy and distribute a Modified Version of the Document under the conditions
of sections 2 and 3 above, provided that you release the Modified Version under pre-
cisely this License, with the Modified Version filling the role of the Document, thus
licensing distribution and modification of the Modified Version to whoever possesses
a copy of it. In addition, you must do these things in the Modified Version:
A. Use in the Title Page (and on the covers, if any) a title distinct from that of the
Document, and from those of previous versions (which should, if there were any,
be listed in the History section of the Document). You may use the same title as
a previous version if the original publisher of that version gives permission.
B. List on the Title Page, as authors, one or more persons or entities responsible for
authorship of the modifications in the Modified Version, together with at least
five of the principal authors of the Document (all of its principal authors, if it has
fewer than five), unless they release you from this requirement.
GNU Free Documentation License 217
C. State on the Title page the name of the publisher of the Modified Version, as the
publisher.
D. Preserve all the copyright notices of the Document.
E. Add an appropriate copyright notice for your modifications adjacent to the other
copyright notices.
F. Include, immediately after the copyright notices, a license notice giving the pub-
lic permission to use the Modified Version under the terms of this License, in the
form shown in the Addendum below.
G. Preserve in that license notice the full lists of Invariant Sections and required
Cover Texts given in the Document’s license notice.
H. Include an unaltered copy of this License.
I. Preserve the section Entitled “History”, Preserve its Title, and add to it an item
stating at least the title, year, new authors, and publisher of the Modified Version
as given on the Title Page. If there is no section Entitled “History” in the Doc-
ument, create one stating the title, year, authors, and publisher of the Document
as given on its Title Page, then add an item describing the Modified Version as
stated in the previous sentence.
J. Preserve the network location, if any, given in the Document for public access to
a Transparent copy of the Document, and likewise the network locations given
in the Document for previous versions it was based on. These may be placed in
the “History” section. You may omit a network location for a work that was pub-
lished at least four years before the Document itself, or if the original publisher
of the version it refers to gives permission.
K. For any section Entitled “Acknowledgements” or “Dedications”, Preserve the
Title of the section, and preserve in the section all the substance and tone of each
of the contributor acknowledgements and/or dedications given therein.
L. Preserve all the Invariant Sections of the Document, unaltered in their text and
in their titles. Section numbers or the equivalent are not considered part of the
section titles.
M. Delete any section Entitled “Endorsements”. Such a section may not be included
in the Modified Version.
N. Do not retitle any existing section to be Entitled “Endorsements” or to conflict
in title with any Invariant Section.
O. Preserve any Warranty Disclaimers.
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If the Modified Version includes new front-matter sections or appendices that qualify
as Secondary Sections and contain no material copied from the Document, you may at
your option designate some or all of these sections as invariant. To do this, add their
titles to the list of Invariant Sections in the Modified Version’s license notice. These
titles must be distinct from any other section titles.
You may add a section Entitled “Endorsements”, provided it contains nothing but en-
dorsements of your Modified Version by various parties — for example, statements of
peer review or that the text has been approved by an organization as the authoritative
definition of a standard.
You may add a passage of up to five words as a Front-Cover Text, and a passage of up
to 25 words as a Back-Cover Text, to the end of the list of Cover Texts in the Modified
Version. Only one passage of Front-Cover Text and one of Back-Cover Text may be
added by (or through arrangements made by) any one entity. If the Document already
includes a cover text for the same cover, previously added by you or by arrangement
made by the same entity you are acting on behalf of, you may not add another; but you
may replace the old one, on explicit permission from the previous publisher that added
the old one.
The author(s) and publisher(s) of the Document do not by this License give permission
to use their names for publicity for or to assert or imply endorsement of any Modified
Version.
5. Combining Documents
You may combine the Document with other documents released under this License,
under the terms defined in section 4 above for modified versions, provided that you
include in the combination all of the Invariant Sections of all of the original documents,
unmodified, and list them all as Invariant Sections of your combined work in its license
notice, and that you preserve all their Warranty Disclaimers.
The combined work need only contain one copy of this License, and multiple identical
Invariant Sections may be replaced with a single copy. If there are multiple Invariant
Sections with the same name but different contents, make the title of each such section
unique by adding at the end of it, in parentheses, the name of the original author or
publisher of that section if known, or else a unique number. Make the same adjustment
to the section titles in the list of Invariant Sections in the license notice of the combined
work.
In the combination, you must combine any sections Entitled “History” in the vari-
ous original documents, forming one section Entitled “History”; likewise combine any
sections Entitled “Acknowledgements”, and any sections Entitled “Dedications”. You
must delete all sections Entitled “Endorsements.”
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6. Collections of Documents
You may make a collection consisting of the Document and other documents released
under this License, and replace the individual copies of this License in the various
documents with a single copy that is included in the collection, provided that you
follow the rules of this License for verbatim copying of each of the documents in all
other respects.
You may extract a single document from such a collection, and distribute it individu-
ally under this License, provided you insert a copy of this License into the extracted
document, and follow this License in all other respects regarding verbatim copying of
that document.
7. Aggregation with Independent Works
A compilation of the Document or its derivatives with other separate and independent
documents or works, in or on a volume of a storage or distribution medium, is called an
“aggregate” if the copyright resulting from the compilation is not used to limit the legal
rights of the compilation’s users beyond what the individual works permit. When the
Document is included in an aggregate, this License does not apply to the other works
in the aggregate which are not themselves derivative works of the Document.
If the Cover Text requirement of section 3 is applicable to these copies of the Docu-
ment, then if the Document is less than one half of the entire aggregate, the Document’s
Cover Texts may be placed on covers that bracket the Document within the aggregate,
or the electronic equivalent of covers if the Document is in electronic form. Otherwise
they must appear on printed covers that bracket the whole aggregate.
8. Translation
Translation is considered a kind of modification, so you may distribute translations of
the Document under the terms of section 4. Replacing Invariant Sections with trans-
lations requires special permission from their copyright holders, but you may include
translations of some or all Invariant Sections in addition to the original versions of these
Invariant Sections. You may include a translation of this License, and all the license
notices in the Document, and any Warranty Disclaimers, provided that you also include
the original English version of this License and the original versions of those notices
and disclaimers. In case of a disagreement between the translation and the original
version of this License or a notice or disclaimer, the original version will prevail.
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If a section in the Document is Entitled “Acknowledgements”, “Dedications”, or “His-
tory”, the requirement (section 4) to Preserve its Title (section 1) will typically require
changing the actual title.
9. Termination
You may not copy, modify, sublicense, or distribute the Document except as expressly
provided for under this License. Any other attempt to copy, modify, sublicense or
distribute the Document is void, and will automatically terminate your rights under
this License. However, parties who have received copies, or rights, from you under
this License will not have their licenses terminated so long as such parties remain in
full compliance.
10. Future Revisions of this License
The Free Software Foundation may publish new, revised versions of the GNU Free
Documentation License from time to time. Such new versions will be similar in spirit
to the present version, but may differ in detail to address new problems or concerns.
See http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/.
Each version of the License is given a distinguishing version number. If the Docu-
ment specifies that a particular numbered version of this License “or any later version”
applies to it, you have the option of following the terms and conditions either of that
specified version or of any later version that has been published (not as a draft) by
the Free Software Foundation. If the Document does not specify a version number of
this License, you may choose any version ever published (not as a draft) by the Free
Software Foundation.
ADDENDUM: How to use this License for your docu-
ments
To use this License in a document you have written, include a copy of the License in
the document and put the following copyright and license notices just after the title
page:
Copyright c© YEAR YOUR NAME. Permission is granted to copy, distrib-
ute and/or modify this document under the terms of the GNU Free Docu-
mentation License, Version 1.2 or any later version published by the Free
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Software Foundation; with no Invariant Sections, no Front-Cover Texts,
and no Back-Cover Texts. A copy of the license is included in the section
entitled “GNU Free Documentation License”.
If you have Invariant Sections, Front-Cover Texts and Back-Cover Texts, replace the
“with. . . Texts.” line with this:
with the Invariant Sections being LIST THEIR TITLES, with the Front-
Cover Texts being LIST, and with the Back-Cover Texts being LIST.
If you have Invariant Sections without Cover Texts, or some other combination of the
three, merge those two alternatives to suit the situation.
If your document contains nontrivial examples of program code, we recommend re-
leasing these examples in parallel under your choice of free software license, such as
the GNU General Public License, to permit their use in free software.
